Category: Tactical Analysis

ATP Finals, Wednesday: First-Match Recap

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Grigor Dimitrov on fire, defeats a flat David Goffin 6-0 6-2

After a match like the one Dimitrov and Goffin played this morning in London, it is next to impossible to evaluate with accuracy the value of such win for the victorious side, as well as the negative effect it may have on the losing side.

Grigor should feel great for having won so convincingly. But wait, should he really after this match? David should feel bad for having gotten blown away so quickly. But wait, should he really? The circumstances surrounding this match cause the existence of those two “but wait” clauses.

Dimitrov could have played the best match of his career, yet he would not get the full credit because his opponent was (or at least appeared to be) diminished. Well, what the 6th seed from Bulgaria did was still pretty close to perfect. His footwork was stellar and that led to the display of his spectacular shot-making skills.

Photo: Getty – Julian Finney

Grigor Bulgaria generated power on his serve and returns, varied the pace and the spin on his backhand at will, and nailed winners with his forehand every time he had a chance to step in the court. As the icing on the cake, he won several points at the net, looking impressive not only because of his sound volleying technique, but also because of how quickly he was closing into the net whenever he sensed that Dominic was in trouble and about to float the ball back in the court.

You need examples of Dimitrov’s all-around skills working to perfection? Look no further than the two game points he won in the second and third games of the match.

At 1-0, 15-40 up on David’s serve, Dimitrov hit an aggressive return, a low backhand slice, two backhand heavy topspins, a dazzling forehand counter-punch shot on the full run that put David on defense, a slice approach shot, and a high-degree-of-difficulty drop-volley that force David into an error.

Footwork, defense, offense, transition, wrist control, you name it, Grigor had it. He enjoyed it too, yelling a loud “Come oooon!” that you could hear over the cheers and claps of the spectators.

Next, game 2-0, 40-15 on his serve, he went on full offense, imprisoning Goffin to the add corner with a trio of stifling forehands, each time pushing him further wide and back, and running lightning fast to the net after the third one to catch the ball in the air and put the forehand volley away to the open court.

These two points were part of a doozy set of three first games by Dimitrov during which he showed all the signs of a determined player with a purpose. Notice that at 3-0, Goffin did not have the body language of a defeated player, or even a diminished one. He was simply outplayed for three games.

Photo: AFP – Glyn Kirk

I would argue that Goffin began feeling the after effects of his fatigue from his previous match – or is he injured? We will not know for sure anytime soon – only after the reality of having to fight another long battle to overcome a player on top of his game has set in. Those three games were a large part of that reality setting in.

The last straw came when he had a chance to hold serve on an advantage point in the next game.

In that point, and I would call it the best point of the match, it seemed like Dimitrov made Goffin run the five-mile marathon at high speeds following a 22-shot rally that ended with an exquisite drop shot half-volley at the net, leaving Goffin visibly breathing hard. Goffin was so exhausted that he double faulted the next point. He eventually lost that 16-point-long service game that lasted 8 minutes and 15 seconds.

The curtains closed on David at 4-0, he never recovered. That was the moment after which he began feeling the fatigue, his shoulders slumped, and appeared to have very little fight left in him.

So, what is next for both of these players?

Photo: Getty – Julian Finney

Grigor has now qualified for the semifinals and will face either Jack Sock or Alexander Zverev. Should he feel confident? Yes. Does he look as sharp physically as (or sharper than) anyone else in the tournament? Yes. Is he good enough to win the tournament? Possibly, certain within the realm of possibilities, and it’s not like there are many possibilities here. What would this title mean to his career if he were to win? A whole lot! Hard to express in words, and if he really were to win it, I believe he would also find it hard to express after the match.

Goffin says he did not lose the match because of a physical ailment and gave all the credit to Dimitrov. Did we expect anything less from one of the nicest guys on the ATP Tour? I don’t believe so, even though most of us saw it differently on the court. He was either tired, or injured, or both. I would take the first over the next two, but also give credit to Grigor’s tennis in the early going for aggravating David’s problems.

David still has a decent chance to make it to the semis if he defeats Dominic Thiem on Friday. I am not so sure how many Belgians around the world will cheer for him in that match. Davis Cup finals against France and the prospect of playing a best-of-five-set match for his country loom large for Goffin, precisely one week from Friday.

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ATP Finals, Tuesday: Second-Match Recap

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Roger Federer, efficient enough in his 7-6 5-7 6-1 win over Alexander Zverev

“Efficient enough” is the key term here. It was not a stellar performance, but Roger used whatever was available to him within the scope of his current form and the opponent he faced – yes, yes, I know, that is still way above the standards of others, but let’s focus on this match, shall we?

Let me also note that the Swiss may not even need his top form to win the ATP World Tour Finals. He won the Basel title two weeks ago without performing at his top level. Today, he defeated the number-three player in the world, while playing spotty and uninspiring tennis at times.

Back in 2012, I wrote an article in which I talked about Federer’s rare ability to switch from one Plan A to another and not skip a beat, while others can only switch to plan B’s, thus compromising their preferred tactics in an effort to adjust to their opponents. Roger’s repertoire is large enough to where he can change patterns, shift his positioning on the court, vary his pace and spin, and still call that modified tactic, his Plan A.

Today was no different. He came on the court with yet another Plan A, but he had to modify it after the first five games to pull off a victory that was only delayed by some inexplicable loss of intensity in the early portion of the second set.

Here is the purpose of my piece today. The general impression in the world of tennis after the match was that Federer was slicing his backhand too much, thus playing too defensively, and that it was a mistake on his part. It is true that the slice was part of Federer’s game plan, but certainly not to the extent that we saw over the three sets. Those who closely observed the early games should have realized that he definitely did not begin the match that way. An analysis of the first five games should clarify why Federer initially sought to follow a distinct plan, yet ended up executing a different one.

First let me give you some numbers. Until 3-2, Federer sliced his backhand thirteen times, and came over the top (call it flat, spin, or drive) also thirteen times. However, seven of those thirteen slices came when he had to stretch or lunge to get his racket on Sascha’s booming first serves and return them. In other words, he had no choice but to block or slice those seven returns.

Photo: Getty – Julian Finney

Thus, if we just count the backhands hit once going past the serve-and-return phase of the points, he sliced only six times vs thirteen over-the-top backhands. Plus, he was going to hit some anyway because the short and slice backhand was part of his plan to get Sascha to commit errors – for those interested in visual examples, Sascha missed his first such shot at deuce in the first game. To sum it up, Roger sliced only three or four times in the first 5 games when he had a choice.

I would not call that a defensive tactic.

That short slice, forcing the six-foot-six (almost two meters European terms) German youngster to move forward a bit inside the baseline and strike the ball below his knees, would prove vital to Roger’s success for the rest of the match. He probably walked out on the court planning to utilize that weapon. He would stick mostly with aggressive drives on both wings that have been working well for him this year, and mix in the occasional low slice to throw Sascha off balance. At least, that is precisely what the first five games showed.

Yet, as we know now, he ended up slicing a lot more than that, didn’t he? It was not an error on his part, he did not have a choice. His opponent showed him in the next two games, on three different occasions, that Roger’s plan A that rested on varying the pace just enough to still take charge with aggressive shots would not be enough, and that he would need to defend a bit more than he initially wanted to.

Let’s remember those three occasions:

Federer was leading 2-1 and Zverev was serving at 30-15. The point began with another short and low slice backhand return by Federer. This time Sascha handled it (not the norm in this match) and sent it deep to Roger’s backhand forcing him to defensively slice back. However, on the next shot, Roger got his feet set and nailed maybe the hardest flat backhand of the match to Zverev’s add corner. I am guessing he did not expect it to come back. Not only did it come back, but Sascha landed it on the baseline. Federer backed up quickly and spinned his forehand back. Two shots later, Roger would once again be under pressure on his backhand and this time he would miss it. It was then, the longest point of the match. Federer mixed it up, never giving Sascha the same look twice in a row, using his two biggest weapons, the low and short slice and the crushing flat shot. The problem was that Zverev answered every challenge beautifully in that point and Roger ended up being the one to commit the error.

The second occasion was even more telling. This was a 22-shot rally, the first point of the 2-2 game, in which Federer threw everything but the kitchen sink at Sascha in terms of being aggressive. He did not use his slice once, and had Sascha on the ropes for the better part of the point. But the German put on display his defensive skills and got every ball back. He eventually found the balance in the rally around the 15th shot. At the first opportunity, when he got his feet set, he accelerated his backhand down the middle of the court to a stationary (and probably frustrated) Federer. Another long rally would end with the Swiss coming out on the losing end, this time missing his forehand into the net.

Two points later, at 15-15, once again Federer got into a back-and-forth with Zverev, and once again, it looked like he had the upper hand in the rally. He was the one with the initiative, slicing his backhand only once but coming over the top and accelerating on all the others. Zverev stood tall once again, got everything back, and Federer eventually went for a rocket shot to the corner that sailed out.

Let me summarize. These three points took place within a three-minute, two-game span and changed the entire outlook of the match. Federer still held to go up 3-2, thanks to some remarkable placement on his serves (what else?) but one thing was clear: he would need to modify his game from that point forward.

He would now play a bit more conservative and make more use of that short and low slice. He would take risks only when a convenient opportunity – read that “one that offered good percentage play” – presented itself. He would rely on his serves to hold and on Sascha’s errors to break. That was now his alternative plan A.

Photo: AFP – Glyn Kirk

The rest of the match was interesting and topsy-turvy. There were some wild swings both ways. The tiebreaker itself, Federer’s loss of intensity at 7-6 3-1 up, his renewed intensity once he held in the second game of the final set, and finally, Sascha’s erosion in the last 15 minutes of the match, are all worthy turning points to be discussed, but beyond the scope of my focus in this article, which was to examine the reasons behind Federer’s seemingly defensive play in today’s match.

Couple of side notes:

– From 3-2 to 5-4, total of four games, only a little over 7 minutes elapsed. And that is including the two game changes. I can’t remember four games that went by so quick. I have no proof, obviously, but it felt like a record. It was 3-2, I blinked, and it was 5-4.

– Federer’s short and low slice backhands harassed Zverev endlessly. He missed one at deuce in the very first game, he lost the first set tiebreaker on one, only to mention two among many. If other players did not know any of his weaknesses before, they know at least one now.

– That was a short-tempered Roger out there today. He visibly got frustrated as early as the second game when his forehand passing shot attempt flicked the net and sailed out. His hand did some sort of quick, upward motion that I can best explain as “Get the hell outta here,” although I have no idea what came out of his mouth. And that was only the beginning.

– I am sorry, I listened to all the explanations for years, but I will still call the likes of the Marin Cilic vs Roger Federer match on Thursday a pseudo-ATP match. I hardly believe that either player cares that much about winning or losing that match (probably Roger even less than Marin). For those who need clarification, Cilic at 0-2 is already eliminated and Federer at 2-0 has already qualified for the semifinals.

Until next time…

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ATP Finals, Monday: First-Match Recap

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Grigor Dimitrov def. Dominic Thiem 6-3 5-7 7-5

Two weeks ago, in a podcast hosted by Tennis Accent, when the discussion centered on Dominic Thiem, I spent a few minutes drawing a comparison between him and Grigor Dimitrov. I maintained that Dimitrov has better on-court instincts than Thiem does, and consequently, makes better decisions during points than the Austrian does. When Thiem makes errors, they can often be due to bad decisions whereas when Dimitrov makes them, it’s usually because he simply missed the execution although he chose the right shot.

Little did I know that they would face each other thirteen days later in the ATP World Tour Finals. Having now seen them play for the third time this year, and with all three matches going to the final set, I stand even more firmly behind what I said.

As far as today’s match is concerned, I realize that most people remember the last couple of games better than any other part of the match. Thus, they remember Dimitrov getting tight and struggling to close out the match at the end. That is certainly (but only partly) true. To make that, however, the principal theme of one’s after-match thoughts on the winning player would be incomplete. Let’s look instead at the complete picture.

Photo: AFP – Glyn Kirk

Neither player performed particularly well or dominated the match at any moment, even though there were plenty of shot-making on both sides.

There was however only one player who had a firm game plan in which he believed. That same player insisted relentlessly on taking the initiative during points in order to execute that plan that he and his team designed specifically for this match. That same player believed in that plan with such clarity that he was willing to accept the minor setbacks caused by occasional errors but not let them deter him from achieving his goal. He and his team probably believed that in the long run the cumulative effects of their plan would tilt the outcome in his favor. That proactive player’s name was Dimitrov.

Then, there was the other player. His plan was like the one he had used in most of his past matches regardless of the surface. He had stuck to his strengths that were enough against most players that he faced. He was not going to be proactive like his opponent, instead he would adjust if his opponent happened to get the lead. That reactive player’s name was Thiem.

Let me illustrate the difference I described above with some examples.

The match began on Dimitrov’s serve. On the first point, Dimitrov got a solid first serve in, Thiem responded with a rather short ball to the middle of the court. Dimitrov went for the inside-out forehand winner and missed by a couple of inches.

Two points later, at 15-15, another solid first serve, another short return by Dominic to the middle (albeit a bit shorter this time), another inside-out forehand winner attempt by Grigor, this time successful. Missing that same shot on the first point made no difference. No hesitation on the footwork, no holding back on the speed of the swing. That first point would not be the only time he missed the second part of the 1-2 punch (see the 1-1, 15-0 point), but he obviously believed in that tactic enough to stick with it from the beginning to the end.

Later in that first game at 40-30, we saw the first rally of the match. Dimitrov kept rallying deep until he got a ball that gave him just enough time to wind up for a big backhand. He flattened it out for a powerful down-the-line for winner to take a 1-0 lead.

First game made his plan was clear to everyone. He was going to look to push Thiem around, put him on his backfoot and use the court’s speed in order to press Thiem who needed some time to prepare his big backswings to launch his groundies.

The 1-2 punch behind the first serve and the flat backhand down-the-line accelerations were two of the many components of that plan. Another major one was to step in on Thiem’s second serves and unleash on returns. He was also determined to approach the net anytime he stretched his opponent on the run or got a short ball to move forward.

Not every component had to work perfectly. Errors were allowed and expected. Not every component needed to end with a point won either because there was another player on the other side of the net, a skilled one at that. The goal was to make the components work as an ensemble often enough to collect most of the points. Hopefully, after some time, Thiem would feel the urgency to make adjustments beyond his comfort zone, and as a result, commit more errors.

Thiem relied on big swings to generate pace and on direct points from first serves.
That was enough to hold a couple of times, but serving at 2-3, it began to fall apart. Leading 15-0, Thiem ran down a cross-court backhand by Dimitrov and floated it back in the court. Dimitrov quickly ran to the net, caught it in the air, and finished the volley. Chalk one up for Dimitrov’s plan.

At 15-15, Dimitrov hit a low, slice backhand return, deep to the middle of the court. Thiem had no plan, no idea what to do with the ball, except aimlessly swing a heavy spin forehand to Grigor’s deuce side. From the ankle level, slightly behind the baseline, on a sliding, low ball, a hard spin ball to the opponent’s strength should have been Thiem’s last choice. Yet, he hit that shot, missed it, and went down 15-30.
Chalk one up for Thiem’s bad decision-making.

At 15-30, Thiem double-faulted. You can simply blame Thiem, or do like Paul Annacone did on the Tennis Channel and give credit to Dimitrov for consistently stepping inside the baseline and unleashing on returns, thus pressing Thiem into a risky second serve. I chalk one up for a combination of both because while I agree with Annacone, I cannot pretend that a player should get zero blame for double faulting. Not for double faults.

Regardless, Dimitrov now had two break points.

On the second break point, Dimitrov again got a slice return in, this time a bit shorter than at 15-15, and what did Thiem do? He attempted exactly the same shot as the one at 15-15, and missed it long, again!

Even if that shot landed in, it would not have been a winner. In fact, Dimitrov would have gotten it back without much problem because it was to his stronger forehand side and he was already there. Once again, there was no reason to hit that low-percentage, high-velocity shot on a heavy slice ball that bounced no higher than the knee level, unless he aimed it to the open court for a winner.

Bad decisions by Thiem, clarity and purpose from Dimitrov.
Dominic sailing aimlessly, Grigor following his plan.
There is the difference that I noted above between these two players.

On the scoreboard, it meant a break for Dimitrov, 4-2. He would go on to win the first set 6-3.

Thiem eventually turned it around in the second, largely thanks to keeping his balls deeper, and more to Dimitrov’s backhand. When short-ball opportunities became rare, Dimitrov began rushing, taking unnecessary risks, and eventually losing the second set 7-5 on three straight errors on his service game.

Photo: AFP – Glyn Kirk

When Dimitrov was serving at 0-1, 0-15, in the final set, his prospects looked grim. He had just played his two worst games of the match and needed to stop the slide. He had gotten away from one particular component of his plan, which was to approach the net when the opportunity presented itself. He had passed on some of those chances in the last several games. Solid serves came to his rescue and he held for 1-1. Balance was restored, as well as his confidence.

Dimitrov, looking more and more positive as the final set progressed, finally broke Thiem in the seventh game and served for the match at 5-4.

That is when one of the most disastrous sequences any player can face took place.

With Dimitrov two points away from the match at 30-15, Thiem’s return landed clearly deep. Grigor even stopped his feet momentarily, after hitting the ball back. Yet, there was no call (replays showed that it was clearly out). Dimitrov realized that and continued the point.

It turned into a long rally in which Thiem approached the net on a cross-court shot, right to Grigor’s forehand – yes, another terrible decision by Dominic. Dimitrov simply needed to hit a mid-pace forehand down-the-line to passing shot to the open court. He didn’t hit it accurately enough, and not with enough speed. Thiem got to the ball and won the point.

Dimitrov should have won that point at two different times and hold two match points on his racket at 40-15. Instead, it was 30-30. First the umpire betrayed him, then his own apprehensiveness, within the same point.

At 30-30, Dimitrov hit a forehand inside-out that bounced off the net and landed conveniently for Thiem in the mid-court. He put it away with his backhand. It was now 30-40, break point for Thiem. Dimitrov ended this dreadful turn of events with a framed backhand that sailed wide.

In a matter of two minutes Dimitrov went from staring at the finish line at 5-4 30-15 to a neck-to-neck race at 5-5. It all happened in less than two minutes, because of some combination of a horrendous non-call, bad luck, and his own gagging.

This is where I come back to what I said in the beginning of my recap.

Most people will only remember the two successive double faults by Thiem to lose that next 5-5 game. Thus, they will claim that it was thanks to Dominic that Dimitrov got over the disappointment of losing his serve at 5-4, got the break again, and eventually won the final set 7-5. Because, well, “Dimitrov can’t finish.” Why in quotation marks? Because that is what the complicated sequence of three points described above will be reduced to: “Dimitrov can’t finish.”

They will also ignore how Dimitrov got to 0-30 in that 5-5 game before Thiem double faulted. They will not remember the great defense by Grigor on the first point, and the forehand lunging return he hit on a terrific first serve by Thiem on the second point (even though Thiem should not have missed the next shot).

More importantly, they will forget that Grigor played those two points, virtually less than a minute after the disastrous three-point sequence I described above. Many players would have lost their cool and never keep their resolve the way Dimitrov did, immediately following such a disappointing 2-minute-long sequence.

So, yes, Thiem did help Dimitrov with those two double faults and even an error at deuce on the 6-5 game. Yes, Dimitrov did have “some” trouble closing out the match. Just like he deserves “some” credit for the win.

In fact, he thoroughly deserved to win the match, because not only was he the more determined player with clear plan as I noted above, but also because he knew how to persevere and quickly put behind a forgettable plot twist at a crucial moment late in the final set.

In his post-match interview on the court, Dimitrov showed self-awareness, admitting that he was “pretty nervous in [his] first match out here.” When asked about those 5-4 and 5-5 games, Dimitrov had a few sentences to say, something that sounded like “You fail and you get back up again” and something else about how to “manage to switch it that fast around.”

Sorry I can’t remember the exact quote.
But, you get the idea…
Grigor certainly does…

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Wimbledon 2017 Men’s Final Preview: Roger Federer vs Marin Cilic

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You can find all the information you want on the internet about Federer’s accomplishments, if you do not know them already, with one or two clicks. Nevertheless, I have always found interesting what his colleagues have to say about him during tournaments. So I will skip any lengthy introduction to this preview and begin with some quotes by the last two victims of Federer, Milos Raonic and Tomas Berdych, from their post-match talk with the press.

Raonic:
“I was sort of moving on, okay, let’s see if he can do it again. Let’s see if he can do it again. He kept doing it.”
“You can see there’s not much doubt in his mind. He’s feeling it.”

Berdych:
“I don’t see anything that would indicate really Roger is getting older.”
“I think he’s playing by far the best tennis right now.”
“He’s playing barely with any mistakes.”

Photo: Clive Brunskill – Getty Images Europe

Having watched Roger improve through each round at Wimbledon – not that he was playing anything below “pretty well” tennis before the tournament even began – the above observations by Milos and Tomas do not seem exaggerated. In fact, Federer’s past-round performances confirm them. Roger is three straight sets away from pulling a “1976-Borg,” in other words, capturing the title without losing a set. He would also become the only man to ever win eight Wimbledon titles. Both are very much within the realm of possibility, unless his opponent Marin Cilic concocts some brilliant game plan to first snatch a set, and then two more. (Side note to (some) people: Yes folks! There will be another tennis player on the other side of the net. He is the number 6 player in the world, and he plays “pretty well” too!)

Cilic was in position to do just that last year in the quarterfinals, when he led Federer two sets to zero and had 0-40 lead on Roger’s serve at 3-3 and could not capitalize on those break points, then squandered three match-point opportunities in the fourth set, and eventually lost the match 6-3 in the fifth. It was a thrilling match with several unexpected turns – you can read my detailed analysis of that match from a year ago by clicking here. It was only a year ago, yet a lot has changed since that day.

First of all, Cilic is at a high point in his career, although 2017 cannot yet be called his best year. There is no doubt that the year 2014, in which he amassed the US Open title, as well as three other ATP ones, is his golden one. However, if we drop the calendar-year angle aside, and center on his last twelve months, Cilic is on the verge of moving up an echelon by his own standards.

After losing to Federer in the quarterfinals of last year’s Wimbledon, Cilic managed to win his first ATP 1000 event in Cincinnati. Then, he captured the titles at the Swiss Indoors in Basel, and at the Istanbul Open in May, the last one being his first career title on clay. He is currently ranked the sixth-ranked player in the ATP, the highest ranking he has achieved in his career. Finally, he is now on the verge of winning his second Major title, first Wimbledon.

Do you get the picture?

He is one win away from confirming his status as an elite player in men’s tennis, ensuring his induction into the International Tennis Hall of Fame, and, as one of my favorite tennis writers Matt Zemek says in his article, “traveling from one tennis universe to another.”

He did not get here by coincidence. I will not go into the “who”s and “why”s of how he has risen up the rankings and won titles, nor blemish his accomplishment of reaching the final here by trivial mentions of whom he did not face. It is sufficient to say that for most of us who follow tennis closely, when the draw was made, Marin was right behind Rafael Nadal and Andy Murray when considering the possible names who could make the final from the top of the draw.

What makes him different now than in the past years, including in 2014?

For starters, the 2014 US Open run was one of a kind. His performances in the semifinal and final rounds were nothing less than dazzling, and highly unlikely to happen again. Cilic literally blitzed through two formidable opponents, playing some type of what I call “spatial tennis.” It is neither realistic nor fair to Cilic, though not impossible in the word’s true sense, to expect that type of performance repeated again. He has not since then and he is not currently doing it in this Wimbledon. Instead, he has gotten the job done the old-fashioned way, by the use of sound tactics, a steady level of tennis, and by maximizing his strengths (84% points won on first-serve points).

This brings me to the heart of the answer to the question above. Today’s version of Cilic has one thing going for him that he did not have, at least not as much as he does today, in his version of the past. It is his improvement of how he handles nerves.

Cilic has been known in the past to get tight in matches. His loss to Federer last year was the most glaring and recent example of that. I am sure the end of his first set against Sam Querrey, when he framed two backhands in a row and hit the outside of the doubles’ alley to lose the tiebreaker, reminded Marin of those times. Yet, he persevered, and put that moment behind him to win most, if not all, of the clutch points in the next three sets. He eventually held two match points, at 6-5 in the fourth set. In the first one, Cilic blew another backhand sitter in the net. Was he going to now hesitate unleashing a shot if he got a similar chance in the next point? He was not. The remarkable forehand winner that left Querrey staring in the second match point secured the victory. The win against Querrey only proved once again that Cilic has learned how to handle pressure and will no longer succumb to it like he has in the past.

Photo: Julian Finney – Getty Images Europe

It is a long process to overcome such barriers. You could tell how much the mental improvement meant to him back in May, after he defeated Diego Schwartzman 6-1 7-6 in the semifinal of the Istanbul Open. Cilic dominated that match until midway through the second set when he began making errors and allowed Shwartzman to crawl his way back into the match. In his post-match comments, he touched on those moments in the second set when doubts crept into his mind: “I am extremely satisfied with how I was hitting, and also in the second set, when things got tight, when things were not working so well, I still kept the same focus and same mentality, that is something that I believe is going to bring me much more in the next couple of months.”

Here we are, a couple of months later, and Cilic could not have been more accurate.

So yes, his serves and his forehands, how deep he can keep the ball during rallies to stop Federer from directing rallies, or how often he can return Roger’s serve back in the court, will all play a role in the outcome of Sunday’s final. Yet, very few of those factors would matter now, had Cilic not learned how to master the mental challenge with which he was faced.

Federer, for his part, does not seem to have any questions marks in his mind. None at all! He has won all the key points that he had faced in his previous matches, including five tiebreakers in which he raised his level even higher than in the rest of those matches. If you have not seen them and you would rather see it for yourself, I would suggest that you watch the tiebreaker against Lajovic, or the one against Raonic, or the second-set one against Berdych.

The problem facing Cilic is that Federer has already encountered in this tournament a first serve as big as his, much better second serves than his, and forehands as big as or better than his, and dealt with all of them just fine. I would comfortably say that Marin is not likely to win prolonged baseline battles. He returns well, but Federer throws a lot of different types of serves at his opponents at his adversaries until he finds the right formula. This is nevertheless one small window of opportunity that could open for the big Croat. He could get an early break before Roger finds the right formula on the serve, and protect that lead as long as possible.

In terms of on-court patterns and tactics, I believe Federer is clearly superior to Cilic in that, he can vary his shots more, transition from defense to offense in the blink of an eye, and fabricate a different pattern in rallies than the previous ones that may not have worked, and do those adjustments in a very short period of time. Thus, the main puzzle to solve for Roger will be how to neutralize Cilic’s power and not allow him to start the match like the one in New York in 2014.

Last note: I have said before Federer’s quarter and semifinal matches that, in order to have shot at defeating him, his opponents must absolutely find a way to win the first set, and that carrying it to a tiebreaker would be one possible way to do that. Having watched the three tiebreakers in those two matches, I feel fairly at ease saying that tiebreakers would not be in Cilic’s favor.

Where does all this leave the two finalists? You make your own call. It is nevertheless undeniable that Federer is the heavy favorite and that Borg, in the category noted earlier, could have some company in the record books by tomorrow evening.

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Wimbledon 2017: Men’s Semifinal Previews

ATP Majors Tactical Analysis No Comments

Roger Federer (3) vs. Tomas Berdych (11)

In the third set of his match vs Federer on Wednesday, Milos Raonic played one of the better sets of his career and still could not steal the set. On how Roger kept coming up with one amazing shot after another, Milos said it best: “I was sort of moving on. Okay, let’s see if he can do it again. Let’s see if he can do it again. He kept doing it.” In case you missed it and require some illustration of what Milos is talking about, you only need to watch four points with which Roger climbed from 1-3 down to 5-3 up in the tiebreaker.

Raonic is hundred percent right. Federer keeps doing it over and over again, and does it even better with each match since Wimbledon began 11 days ago. The question is who can stop Federer, and my answer to that, as some readers may remember from my article on Sunday, was a simple “nobody,” at least until the finals. Well, Tomas Berdych is the last one standing between Federer and Sunday.

Photo: Clive Brunskill – Getty Images Europe

The only way to beat Federer is to crush the rallies with heavy shots going at warp speed 9 (see: Star Trek terminology). You can probably tell from the adjectives I used how much I believe in the possibility of such chain of events taking place tomorrow. There are nevertheless only a select few players who can do that to Roger and Berdych happens to be one of them. He did it twice in Majors, in 2010 at Wimbledon, in 2012 at the US Open. He had a great chance to do it even earlier, in 2009, at the Australian Open, but could not close it out, letting Roger come back from two sets down to beat him in five.

However… and you knew there was one coming… Federer has not lost to Berdych since 2013. He also defeated him soundly in this year’s Australian Open. That is more likely to be the scenario tomorrow. Federer is serving betterer-than-everer and Berdych not only lacks the explosion necessary on his first step to return the serves away from him, but also will have a miserable time catching any sort of a rhythm if Federer varies their speed and spin, as well as he has done so until now. Life will get even more complicated for Tomas if, on top of everything else, if he goes down a break down early in the match and allows Roger to play with a lead. Thus, Berdych must hold serve early and aim to create a dent in Roger’s baseline armor with his power. It is the only formula, regardless of how obvious it seems, that gives the 15th-ranked Czech player any chance to disturb Roger.

Photo: Shaun Botterill – Getty Images Europe

Federer, for his part, will counter that with his large arsenal of shots from the baseline and mix in a few rocket forehands of his own, aiming for the corners on Berdych’s side of the court. If the Swiss systematically wins rallies that go over seven or eight shots, I believe we will watch a one-sided, routine affair for three sets. If not, it may still be one-sided, with a more balanced scoreboard, whatever that may mean to you. If I am Berdych, I would first and foremost hope for Roger to have an off day on his serves, then focus on holding my service games, and look to get ahead in the first set. Unless he can derail Federer’s confidence early, there is no “W” for Tomas at the end of Friday.

Marin Cilic (7) vs. Sam Querrey (24)

The fact that Cilic is the favorite in this match certainly has something to do with his much superior record in Majors compared to that of his semifinal opponent. Not only does he have a Major title in his name but also a multitude of quarterfinal and semifinal appearances compared to only one semifinal one for Sam. Marin has also collected eight more ATP titles than Sam has over his career.

Cilic also carries a lot of explosive ammunition with him in the form of forehands and serves that he can unload on the court and make life very uncomfortable for the guy across the net. Don’t take my word for it; ask Kei Nishikori and Roger Federer, his last two victims on the way to his US Open title in 2014.

Yet, same can be said for Sam with regard to his artillery comprised of forehands and serves. If we were to look at the numbers, Sam’s numbers in those departments are as solid as those of Marin. Querrey is collecting points from his serves at about the same rate (84%) as Cilic does (83%). Querrey gets 63% of his first serves in while Marin is serving at 62%. Cilic has hit ten more winners on the forehand side than Sam (78 to 68) over the course of the tournament. Sam has 126 aces throughout the tournament compared to Marin’s 105.

Photo: Clive Brunskill – Getty Images Europe

So, if we are going to praise the power of Cilic’s serves and forehands, we must do the same for Querrey. The story is not much different in the unforced error categories. They are practically the same: 52 forehand unforced errors and 46 backhand ones for Sam, 54 and 46 for Marin.

Points-won-on-returns categories seem to carry the only significant difference between the two players. Cilic has won 32% of his total first-serve-returned points versus 28% for Sam, and on second serves that number is 58% for the Croat, 48% for the American. This distinction in return-points won may nevertheless be the result of Sam having faced more big servers (Kevin Anderson, Jo-Wilfried Tsonga) in the previous rounds than Marin has (Gilles Muller).

This is the reason for which putting too much importance in numbers can be misleading. Cilic may have had trouble reading Muller’s serve but could jump all over Sam’s. He may outlast Sam in rallies every time they can get into a cross-court backhand rally, eventually causing Sam’s unforced error count on the backhand to climb higher than usual. I can multiply such examples when one faces the other. That is why the way a player matches up with another supersedes sheer statistics in terms of importance.

The bottom line is, Cilic is a better baseliner than Querrey. He does the “1-2 punch” better than Sam does, because he can use his backhand just as effectively as his forehand on the second shot of that “1-2 punch” combination, whereas Sam must run around his backhand to be as effective. Both players can generate a lot of speed from deep behind the baseline, but I would argue that Sam can probably hit more “wow” shots with his forehand from that position than Cilic can. These are the details that will make the difference rather than comparison of numbers and percentages.

Photo: Julian Finney – Getty Images Europe

My only question mark for Cilic would be where he will position himself on the returns. In my quarterfinal previews, I mentioned that Marin would wait Muller’s serves closer to the baseline after seeing how much Rafael Nadal struggled on returns against Muller, because he was parking by the line judges to wait for them. To my surprise, he chose to stay few yards behind the baseline, not as far back as Rafa, but certainly not as close to the baseline as I expected. As a result, he also struggled with Muller’s wide serves, albeit not as much as Rafa did. So, I am reluctant to comment on his position on returns when returning Sam’s first and second serves. I will merely “guess” that, for his sake, Cilic will step inside the baseline to return Sam’s second serves.

Speaking of on-court stance, where players choose to hit their shots from will be an important part of the formula for victory. You know the image of the court that the experts put up on your screen, the one on which you see straight lines running parallel to the baseline, one in front of it and one in the back, each separated area colored differently so that they can tell you what percentage of their shots the players hit from each colored zone? That is what I am talking about. If Marin can more hit shots from the colored area inside the baseline than his opponent, he will be the one likely to reach the final on Sunday, and vice versa. I can at least guarantee one thing: we will see plenty of baseline shots, but we will not see many rallies. These two players will hit every ball with a purpose and that purpose will rarely include notions such as “getting the ball over the net” or “making the opponent hit one more shot.”

Have a great Friday afternoon!

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Wimbledon 2017, Match Preview: Magdalena Rybarikova vs Garbine Muguruza (14)

Majors Tactical Analysis WTA No Comments

Among the four semifinalists in the Wimbledon women’s draw, there is one unseeded player and the other three are all seeded outside the top five. With Serena Williams out, Angelique Kerber still trying to find her top form, Victoria Azarenka and Petra Kvitova making their comebacks, it was no secret that the women’s draw in Wimbledon presented an opportunity for some players to advance into the second week, and possibly have a breakthrough. However, only a handful of people would have picked Magdalena Rybarikova, who has never reached the second week of a Major in her 12-year-long career, to be that player in the semifinals.

The 87th-ranked Slovakian did not have a very convenient draw either. Among her victims were the third-seeded Karolyna Pliskova in the second round, the athletic Croatian Petra Martic in the fourth, and the hard-hitting, 24th-seeded American Coco Vandeweghe in the quarters. It was anything but a cakewalk for a player who had spent the larger part of last year recovering from two surgeries, one on her knee and the other on her wrist. She started her comeback in February, having dropped to no. 453 in the WTA rankings. It is nothing less than impressive that she even amassed enough points in such a short time and made the main draw of Wimbledon, let alone advance to the semifinal round.

Photo: Shaun Botterill – Getty Images Europe

Rybarikova was able to do it, thanks to a crafty style of play, with plenty of variety that can at times leave her opponents bewildered. It is the type of game that can throw heavy-hitters like Pliskova and Vandeweghe out of their rhythm and frustrated. She can vary her ground strokes through a multitude of spins (such as high and loopy at times, flat drives at others, with the occasional low-bouncing slice mixed in) and give a different look to the returner through changes in placement and speed on her serves. For example, she has the ability to slice the serve and make it curve further once the ball hits the ground as well as any other players that utilizes that type of serve, such as Lucie Safarova.

Her opponent Garbine Muguruza is another heavy-hitting star. This is partially the reason for which a match that shows her as the clear favorite to win, at least on paper, could quickly turn into a nightmare for the 14th-seeded Spaniard if she does not take the necessary precautions. After all, Muguruza will hit the ball aggressively from the baseline but not more than Pliskova does, and will serve big, but not bigger than Vandeweghe does, and we saw how that all worked out for Karolyna and Coco when they faced Magda. Muguruza will also need to strike a lot of balls from the knee level or below, not exactly her preferred height for ball contact.

The good news for Garbine fans is that their favorite player is more athletic than any of Rybarikova’s previous opponents (except Martic) and she seems to have caught fire as the rounds progressed. She played a terrific match against Svetlana Kuznetsova, never allowing her to get set and gain any control of the rallies. She was even able to hit spectacular counter-punch shots from defensive positions in the court, even when she found herself chasing balls down. She can move side to side, and explode forward, a lot better than most of her colleagues. It means that against Rybarikova’s low-paced shots, she will likely have her chance to frequently get in position, in order to unleash her powerful baseline strokes.

Photo: Shaun Botterill – Getty Images Europe

The outcome of this match will for the most part depend on two things. First, in terms of on-court tactics, the way both players handle the first shots in the rallies – meaning the returns, first-serves and their percentages, accuracy of the second shot the 1-2 punch pattern – will largely determine the outcome of the points. Garbine’s success rate in these will prove central to her game plan. The last thing she wants is to allow Rybarikova to park herself in the middle area of the court, switch her “slice-dice-direct” mode in active mode, and make Muguruza guess the next shot instead of the other way round. Second, in terms of inner game, the way Rybarikova handles being in the semis of a Major for the first time in her career, against a player appreciated by the Wimbledon crowd, will make the difference in the first 20 minutes of the match. Luckily, it is not her first outing on Centre Court where she already defeated Pliskova and finished her match against Vandeweghe.

I do not consider Muguruza a heavy favorite in this match, as most people do. In fact, I believe Rybarikova, with a solid start in the first couple of games, has a legitimate chance to derail Garbine. I am intrigued!

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