Category: Tactical Analysis

ATP Istanbul Open Wrap-Up

ATP Tactical Analysis 2 Comments

Part 1: Cuevas and Federer engage in a cerebral duel in the final

While the level of play never came close to the kind of spectacular tennis one would expect from the number 2 player in the world and one of the better clay-court specialists in the top 30, the spectators at the Garanti Koza Arena and others watching on TV witnessed a fantastic chess battle between the two players. At the end of the day Roger Federer prevailed with a 6-3 7-6 win, and lifted the winner’s trophy at the inaugural TEB BNP Paribas Istanbul Open.

Cuevas came out with a simple and expected plan. He would stay solid from the baseline, work Federer’s backhand, and win through consistency. However, Federer sent a firm message from the very first game that he was not going to submit to Cuevas’ plan A. Whenever Cuevas tried to engage in backhand cross-court rallies that have worked so well for him in his previous matches, including his upset of Grigor Dimitrov in the semi-final, Federer would either run around and accelerate his forehand, or switch the pattern with a down-the-line backhand or a drop shot. In his post-match press conference, Federer did say that hitting his backhand down-the-line was not part of his main game plan because he saw that “Grigor did it and it didn’t work for him.” Nevertheless, the fact that he avoided more than one or two cross-court backhand rallies (something from which he usually does not shy away), whether intentional or unintentional on his part, did negate a pattern that would have favored the Uruguayan player. Let’s remember that Cuevas hits a heavy topspin backhand and that pattern would have forced Federer into hitting several backhands in a row above the shoulder level. Federer also stepped inside the baseline often, rushing Cuevas into mistakes. Add to the mix a few surprise serve-and-volley attempts and the Swiss was already up a break at 3-0, before Cuevas could gain any footing in the set.

Seeing that his Plan A is getting him nowhere, Cuevas began to go for more on his forehands, step inside the baseline, and even attack the net when Federer’s shots landed short. The adjustment did work enough to level the play in the set, except that he was already down a break. He then faced a bigger issue: Federer was having his best serve day of the tournament and collecting two or three points per game just on his serves. Federer said after that he felt his serve was the one thing that worked well for him throughout the week, but added that he served best against Cuevas.

Second set picked up where the first ended. Cuevas continued to depend on his plan B, while Federer got more and more aggressive to push his opponent back and gain the upper hand once again. Both players won their serves until Federer drew first blood at 3-3 to break Cuevas’ serve. Most people thought the match was over when Federer jogged to his seat straight from having hit his volley winner and broken Pablo’s serve (see picture below).

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Federer jogs to the bench after hitting the winning the volley to go up 4-3

Cuevas would not fold. At the 4-3 and 30-30, Cuevas won two points that probably corresponded closely to his original game plan. They were both fairly long rallies in which Federer looked to close the rally with risky shots to the corners, Cuevas running them down and making Federer hit the extra shot, and the Swiss finally making the mistake due to impatience. It was now 4-4 and back to being on serve. However, Cuevas stuck to playing aggressive for two reasons: first, it got him to level the play when he was initially being pushed around, and second, he was feeling some pain in his arm, enough to have it massaged earlier and to motivate him to keep the points shorter.

From 4-4 on, it was anybody’s set. Once the players arrived to the tiebreak, everyone thought the quality of tennis would reach a new plateau. It never happened. In fact, both players probably chalked that tiebreaker down in their notebooks as one to forget, quickly! From 4-3 to Cuevas in the tiebreaker to the end of it, it was mistakes galore for both players. At 4-4, Cuevas had an easy put away the service line, and shanked the forehand almost into the stands. At 6-4 and two match points, Federer made two direct unforced errors, and then again one at 7-6, in the third match point.

Cuevas had three set points himself, one of which was another forehand that he would have probably made in his sleep. In fact, the only spectacular point of the tiebreaker came on a backhand return winner that Federer hit on a set point for Cuevas, but one that he later called “lucky, because the ball bounced off the line.” Federer admitted that he reflexed the racket into the ball due to the awkward bounce and it somehow turned into a winner when it could have easily gone “to the stands.”

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“Lucky shot” – on the return winner on set point

At 11-11, Federer served and volleyed, hitting the most terrific “intentional” shot of the tiebreaker: a diving low backhand volley on Cuevas’ low return that landed deep in the opposite corner of the court, completely catching Cuevas off guard. He was moving forward, thinking Federer would either miss the volley or barely get it over the net. Instead he found himself sprinting backward and to the backhand corner to retrieve the ball. He did, and Federer won the point on the next, much easier shot. Federer finally closed the curtain on the next point on a Cuevas error. You could see the exhilaration on Roger’s face when he won the match point. He came to Istanbul with the goal of getting some miles on clay under his shoes, and he accomplished his goal while earning his 85th career singles title.

Part 2: Parting shots

Unfortunately the parting shot of the tournament for the spectators live at the tournament was the trophy presentation. Why unfortunately? Because a portable well was put up for the presentation, in front of which the ceremony took place, and in the back of which half of the stadium who paid the same amount of money for corresponding tickets as the other half of the stadium, were denied the trophy presentation. How did it look to those who happened to be on the “wrong” side? See the view below:

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The view from behind the “portable wall of denial”

Next time, please find another way to show the sponsors’ names on TV. Many other tournaments have found ways to have the trophy presentation, showcase the sponsors names, and yet not put up a “wall of denial” basically disrespecting half of the spectators who came to the stadium, not knowing that they paid for the match only while others earned the right to see the match and the trophy presentation for the same price.

One small negative note goes to the spectators who pass as “tennis fans” but who are really no more than “I-want-to-simply-earn-the-right-to-say-I-saw-Federer” fans. There is something wrong when there is a tennis fan who would be happy to buy a ticket to watch every match, yet he/she can’t, because some person bought that ticket, came and watched a set and a half of Federer (probably because he couldn’t care less about the game of tennis that he half understands) and left, leaving the seat open. There is also something wrong when the organizers succeed in bringing an elite player, a star player, and a few great clay-court players, and yet Federer plays to an almost-filled stadium, while Dimitrov, half an hour later, plays to only half full arena (in the case of semifinals), or no more than 2000 people (in the case of quarterfinals). Next time, dear Turkish “tennis fans”, please treat the tournament as tennis fans and not a showcase event where one earns the title “cool” if he/she attends it.

Major kudos to Federer, a true professional who fulfilled his role as the main actor of the tournament, not only by reaching the finals and putting his name on the winners’ list for the future to come (I don’t even want to think what the attendance would have been if he got upset in the semis and the final match featured Cuevas vs. Schwartzman), but also by engaging in the scheduled activities with enthusiasm, running the kids’ clinic more efficiently by himself than anyone else I have ever seen, becoming basically the advertising face of Istanbul for several days through his facebook and press conferences, and doing everything he can to promote the tournament.

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Roger not turning down anyone for an autograph after matches, including the final Sunday

Despite all its problems this year (see previous posts this week), I remain hopeful that they will be addressed and that the necessary measures will be taken so that next year tennis can become the center of attention. I know there are capable people in position of authority who should manage to turn things around and avoid these errors in the future. But they must galvanize everyone around them to follow their lead. One cannot bank on a super star to come every year and carry the tournament on his shoulders: Federer and this 2015 edition was the exception from that standpoint, and not the rule.

I would like to thank readers for following MT-Desk throughout the TEB BNP Parisbas Istanbul Open. For now, it looks like the next live coverage will be the French Open, however stay tuned for regular blog posts on the tour at any time, and click here to follow MT-Desk on Twitter for continuous tweets from the tennis world.

High Volleys on Floaters: A Lost Art – Ask Azarenka and Muguruza

Tactical Analysis WTA No Comments

The swing volley began to work its way into professional tennis in the 1980s and grew in frequency for the next two decades until it became almost the norm in the 21st century whenever the opponent hit a floater high in the air, in case he or she would get pushed and stretched to a corner. With the addition of new technology, and fitter players, the use of swing volleys generated winner after winner in both professional tours.

The only problem is that you cannot hit a swing volley on every high floater. Sometimes, the ball is too far, or it’s too risky to make a full swing. It is sometimes enough to simply to block the ball to the open court. When that moment arrives, the arm must remain stiff, and the wrist must go through the minimum amount of recoil possible. Unfortunately for Victoria Azarenka, she did neither of those on her high backhand volley at 2-1 up in the third set against Dominika Cibulkova, when she had an opportunity to break her opponent’s serve at 30-40:

You can see Azarenka’s racket head drop all the way below the wrist level when she strikes the volley, causing the ball to float and allow Cibulkova to chase it down. She simply did not keep her forearm muscles clenched and let her wrist loose. Now, remember that this was not just a point like any other.

I have talked in my last article in depth about momentum shifts early in sets. This point above was precisely that! It led in fact to the most decisive momentum shift of this match. Cibulkova crushed Azarenka in the first set 6-2. Vika began finding depth on her strokes early the second set and took control as the set progressed. She often neutralized Cibulkova’s aggressive baseline shots by making use of all the four corners of the court, keeping her guessing. Vika won the second set 6-3 and when the third set began, it seemed that it was just a matter of time before she took control of the final set. The point above was that moment! Had she made that volley, she would have gone up 3-1 and probably continued to steamroll the way she has done so, since early in the second set. Cibulkova would have had to play catch-up, her only hope of coming back resting on an unlikely let-down by Azarenka. However, Cibulkova held serve, regained her confidence, and zoomed at warp factor nine to the finish line from there on, losing only one more game (6-3).

Let’s fast forward to Serena Williams vs. Garbine Muguruza, to the second game of the final set. Muguruza dominated the first set, Serena recovered, as only she can, to equalize at one set all. In the beginning of the third set, Muguruza held serve after a long game in which she faced break points. It was a big hold, giving Muguruza a chance to sink her teeth back in the match after a disappointing second set. She not only did that, but she climbed to a 15-40 lead on Serena’s serve, looking to go up 2-0 and to take charge again in the third set. Then, this happened:

Again, what you see is Muguruza tilting her wrist back quite far, causing the racket to flip back as she blocks (or not) the ball. Thus the floating ball that should have been an easy put away results in a “floating volley” that sails out. As a result, what should have been a guaranteed early break that would have left Serena frustrated (remember that she was already frowning from not having broken Muguruza in the previous game) and allowed Muguruza to move forward with confidence in the final set, turned into a long game that lasted over ten minutes, ending with Serena holding serve. Serena pumped her fist up screamed when she finally held to equalize at 1-1. She returned to her form of the second set and Muguruza slowly began to fade away, only winning one more game the rest of the set.

This type of shot occurs less and less since the topspin-swing volley has replaced the traditional block volley. However, it does not mean that it should not be practiced specifically. Because it can make your day, or as the cases of Azarenka and Muguruza showed today, it can also break it.

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Lessons from the Tomic vs. Berdych and Kyrgios vs. Seppi Matches

ATP Tactical Analysis No Comments

Prior to the start of Sunday, most tennis fans had high expectations of the fourth-round matches on the men’s side. But it was not until the end of the third set of the Nick Kyrgios vs. Andres Seppi that the excitement finally surfaced. The first two matches, Bernard Tomic vs. Tomas Berdych and Rafael Nadal vs. Kevin Anderson finished in anti-climactic fashion. You could almost write the scenario of Nadal vs. Anderson match prior to its beginning, and it remained loyal to that scenario. Anderson’s strengths played into Nadal’s hands, and baseline rallies ensued in which Rafa did everything better than his opponent, and won convincingly as expected. However, Tomic vs. Berdych could have been – should have been – handled more astutely by Tomic.

The young Aussie came into the match playing perhaps the best tennis of his career, and had the necessary skills to startle Berdych. He possesses the ability to flatten out his forehand, push his opponent around, approach the net, as well as win a slew of free points with his awkward-looking-yet-effective serve. What Tomic seems to have forgotten to do, quite stunningly for a player at his level, was to come out with a game plan. The Tomic camp overlooked one of the most underrated areas of tennis tactics: how to come out of the gates.

The match began with Tomic’s serve. From the first point on, for some odd reason, Tomic stayed at the baseline, rallied and obeyed Berydch’s plan A. The result is that Tomic made three unforced errors on the forehand, Berdych pushed him around on another rally, and broke Tomic’s serve to start the match. When the Czech followed that game with three aces of his own to go up 2-0, Tomic, again oddly, stayed the course with the same tactic of rallying at the baseline. Consequently, Berdych took a 4-0 lead in fifteen minutes. By that time, Berdych beamed with confidence, worked his monster ground strokes and served aces and service winners left and right. Tennis coaches often say “It’s better to have a bad game plan than no plan at all.” That cliché could not have been more accurate in this case. Tomic seemed to have spent the entire first set figuring out what to do next. In 27 minutes, Berdych won the set 6-2 having committed three more unforced errors (11) than Tomic (8). On paper it may raise an eyebrow, but Tomic committing less unforced errors than Berdych is a bad sign for Tomic, not for Berdych. It showed how passive Tomic played throughout the set.

The first game of the second set was indicative of what Tomic needed to do from the beginning of the match. At 15-30 serving, Tomic served a big serve and earned a short return from Berdych. Instead of rushing Berdych and coming to the net, he inexplicably contented with putting the ball back in play. Three points later at deuce, he got the same type of short ball, and this time, hit his forehand with a purpose, forcing Berdych into an error. When he held that game to go up 1-0, it looked like he finally figured out that he could not rally with the Czech from the baseline, that he needed to keep the points short and not let Berdych have the first shot at target practice during rallies. Tomic did just that in the ensuing games with renewed confidence, and Berdych began to feel the pressure. The Czech forced some shots to keep Tomic from unleashing shot after shot. It resulted in him making a number of “forced” errors, and eventually, the match leveled. Again, it was the early games of that set that established the tone.

The problem remained that Tomic now had to play catch-up, down a set. And when you play catch-up against an experienced top-10 player, there is no room for blunders and every point becomes crucial because that second set is vital to having a chance to win. Despite a much better set by Tomic, Berdych played an impeccable tiebreaker to take a 6-2 7-6 lead, effectively shutting the door on Tomic. Third set was just the countdown to the inevitable.

The lesson from this match: you must come out with a game plan. The underlying message: do not underestimate the underrated importance of the first games in any set. Regular readers and my friends have heard me say this numerous times before: sets are won or lost in the first few games. Nobody remembers the 15-30 1-0 point, or the deuce point in the first game (à la Ivan Lendl did with his computer brain), and often focus on a set point at 6-5 or the 5-5 point in the tiebreaker. Then the clichés resurface: “A point here and there on big points at late stages, and the outcome would have been different!” First question should rather be “How did it get there?” The answer often lies in the first couple of games where momentum swings occur and set the tone for the later games in the set.

The Kyrgios vs. Seppi match provided an emblematic example of this underrated aspect, for anyone that cares to remember the early points of the third set.

This match was the featured event of the night. What it lacked in quality of tennis, it made up for in excitement. The score line was dramatic, and it pitted the player who upset Roger Federer against the most exciting youngster in the ATP in front of his home crowd at the Hisense Arena. I will refrain from doing a lengthy analysis of the match (there are plenty around the web) and center on the first two games of the third set which, in my opinion, played a paramount role in the improbable comeback of Kyrgios. Once again, people will remember, the match point in the fourth set, the crucial point or two at 6-5 and 6-6 in the fifth, and talk about them. But none of that would have taken place if Seppi did not serve the first two games of the third set on a golden platter to Kyrgios.

At 7-5 6-4, Seppi had complete control of the match, and generated more winners from both sides and served more aces than Kyrgios (who would have guessed that?!?!). More importantly, his performance had quietened the crowd and seemed to sap Kyrgios’ spirit. Uncharacteristically, the Italian veteran had a let-down. Either he felt that he had the match in his pocket and relaxed, or simply lost his concentration. In any case, he played the two loosest games of his Australian Open adventure, did not move well, and lacked intensity and determination. He spat out seven unforced errors in two games, four of them coming in the second game where he got broken to give – and I don‘t use the verb ‘give’ lightly here – Kyrgios the 2-0 lead. Just like that, Kyrgios held to go up 3-0. Seppi gave Kyrgios a shot of renewed belief and energy that he masterfully sucked out of him for two sets. But Kyrgios was not the only energized. The break also galvanized the Hisense Arena fans that were desperately looking for something to cheer. They began to feed Kyrgios a steady stream of loud cheers and banging noises on the walls, seats, and anything else they could find on which to tap their hands. It is no secret that any player can feed off the crowd support. But Kyrgios is a different horse in this category. He savors the crowd; he communicates and teams up with them. He pumps them up, they pump him up! All of a sudden, Kyrgios looked determined in his demeanor. He began to pierce his groundstrokes, pressuring Seppi, and serving bigger and better. Doubts began to creep in Seppi’s mind and he began to falter on his ground strokes that have previously clicked on all cylinders.

When the first set was over, Seppi knew that this was now a much different match than the first two sets. Yes, not capitalizing on match point in the fourth set did not help. Yes, not daring to go for the short ball on Kyrgios’ return on the last point of the match did not help. Yes, Kyrgios’ improved serve in the last two sets did not help. However, none of those late “key” points were momentum changers. Everything that happened in the last three sets were the end-product of the momentum change from the first two games of the third set. Seppi had the match in his hands, did not put it away. I would argue that he had the match “in his hands” more at 7-5 6-4 than when he had the match point.

Coaches of today: spend time with your young pupils in front of the TV and make them watch professional matches from the first point to the last. More importantly, discuss and analyze as the match progresses, stimulate their minds to the importance of the early games. I see too often junior players beginning their matches with low intensity, playing the first games of the match, or even the early games of the next set, as if they were the continuation of the five-minute warm-up. They are not! Tomic and Seppi can tell you more if you run into them.

tennisYes, this point is important, but how did it get there? (Image: Movitec Electronics)

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Tactical Analysis: Importance of Scouting & Knowing the Opponent’s Game

Tactical Analysis WTA 2 Comments

The Case of Zarina Diyas (#52) vs. Irina-Carmelia Begu (#62) – WTA Cincinnati 2014, First Round – Diyas wins 7/6 7/6

On a rather windy morning, two players that have never met each before entered Court 10, one of the “outside” courts at the Western & Southern Open WTA Premier Event. Both Zarina Diyas of Kazakhstan and Irina Begu of Romania came through the qualifying draw. On the one hand, since this is their first meeting, I can understand (to a degree) that they may not know each other’s’ strengths or weaknesses down to the last detail. On the other hand, isn’t that why the players have coaches? Isn’t that why they talk to other players or coaches on the tour to get bits and pieces of information on the next opponent? I am not sure if this was the case for Diyas, but there is no doubt that Begu could have benefited from some quality scouting, especially in a match like this where the balance hangs on a very small number of points.

Diyas is a solid baseliner who likes to drive the ball on both sides rather flat, with some spin at times. Her shots can penetrate the court and derail an opponent because they do not bounce particularly high. She is a short girl and likes to contact the ball below the shoulder level, preferably low. Needless to say, her best results have come on fast surfaces, with a third-round breakthrough appearance at this year’s Australian’s Open and a fourth-round appearance at Wimbledon little over a month ago. She likes to direct the point with her forehand and driving through the ball, especially if she can make contact with the ball at about hip or knee level. Begu is also a baseliner who has more variety in her game, very characteristic of players with a European pedigree, having developed skills by practicing mostly on red clay. She can hit drop shots, heavy topspin, angle shots, and even mix in an occasional slice.

As the match began and I saw point after point, I was a bit surprised that Begu kept on holding rallies with Diyas where she was hitting the ball with the same pace, trying to be aggressive at times, and going for winners at others. This type of game played into Diyas’ hands as she gained momentum and began to strike the balls with perfect timing. My surprise turned to downright bewilderment by the end of the match, because Begu attempted to play a Sharapova-like game, in other words, hit the balls hard to the corners, and go for winners by out-hitting Diyas. She did not drop shot or use angles much, but more importantly, she did not try to make Diyas hit the kind of shot that makes her uncomfortable, which is any ball above her shoulder, especially on the forehand side! As you can see in this picture, Diyas hits an open-stance forehand which gathers force from the right foot rotation:
Diyas 8

Watch also in this clip how essential the right-foot push is to Diyas’ forehand at her comfort zone, as she hits the low forehand on the baseline to force her opponent into a mistake:

A high ball which forces Diyas to make contact above the shoulder may cause her balance to be slightly off, thus take away her control and power. Strangely, Begu forced Diyas to hit forehands above the shoulder level only three times the whole match! First one was at 5-5 in the first set, and it resulted in a short ball by Diyas which allowed Begu to hit a winner. The second was at 4-2 for Diyas in the tiebreaker of the first, and Begu’s high and loopy topspin forehand resulted in a direct error by Diyas! The third time and only other time Diyas had to hit a forehand above the shoulder level is in the clip below. You will see Diyas’ forehand return fall short because she had to hit it above the shoulder level, out of her comfort zone. Begu should have taken advantage of the short ball and gone for the kill but instead she gives Diyas a second chance, and Diyas ultimately wins the point on yet another forehand from her comfort zone around the hip level:

It’s a mystery to me why Begu never centered on hitting high balls to Diyas on both sides and set up the short ball to put the pressure on her opponent? She definitely has that shot in her repertoire and in fact, she used it occasionally against Kimiko Date-Krumm in the first round of qualifying. Yet, she did exactly the opposite against Diyas, mostly hitting the ball hard and going for winners. To exasperate things further, she played that style trying to break Diyas’ forehand down (it’s the only explanation that comes to mind since almost 80% of Begu’s shots went to Diyas’ deuce side as you can see in all of the clips in this article too). Without any surprise, Diyas felt right at home, hitting the type of forehands that she likes, at the pace that she likes, moving the ball around at will. Spectators saw plenty of points like the ones in the three clips below. See how Diyas continuously gets to hit precisely the type of ball that she likes, at the same sweet zone, over and over again even though she remains on defense in this first clip:

And now check out this rally where Diyas gets to play a mixture of offense and defense, always in control of the point because what you don’t see is Begu running from corner to corner on the other side of the net:

In this next rally, see Diyas as the aggressor, stepping inside the baseline, mounting the pressure, and eventually hitting a forehand winner:

As these clips show, the match was played on Diyas’ terms. Considering how versatile her game is, Begu would have done herself a favor by utilizing the full arsenal of shots that she has in her depot, especially the high topspin off-pace ball that she uses on and off on clay courts. Furthermore, a little scouting would have directed the Begu camp in the right path beforehand. Diyas played another Romanian player Monica Niculescu in the last round of qualifying. A close look at that encounter, or some advice from Niculescu’s camp would have pointed to Diyas’ strengths and weaknesses and helped Begu prepare better for the match. Despite the pattern of points in Diyas’ favor, the match’s outcome rested on a handful of points and it was decided in two tight tiebreakers. Thus, the right type of scouting and game-plan preparation could have made the difference between winning and losing. That game plan would not have included allowing Diyas to dictate points with below-the-shoulder level strokes, since she is a rather small girl who has no trouble bending her knees if necessary, as this picture shows:
Diyas 5

I spoke to Diyas after the match and asked her if she felt comfortable with the type of ball that she was receiving from her opponent. She responded “yes” and when I vaguely touched on the above, she remembered the point in the tiebreaker where she made the mistake on the high ball, and did not really have an answer as to why her opponent did not hit higher balls. She did point out that it was windy and that perhaps it was not easy to direct the ball in Begu’s defense, however her response clearly showed that she was very much aware of the fact that she was getting to play match on her terms.

Until next time…

Tactical Analysis: When One Sticks Too Long with the Wrong Strategy

Tactical Analysis WTA No Comments

The Case of Caroline Garcia (#48) vs. Timea Babos (#102) – WTA Cincinnati 2014 Qualifying 1st Round – Babos wins 6-4 6-3

SAM_2542

When Caroline Garcia (picture above) stepped on the court for her first round match in Cincinnati, she was on paper the clear favorite as the seventh seed against the Hungarian Timea Babos who was one of the lowest-ranked players in the qualifying draw. After getting broken in the first game and subsequently going down 2-0, Garcia won three games in a row and went up 3-2. At that point, everything seemed in order for the 20-year-old French player. In that stretch of three games won by Garcia, one of them was a return game in which Garcia hit a forehand return winner and one other return that forced an error from her opponent. Those were aggressive returns, taken very early, with Garcia being at least two or three steps inside the baseline. In other words, being extra-aggressive on returns worked for that one game. Ironically, it would also play a major role in Garcia’s downfall over the duration of the match. Garcia insisted on going for too much on returns, often trying to step far inside the baseline, especially on second serves, to hit return winners that frequently resulted in direct errors such as the one you can see in the clip below:

Click here (11 seconds)

It is possible that Garcia is currently working on improving her aggressive returns in the long run and that in order to attain that goal her coach told her to keep going for the returns regardless of how many errors she may make. If that is the case, I am usually for the idea of sacrifice in the short run if that points to the possibility of adding a new dimension to the game in the long run. However, this tournament was not the right time. Cincinnati is a WTA Premier Tier event. Garcia has been in the mix with the likes of Eugenie Bouchard, Simona Halep, Garbine Muguruza, and the rest of the “new generation” as an up-and-coming player in the last couple of years. She cannot afford the luxury to lose a match in a tournament of such importance, a match in which she would have greatly improved her chances had she simply made one minor adjustment: move back on the returns and put the return in play to construct the point later. Furthermore, Garcia’s confidence cannot be that high since she has recorded mixed results this year so far, on the heels of a very promising 2013 campaign. This was a case where the importance of winning the current match trumped the promise of a long-term goal. Going for broke on every return simply did not translate into winning games.

In any case, Garcia kept on taking high risks on returns, either making direct mistakes (such as the one in the clip earlier) or putting herself in a defensive position from the first shot in the point because her return was turned out to be dismal. In the following clip, we see just that, Garcia trying to do too much with the return on a first serve by Babos, and resulting in a bad return that allows Babos to force an error out of Garcia on the next shot:

Click here (10 seconds)

Ultimately, this wrong strategy gave confidence to Babos who actually started the match not serving particularly well – she made all three double faults in the first two serving games –, but as the match progressed, felt more and more comfortable on her serves because she understood that if she hit a solid enough serve she could collect the error from Garcia or get a ball back that she could attack immediately.

SAM_2540Timea Babos

This particular tactic of going for the big return may not have been the only cause for Garcia’s straight-set loss, but there is no doubt that it had a snow ball effect as Babos felt less and less pressure on her serve. In the first set, Babos faced four break points, whereas in the second set, there was only one that was wasted away once again by Garcia’s missed return. Considering what little it takes to turn matches around in tennis, this was a good case of a match where Garcia could have moved back a bit and modified her returns to put the ball back in play. Perhaps, it could have been enough to win the match and build some momentum going into the U.S. Open in two weeks from now. I have been a fan of Garcia for a couple of years in that I believe she has the athleticism and the fundamentals to transform into a big-time player in the women’s circuit. However, this match was a step in the wrong direction, one that should indicate to her camp that setbacks of this type can be avoided with a little flexibility in the tactical preparation.

Roger Federer’s Multiple Plan A’s

ATP Majors Tactical Analysis No Comments

Yes, we all know about Roger Federer’s 17 Slams, his regaining of the number one ranking, and his equaling of the 286-week record at number one held previously by Pete Sampras. Congratulations to the great Swiss player but in this article, I will neither repeat his astonishing statistics nor reload the “bravo” tributes and comments that newswires have been overloaded with since his moment of victory at Wimbledon. I will simply attempt to point to a certain aspect of Federer as a tennis player that I believe to be non-existent in any other player, and yet seems to mysteriously remain undervalued, if not obscure, to most so-called tennis experts.

Obviously his forehand, his physical shape, the variety of his shots, and his serve, only to mention a few, are all putative qualities of Federer. I would like to go a little further than that in this article. Let’s take into account Federer’s Sunday’s final match against Andy Murray along with his 2009 Wimbledon final match against Andy Roddick. The comparative analysis of these finals posits two relatively overlooked qualities of Federer: his intelligence and awareness on the court.

Let’s rewind the clock back to 3 years ago to that final between Federer and Roddick…

In 2009, in the finals against Roddick, Federer began the match playing aggressively, looking to advance to the net at every opportunity. Roddick was focused from the start and was able to withstand the barrage of attacks from Federer. Roddick took many people by surprise by producing some sizzling passing shots to counter his opponent’s early aggressive tennis. As the set advanced, we witnessed Federer becoming more and more intimidated by Roddick’s accurate passing shots. He began to stay at the baseline and to try to dictate the rally with aggressive ground strokes. On the other hand, Roddick got more confident as the set went on. At 6/5 on Federer’s serve, he hit an “out-of-this-world” forehand crosscourt winner, and then followed it later in that same game with a terrific backhand down-the-line drive on set point to win it 7/5. The Swiss needed to change his tactics before it was too late. Well, he did more than that.

Federer did not simply adjust his game after the first set. He completely changed his tactic and outlook. He took a one hundred and eighty degree turn from his initial plan at the start of the match and went to an exclusively defensive format. He ceased venturing to the net unless forced to do so, thus taking targets away from Roddick. He made each point last longer, giving Roddick plenty of floaters, low-speed slices, in order to force him to hit several great shots to win the points. He placed himself further behind the baseline with the intention of running every ball down, prolonging the time of the rallies and the games, including plenty of off-speed, loopy shots that gave him ample time to come back to the middle of the court if he was ever pushed to the corners.

In short, after the first set, Federer basically took a page out of a classic clay court retrieving game and applied it to the grass of Wimbledon. While it is true that the second set could have gone either way (Roddick did have 4 set points, one of which was an easy forehand volley that he missed!), Federer was able to give himself a chance to level the playing field and have a tangible shot at winning the second set. After he won it in a tiebreaker, the match was not only leveled on the scoreboard but also on the court. Helped by a superb serving performance – he hit his 50th ace to win the epic match at the end of 4 hours of 16 minutes of battle – Federer eventually prevailed over Roddick 16/14 in the fifth set, while playing defensively for the remainder of the match.

Now, let’s fast-forward the clock to Sunday’s 2012 final between Federer and Murray…

Murray began the match with an aggressive approach, and Federer began with an unusual amount of errors (including after he survived the initial break and came back on serve). Federer was not particularly playing defensive, but Murray kept launching so many aggressive shots in succession that all Federer could do was to retrieve balls the best that he could for the first several games of the match. He did eventually break back, but Murray’s early form had him unsettled. The unforced errors still kept coming and he lost the first set 6/4.

To circumvent the problem, Federer did the reverse of what he did in 2009. To counter Murray’s initiative to dictate the points, he began to “out-attack” Murray with an even more aggressive game with the intention to cut the points short. Although he was not the better player in the second set, Federer did what was working best for him: build the points around coming to the net. He came to the net 26 times in the second set (vs. 15 in the first) and won twice more points approaching the new (total: 22) then in the first. Relentlessly staying loyal to his modified plan, Federer began to further embellish it by adding the ‘chip-and-charge’ and progressively coming to the net on second-serve returns in the third set during which he was the better player. Once he won the third set, there was no doubt that he would do more of what he did in the second and third sets. In the fourth set, he came to the net 16 times and won 14!

Overall, in the last three sets, the approaches to the net included slice approach shots, swing volleys, chip-and-charge returns, drop shot that he followed up to the net, wide balls that he knew would put Murray on the run, and last but not the least, several serve-and-volley attempts of which he only lost one point! This time, Federer won the title by changing his game to total offense, in the reverse manner of what he did in 2009, and taking a page out of 70s and 80s grass court tennis, (minus the ‘continuous’ serve-and-volley). It is only fitting that he celebrated the winning point by lifting his arms and immediately falling to his knees at the net after watching yet another passing shot attempt by Murray sail long.

It is an important asset for a top-level tennis player to have the ability to insert variety to his or her game. Although not many do, there are more than a few players who possess the ability to use plenty of variety on their game, including Murray in the finals on Sunday. These few players are already quite distinguished, and in a class of their own. However, it is another thing to be able to combine the intelligence and the on-court awareness, with that variety, in order to modify strategies and produce the result desired. Some of these distinguished players will not do it either because they are still lacking courage to do it, or because they don’t feel comfortable doing it in the course of match, or simply because they the thought does not occur to them. The one that can dare to undertake such adjustment, and actually follow through with it successfully, is the kind of sui generis player who can comfortably claim to have “a Plan A” to fall back to, in case the “other Plan A” already in progress is not functioning well. Plan B is not an option for this type of player. Federer in 2009 against Roddick, as well as on Sunday against Murray, simply switched from one Plan A to another.

I believe Federer’s skill to have more than one Plan A along with the presence of mind to know intrinsically when to shift at will from one to the next is one of the central elements of Federer’s success. While other players strive during their whole careers to improve up weaker defensive (or offensive) parts of their games to match their stronger side, and practice for years their weaker shots to complement their stronger ones, Federer has gone past this stage early in his career. Furthermore, he has not only reached the next stage that I have explained above – the combination of intelligence and variety resulting in multiple Plan A’s – but he has excelled in that area, the one that other players in the game of tennis never even get to experience.

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