Category: Tactical Analysis

Miami Open Match Report: Alexander Zverev vs Borna Coric (quarterfinal)

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Although Alexander “Sascha” Zverev, ranked no.5 in the ATP and holder of six career titles, should have been on paper the favorite to win when he stepped on the court to face Borna Coric, the 36th-ranked Croat, for his quarterfinal match at the Miami Open, most tennis fans who follow the game closely knew better.

Outside of his first-round loss at the Australian Open, Coric had enjoyed an impressive 2018 season, including a semifinal appearance in Indian Wells and a trio of three-set victories, all against quality opponents, to reach the quarterfinals in Miami. Having played nine matches in three weeks, with five of them extending to three sets, he had appeared to answer the call physically and mentally.

There was also their head-to-head record that favored Coric 2-0 when they started the match. Both previous encounters were extremely close, with Borna winning 7-5 3-6 7-6 in Cincinnati in 2015 and 3-6 7-5 7-6 7-6 at the US Open in 2017.

Coric vs Zverev – Cincinnati, 2015

Simply put, there was every reason to expect an intriguing match that was hard to predict.

It ended up more one-sided than expected, with Zverev outplaying Coric in almost every facet of the game. I have a couple of lingering thoughts on these two players that I want to put on paper, or on the computer screen in this case, but let’s get to the story of the match first, because every match has one.

Zverev’s straight-set victory today did not happen because he did one thing to which Coric could not find a solution or because Coric had a bad day at the office all around, or because Zverev happened to win the few key points that decided the outcome, although the 6-4 6-4 scoreline would suggest the latter. Few differences coming into play intermittently made it possible for Zverev to never be in any trouble throughout the match.

Zverev served well, on both first and second serves. Yes, his percentage on first-serve points won was striking at 83%, but the depth on his second serves was majestic. He was able to apply persistent pressure Coric during rallies. So, what should Coric, or any player facing this problem, do to tackle this problem? One possible solution is to step in on your opponent’s second serve and return aggressively in order to take away his baseline drives from the beginning of the point.

Yet, every time Coric attempted to take charge with his return on the German’s second serves, Sascha came up with high-velocity and/or high-bouncing serves that landed on the back line of the service box, forcing Coric to step back or hit the return at a higher point than his sweet spot, in case he did not step back.

If you need examples, see the 2-1, 40-15 and the 4-3, 40-15 points in the first set. In the latter, for instance, Sascha lands a fabulous second serve that pushes Borna back and forces him into a defensive return. In other words, Coric had no choice but resort to doing the opposite of what he initially intended to do when he stepped up to return. Thus, Sascha controls the second shot, Coric has to scramble on defense, and the point ends with Sascha hitting the winner on the third shot.

There is your explanation as to how Zverev won 75% of the points launched with his second serve. When you can complement your 83% first-serve points won – he literally won two or three free points in each serving game with his first serve – with a 75% rate on your second-serve points won, and commit zero double faults, you get to win your service games comfortably. Zverev lost only 5 points on his service games in the second set. Coric’s only two chances to break came in the very first service game of the match by Zverev.

And that brings me to my pet peeve, which is the importance of the first two games of a set and their underrated existence in match analyses. I bet Coric would like to replay that 30-40 break point at 1-0 up in the beginning of the match, the one in which he missed a routine forehand deep.

Speaking of errors, they were another factor that contributed to Coric’s inability to worry Zverev. As I noted above, Coric did not particularly play badly. He did, however, err uncharacteristically on some important points. The above at 1-0 up, break point, was perhaps the most important one.

Photo: Matthew Stockman – Getty Images

There were also the two unforced errors that made him trail 15-40, at 3-3 in the second set. He got out of that hole, so initially it may seem like a no-biggie in retrospect. But when you do that two service games in a row and fight hard to dig yourself out of each hole, it carries long-term consequences. When you get behind in the score due to those types of errors, although they end up not costing you in those two games (Coric also saved two break points in the 1-1 game), harm your confidence in your ground strokes. The resulting mental dent may come back to haunt you later in the set.

It most likely did for Coric, in the most crucial game of the second set, when he served at 4-4. At 15-15, he missed a backhand down-the-line deep that he would make nine out ten times. He followed it up with another routine cross-court backhand missed wide, and he found himself down two break points once again. He saved the first one but could not save the second (sixth in the set), committing yet another backhand error. It was probably the worst service game played by Coric from the baseline but having to dance on thin ice on your service games throughout the set while your opponent is winning his serves with ease, can crush you when the match is on the line.

Again, it was not like Coric performed badly throughout the match from the baseline. In fact, in those break points that he saved in the second set, he played some of his best tennis. He bravely hit a rocket backhand down-the-line on one, put his touch on display with a fine drop volley on another, and got a big first serve in on a third one. Zverev did not perform far above his standards from the baseline either. He also committed some errors. The German was, however, the more pro-active player, looking for openings, stepping inside the baseline, changing the pace of the ball, while Coric parked three meters behind the baseline, mostly retrieving, relying on his legs, and playing the reactive role.

Put all the above together and you get a convincing win in favor of Sascha, not in the form of a blow-out (which is more likely to occur if one player had a weakness that the other relentlessly exploited or if one player did everything a little better than the other), but in the form of a steady stream of shifting advantages appearing through various facets of the game, resulting in the inevitable.

I will conclude with one last lingering thought specifically with regard to these two players – and a handful of others with the same obsession, Karen Khachanov comes to mind.

Both players possess better backhands than forehands. Yet, they both occasionally, and inexplicably, move around their backhands to hit forehands. It is baffling to say the least and I am not even sure that it benefits them. Coric and Zverev do not have bad forehands per se and they are capable of accelerating using them. It is just that they can cause the same damage, or more, I would argue, with their backhands. I also believe that Borna and Sascha are themselves aware of the fact that they have better overall skills on their backhands than on their forehands.

So, why then, this obsession with hitting a forehand when you can line-up your strongest shot from the exact same spot? I can provide several detailed examples from this match alone for both players, but I will just stick to a few by Zverev. In the 2-1, 15-0 point, he chooses to hit a forehand and misses. In the 40-15 point at 5-3, he hits three great backhands, puts Coric on the defensive, then moves to hit a forehand on the next shot and misses deep. On the deuce point at 1-1 in the second set, he takes a few steps to run around the backhand, and strikes a forehand that lands behind the baseline.

I would argue that in each one of those points, Zverev would have gotten better results if he got his feet positioned and took those same cuts with his backhand.

In fact, a sequence in the fourth game of the second set shows that he can. In the 2-1 game, at 15-15, Zverev runs around the backhand and produces an inside-out forehand winner. Guess what? Two points later, Coric hits the ball slightly more to Zverev’s backhand side, and this time, Zverev does not around. He sets up and strikes a backhand. He produces almost an identical winner to the one from two points ago, except on his backhand this time, and with a sharper angle.

Photo: Micheal Reaves – Getty Images

I discussed this obsession of certain players with one of the leading tacticians in our game at Roland Garros two years ago and he said that there were studies showing that players can accelerate – or create power – with their forehands better than their backhands. He was not necessarily arguing to the contrary, but data apparently showed that hitting forehands is the preferred method of players when taking charge of a point. I have no doubt that the majority of the ATP players can power up the amp with their forehands. However, using that particular point to draw a blanket conclusion that forehands are preferable to backhands is one that I am not willing to accept.

Zverev will next play the Spaniard Pablo Carreno-Busta, another baseline monster, for a spot in the final. I predict that the German will have to decide a number of times in that match whether to run around the backhand or not. If he does, his forehand better be operating at maximum capacity.

Until next time, enjoy the tennis!

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Miami Open Match Report: Denis Shapovalov vs Sam Querrey (3rd round)

ATP Players Tactical Analysis 2 Comments

A friend of mine texted me in the beginning of this match’s deciding set and asked: “Can we please talk about Shapo’s serves?” It was a rhetorical question of course, her way of languishing in the misery of watching Denis Shapovalov, one of her favorite players, hit only 37% of his first serves in for the first set, and 32% for the second, while throwing in seven double faults for good measure.

I answered her question with another one, except mine was on a positive note: “Can we please talk about Shapo’s second serves?”

The main reason why Shapovalov was still in the match was precisely because he gave a clinic for one set on how to win points when your first serve temporarily disappears. The problem was that he was playing against a top 20 player and you can only live on your second serves for so long against that type of competition. The Canadian’s first-serve began working better in the late stages of the match, but before we get there, let us take a closer look at the first set.

Both players seemed to start with similar game plans in mind. Each knew that the other would prioritize offense over all else, but instead of focusing on defending well, they seemed to have decided that attacking furiously, early in the point, was the best defense. Making the occasional error was acceptable within this game plan, as long as the opponent did not get to win points on his terms.

Querrey began by serving big, aiming for direct points or big cuts on follow-up ground strokes if Shapovalov happened to get the return back in the court. He did make an error at 40-15, but again, that was within acceptable parameters, because he won the other points thanks to big serves or by forcing Denis into errors.

Photo: Matthew Stockman – Getty Images

Querrey took a big cut on the return on Shapovalov’s second serve to start the next game. Denis was ready. He set his feet quickly and sent the ball back with the same pace. Sam was caught off guard and made the error. 15-0 Shapovalov.

Sam tried another explosive return on the next point. Denis responded even better this time, nailing a spectacular winner with his backhand as he was backing up from the American’s aggressive return. 30-0 Shapovalov.

The Canadian added an ace to go up 40-0.

He followed that with a double fault, surely caused by his attempt at a risky second serve, aware of Querrey’s intention to whack the return. Querrey did go for another rocket return at 40-15, and again, Shapovalov answered the call with a solid backhand down-the-line to the open corner. Querrey did get to the ball but missed it under pressure.

The initial response to the Querrey charge succeeded.

That serving game was the best reaction Shapovalov could have put together to plant seeds of doubt in Querrey’s mind that just power alone would not be enough to oust the Canadian today.

The shift in tone carried into the next game that decided the set. Shapovalov essentially showed Querrey that he can beat the American in his own game. He turned the tables around and went for bazookas on returns, just like the American tried to do in the previous game. At 40-30, he punished Sam’s second serve two points in a row with big forehand returns. Sam saved that break point. Later in the game, on another deuce, Shapovalov went for another big cut on a backhand return that landed on the baseline. Querrey barely got it back and Shapovalov put the forehand away, earning his third break point. He finally got the break on another huge forehand return, this time for a clean winner.

When Shapovalov held serve easily to confirm the break and go up 3-1, Querrey was facing an unpleasant reality. He came out with what he thought was a good plan. It worked in the first game. Then, Denis essentially said, “not so fast Sam.” He turned the challenge around and threw it back at Sam. And precisely where Denis had the answers, Sam did not.

Whereas Shapovalov quickly adjusted to handling Querrey’s monster-return tactic in the second game of the match, Querrey could not handle Shapovalov’s big returns in the following game. That is because Querrey’s legs are not as agile as Shapovalov’s and do not react as quickly to an offensive shot.

Whereas Shapovalov needed one game in which the American had to largely resort to second serves to go up a break, Querrey could not break Shapovalov’s serve all set long, even though the Canadian played with a 37% first-serve percentage. That is because Shapovalov relentlessly varied the placement and speed of his second serves throughout the set.

It’s not that Querrey played a bad set. In fact, he attacked relentlessly, often with success. He served big or used the 1-2 punch after a big serve, and as a result, held serve easily for the rest of the set. Except that the damage was already done. He happened to under-perform on his first serve for one game during which his second serve did not penetrate (or kick, or slice) enough to stop Denis from finding enough rhythm to launch one big return after another. Denis, in comparison, under-performed on his first serve for the whole set, yet he never faced a break point.

If you regularly read my posts, you probably know that I prefer to give concrete examples to illustrate my observations. As for Shapovalov’s second-serve efficiency, the 3-2 game is an excellent example and here is what you will see. Down 0-15, Shapovalov serves and volleys to get back to 15-15. Then, he throws in a heavy-spin second serve that collects an error from Querrey. Up 30-15, he loses the point but goes for a wide, slice serve, which he had not tried previously. He follows that up with a flat first serve, earning a direct point to go up 40-30. Sam gets back to deuce. Dennis misses his first serve again. He hits a high-pace second serve, catching Sam off balance. The American’s return is short and Denis attacks, forcing Sam into a defensive lob that sails long. Denis then closes out the game with a big first serve.

Just look at how many different types of serves the American had to confront even though the majority were second serves. He had to return low on a serve-and-volley, lunge to the outside on a wide serve, step inside the court only to jerk back quickly to get a high-paced second serve back, only to mention a few.

For an additional example, see the 30-15 point at 4-3; a second serve by Shapovalov lands so deep in the service box that Querrey, who stepped inside the baseline with the intention of producing a big return, does not have enough time to make a full swing and misses the return deep.

At the end of the set, Shapovalov had collected 10 out of 19 second-serve points and never faced a break point. He did win 11/11 first-serve points. Imagine if Shapovalov landed most of his first serves in!

You cannot, however, count on winning two successive sets in the third-round of an ATP 1000 event, against a top-20 player, while making less than 40% of your first serves and recording an increasing number of double faults (2 in the first, 5 in each of the next two sets). Shapovalov’s first-serve percentage did not improve in the second set and it did not take long before it caught up to him.

1-0 down in the second set, the Canadian double-faulted twice, once on game point at 40-30, and again on break point, and fell behind 2-0. Querrey raced to a double-break lead when he broke Shapovalov’s serve again in the sixth game. It was on another mediocre service game by Shapovalov in which he double-faulted twice again and missed an easy forehand volley in the net on break point.

When Querrey closed out the second set 6-3, the only question that mattered to Shapovalov was whether he could improve his first-serve percentage or not. He did, to a whopping (!) 53% in the third set. Yet, it was once again his second serve that kept him in the match when the third set began.

At 30-30 in the first game, he hit a great kick serve to the “T” and jammed Querrey’s backhand into his body. Sam’s return fell short and Shapovalov hit the winner to go up 40-30. Three points later, Shapovalov pocketed the game on another kick second serve that bounced so high that Sam had to jump to hit at the last moment. He missed it deep.

During the 2-2 game, Denis’s first serve finally began to come back. It was a contested game that saw Querrey have four chances at breaking Shapovalov’s serve. On three of those, Denis did not need his second serve, winning two of them directly on his first serves. He finished the game with an ace and grabbed the 3-2 lead.

Shapovalov would have to save two more break points in the 3-3 game, one with a hard serve to the service-box ‘T’ and the other with an ace. He won that game on another wonderful kick serve that bounced high into Sam’s body, causing him to miss the return.

At 5-5, Shapovalov would double-fault twice more to go down yet another break point at 30-40, only to save it, yet again, with a big first serve that allowed him to hit a winner on the next shot.

Photo: Matthew Stockman – Getty Images

Having saved seven break points since 1-1 in this deciding set, Shapovalov would only need one chance himself to break Querrey’s serve. It came in the 6-5 game. Querrey made only one first serve in the game and committed three routine baseline errors, including the backhand in the net on match point. It was an abrupt ending, considering how comfortably Sam had been holding serves since the early break in the set.

While Shapovalov’s first-serve percentage barely climbed above 50% in the final set, he got them in on six out of the seven break points saved in the final set. Out of those six points, five were won directly on his first serve. Querrey, for his part, had his worst first-serve percentage in the final set at 36%.

In other words, the first-serve percentage numbers from the first set were essentially reversed in the third set and that brings me to my last point about the difference in this match. When Querrey had to overwhelmingly resort to second serves in the third set, he depended on winning those points from the baseline. It worked for the most part, but all it took was a single string of bad errors (four in that last game) for things to fall apart for Querrey. Unlike Denis, he could not collect many free points on his second serves.

When Shapovalov missed his first serves in the first set, he was still able keep Querrey off balance on returns through the use of different speeds and spins on his second serves. He would thus earn some effort-free points on return errors by Sam or collect weak enough returns to finish the point himself on the next shot.

I would speculate that Martin Laurendeau, Shapovalov’s coach, is extremely pleased with the match, not because his pupil played particularly well, but because he ‘performed’ at a high level. By that I mean, Denis showed high IQ in terms of problem-solving when Querrey came out swinging very early, dealt with the malfunctioning of one of his main weapons (first serves) by meticulously regulating his second serves, remained cool-headed numerous times under pressure throughout the third set, and rediscovered his missing weapon during the extended stages of the match.

In the fourth round, Shapovalov will take another rising youngster, the Indian Wells semifinalist Borna Coric.

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Miami Open Match Report: Kyle Edmund – Frances Tiafoe (2nd round)

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This encounter appeared to be one of the most intriguing match-ups of the day when the order of play was initially announced. It pitted two rising stars of this year, Kyle Edmund, the highest-ranked British player at no.26 and a semifinalist at the Australian Open, against the American Frances Tiafoe (no.63) who had won his maiden ATP title just a little less than a month ago in Delray Beach.

The match lived up to its billing, not necessarily in terms of quality, but certainly in terms of the twists and turns that it took until the very end of the three-set duel.

From the start, it became clear that both players were going to have considerable edge on their service games, as long as their first-serve percentages remained high. Edmund began with a blank game, hitting three out of four first serves and never having to hit the second shot. Tiafoe returned the favor with a blank game of his own, not missing any first serves. Edmund replied with two aces in the third game for another easy hold and Tiafoe held firm with his second routine hold to get back to 2-2.

You get the picture, don’t you? The first serves were so dominant that by the time it was 5-5, each game averaged around 2,5 minutes. There had been no break points and only one deuce. The first set lasted a brief 45 minutes despite ending with a tiebreaker.

Photo: Matthew Stockman – Getty Images

The only break point – a set point for Edmund at the same time – was in the 6-5 game and it needed a lot of unusual things to occur for it to take place. At 30-15, Tiafoe made an unforced error on his forehand that had been working well until then. Then, a framed-forehand return by Edmund happened to land on the baseline (more on Edmund’s frame mishits later), completely catching Tiafoe unprepared. Frances barely got the ball back on an off-balance shot that landed short. Edmund attacked with his forehand, forcing Tiafoe into an error. Out of nowhere, the Brit found himself up a set point. It was too much variation in an otherwise metronomic set. Frances needed to reset the system. He served three big serves in a row – the third one, an ace – and carried the set into a tiebreaker.

So far, I have talked about how dominating first serves were in the first set, but I would not want you to think that the players served a ton of aces. At 6-6, Tiafoe had six aces and Edmund had two, so nothing groundbreaking there. On the other hand, they had one double fault combined (Edmund), and each played with an extremely high rate of first-serve percentage, Tiafoe at 95%, Edmund at 75%, but there was even more to it than that.

First serves were dominating in the sense that both players collected a ton of points in the form of 1-2 punches (winning on the second shot after a weak return caused by an effective first serve) or in the form of 1-2-3 punches (in which the third shot is a winning volley after a good approach shot on a short return, thanks to an effective first serve).

The returner never seemed to get out of the hole even when he was able to return and manage to get in a rally, because he would be stuck defending from the first shot forward. For an example of this, see the 5-5, 15-0 point. Edmund gets the first serve in, takes an offensive position in the court and runs Tiafoe ragged for the rest of the point behind the baseline, until the American eventually misses after multiple scramble shots.

It should come as no surprise then, that at 6-6, both players were hovering in the mid-80% range on points won on first serves. That set seemed to have “tiebreaker” written all over it from the beginning. Yet, the tiebreaker itself completely deviated from the norms.

It all started with Tiafoe leading 3-2 and serving. Until then, he was 100% on first-serve points won. He got the first serve in and Edmund hit an average return that gave Tiafoe a high forehand to attack. It was the 1-2-punch pattern that had worked to perfection for the American until then. Tiafoe nailed it deep behind the baseline. At 3-3, he got another solid first serve in and Edmund pulled perhaps his best return of the set, a rocket forehand that landed smack on the baseline, and went up 4-3. Tiafoe just lost the first (and only) two points of the set on a total of 37 points that started with his first serve.

So, you would think that with two serves coming, Edmund had a significant advantage, especially if he gets his first serves in. He did, on both points, and he lost both points on errors, the second one being an unforced one. Four points in a row lost by the server despite all starting with first serves in this match? Bizarre indeed, but as many on social media would say, with a hashtag attached to it, “that’s #Tennis.”

There was one more twist. At 4-5, Edmund had a forehand sitter on the service line that he would usually put away with one eye closed. He literally hit the ball with the frame of his racket, sending it to the sky and far behind the baseline. Tiafoe had two set points at 6-4. He needed only one. With an ace he pocketed the first set 7-6.

Edmund must have been disappointed at losing the set. He had a set point and led 4-3 in the tiebreaker with two serves to follow. Also, he probably knew that the match could easily turn around in his favor at any point if he could manage to break his opponent’s serve. After all, Tiafoe never came close to breaking his serve in the first set.

The American would not fare much better in the second set in that department, earning only one break point. To make matters worse for him, he would play his first below-average serving game on the fourth game of the set and get broken. He would double fault to start the game, then at 30-15, he would hit a wacky slice forehand approach shot on a last-second decision that would float out. Down a break point, he would hit the forehand approach shot in the net for good measure, giving Edmund a much-needed adrenaline shot in the arm.

Kyle rode the only break of the match all the way to the end of the set, winning it 6-4. Other than the break point that Edmund saved by an ace at 4-3, the rest of the set reflected more or less the pattern of the match, meaning routine service holds.

As the third set began, it was very hard to predict which player would come out on top. Edmund had the only break of the match, but there had only been a total of four break points in the 22 games played in the first two sets. First-serve percentages remained high, and it looked like unless one of the two had an unexpectedly dismal serving game (à-la fourth game of the second set by Tiafoe), another tiebreaker loomed large on the horizon.

In fact, the first game only served to reaffirmed that expectation. Tiafoe had to resort to second serves in the first three points and lost all three. Down 0-40, he got his next five first serves in, and other than the forehand smacked in the net by Edmund at 15-40, he had little trouble coming back to hold his serve. There were three more routine service holds and the scoreboard showed 2-2 in the final set.

There was one small variation though. While both players were winning almost 100% of their first serves, they were hardly winning any of their second-serve points. They were a combined 2 out of 10 on those, up to that point in the third set. That was different than in the first two sets. Tiafoe was the one to suffer from this problem in the fifth game. He got only one first serve in – an ace, naturally – and made three unforced errors on rallies started with his second serves. Edmund broke to go up 3-2 and it looked like a repeat of the second set was forthcoming.

Until 5-4…

On the first point, Edmund got the first serve in and Tiafoe returned short, like zillion other times before, except that this time, instead of completing the 1-2 punch, like he has zillion other times before, Edmund framed the backhand wide to go down 0-15. At 15-15, Edmund got his first serve in again, but Tiafoe returned well, and a rally ensued. After several shots, Edmund framed the backhand again and Tiafoe punished the ball that landed short with a clean forehand winner to go up 15-30. You could sense the crowd intensity go up a notch. Was an unlikely break finally on the way for the American?

At 30-30, Edmund’s backhand let him down again, this time missing deep on a routine cross-court shot. At 30-40, Edmund approached the net and missed a low backhand volley into the net. The improbable happened. Edmund played his first less-than-average serving game and lost 3 out of 4 points on those started with his first serve. Tiafoe got his first and only – and truly golden – break of the match to stay alive and level the match at one set each, five games each.

Photo: Clive Brunskill – Getty Images

At 5-5, Edmund had another chance to take charge when he led 15-40 on the American’s serve. He had a look at a second serve and hit his third framed shot in the last two games, a forehand return this time, that landed wide (I promise, no more mentions of “frame” shots). Tiafoe followed it up with three big serves to go up 6-5. Not much seemed to go right for Edmund in the last five minutes. He was looking to hold his serve for the 16th time in a row and shake his opponent’s hand as the victor about five minutes ago. Now, he was looking to hold to stay alive and get to a tiebreaker to decide the final set.

For a moment, it looked like he would not even get there. The best point of the match, a spectacular rally during which Kyle threw the kitchen sink and more at Frances, only to see the American get everything back and win the point with a brilliant counter-punch winner, gave the first point of the game to Tiafoe. He would eventually get to a match point at 30-40. Credit to Edmund who played a solid point of his own, approaching the net and challenging Tiafoe to pass him from a difficult position. Frances could not, and Edmund held serve two points later, forcing the tiebreaker.

So, yes, the match did indeed go to the tiebreaker in the final set, just not in the way you would have expected. The tiebreaker would not stick to the script either. Tiafoe would go up 6-1, only to see Edmund climb back to 6-5. On match point number five, Tiafoe would step up to the baseline, toss the ball up, and end the match with an ace.

It was a glorious victory for Tiafoe, and a heavy defeat for Edmund. It was so, not because both players performed at a very high level – in fact, the quality of tennis went slightly down in the final set.

It was a glorious victory for Tiafoe, rather because he had to play for an extended period of time with the burden of letting the match get away from him after having won a close first set, and yet find the determination within himself to finally overcome the barrier that sapped his mind for almost two hours – the inability to break Edmund’s serve – and do so precisely when it counted.

It was a heavy defeat for Edmund, rather because he felt like he had the victory within his reach for the better part of the match, only to have it snatched out of his hands at the last second. It may also bring up some larger questions for Edmund’s camp. The Brit, following a stellar month of January, has now been upset in his first matches, both in Indian Wells and in Miami. The hip injury that followed the Australian Open may have temporarily halted his progress more than expected. One can only hope that he does not have to go through a more complicated mental-recuperation process than he has had to go through on the physical side.

Next challenge for Tiafoe will be the 10th seed Tomas Berdych.

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Miami Open Match Report: Diego Schwartzman vs Nicolas Jarry (2nd round)

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Assuming you have some knowledge of these two players’ games and you only see the final score of the match, you probably thought that it was a straight-forward affair. In other words, you probably thought that Diego Schwartzman remained solid from the baseline and Jarry, unable to penetrate his opponent’s armor, committed many errors and faded away as the match progressed.

Photo: Tennis Accent – @accent_tennis on Twitter

You would not be wrong. In fact, you may be understating the facts of this 67-minute-long encounter. Jarry did indeed commit 44 unforced errors vs 7 by Schwartzman – no, I do not include double faults in the unforced-error count, thank you very much. Yet, every match has a story, and this one also contains some nuances that go deeper than what the score and stats show.

One of those nuances is the underrated IQ of Schwartzman. Yes, it was a good match-up for Diego. His strength is comprised of footwork, returns, and baseline consistency. What better player to face for him than one that depends on big shots, big serves, but at the same time, one that is prone to errors if he must produce them continually? Jarry happens to be one of those types of opponents.

Yet, every match begins at 0-0 and you have to incorporate those advantages into the early points of the match to set the tone for later. If you don’t come out sharp mentally and your big-hitting opponent gets ahead and builds confidence, he can overpower you with winners. Jarry also happens to be one of those types of opponents.

The Chilean has been on the rise as of late and came into this tournaments in good form. Having concluded 2017 at number 100, his 2018 has been nothing but stellar, placing him at number 65 as the Miami Open began.

It would have most likely been enough for Schwartzman to keep his errors to a minimum, even if Jarry had started on a high note. As long as his baseline game remained solid, he would eventually wear the Chilean down and win the points that mattered. The score would have been closer, but he would have grabbed the victory. Well, he had the clarity to go beyond that which would have been enough.

He made adjustments in small doses, beginning as early as in the first game, while remaining loyal to his overall plan A. The goal was to get doubt to creep in Jarry’s mind early, thus not having to depend on a clutch point or two later to break the match free. Credit to Schwartzman for having done exactly that.

Jarry started the match serving. He went up 40-30, thanks largely to his big first serves and/or the use of 1-2 punch thanks to those serves. Diego’s returns were not particularly bad, but Jarry’s plan was crystal clear. He needed to put the heat on Schwartzman immediately and force him to do more than just keep the play in play. This plan played into Jarry’s strengths, on paper at least. He can create openings with his powerful forehand and his flat backhand. He can also serve big, as well as vary his spots in the box.

The problem is, as noted before, Schwartzman has one of the best returns in the ATP and two of the fastest legs on the tour. To make matters worse, he can counter-punch from defensive positions better than the majority of the ATP field. And boy, did he ever put those skills to use as soon as the match started.

Schwartzman quickly realized that he needed to stop Jarry from taking charge after the serve. He began to go for his returns. It may have seemed like the obvious thing to do, but Schwartzman specifically looked to land the return close to the baseline, and at a higher pace (at the cost of missing one or two), to catch Jarry off-guard and make him take a few steps back in a hurry. He sent a message to Jarry that the Chilean could not simply serve and prepare for the next shot inside the baseline. He wanted to take away the 1-2 punch from Jarry. It worked. He kept Jarry at bay, on the baseline, and made him have to force the issue from there. Jarry erred on a couple of shots, and before he knew it, Schwartzman had stolen the game from him.

The first task was completed. For a player like Jarry who considers his serve as one of his main weapons, getting broken on the first game of the match surely caused a significant dent in his confidence. Schwartzman, for his part, still needed to confirm the break to complete the second half of that step.

At 1-0, he went up 30-15 but committed two double-faults to go down a break point. On the break point, Schwartzman did not dwell on those two double faults that seemed to come out of nowhere. He focused and went back to basics. He got the serve in and forced Jarry to engage in a long rally. It ended with the latter committing the error. Two points later, Schwartzman held serve and confirmed the break. He was now up 2-0 without even having performed at his best.

Still only down a break, Jarry pressed on. To get an idea of the mountain he already had to climb, watch the first and third points of the ensuing 2-0 game. In the first point, Jarry attempted several risky shots to put Schwartzman under pressure, but the Argentine not only got all of his opponents’ shots back but added some extra sauce on them. The rally ended with Jarry’s error. In the third point, Jarry put in an impressive serve and stepped into the court, expecting a weak return. Schwartzman returned deep, pushed Jarry back behind the baseline, and eventually won the point from the baseline on a Jarry error once again.

These details were bound to mess with Jarry’s mental sharpness. I mean, what did he have to do in order to put together a successful string of games and get back in the match? And that is where this particular match-up problem rises to the surface. Jarry, as his game stands now, even with the confidence built on the improved results of late, simply does not have many options other than to keep pressing a pesky opponent like Schwartzman. He must continue to take risks and push the envelope.

To his credit, Jarry did seek solutions. He added some backhand slices to change the pace during rallies, hoping that Schwartzman may give him a short ball to work with. He opted for the drop shot a few times, like in the first point of the 3-1 game, looking to bring Diego to the net. In fact, that whole 3-1 game is the second (and last) example among many that I am willing to give in this piece if you are interested in seeing just how much Jarry had to work – and risk – just to earn a point from Schwartzman.

A last glimmer of hope appeared for Jarry when he broke Schwartzman’s serve, on his fourth break-point opportunity, after a contested sixth game that included a few uncharacteristic errors by the Argentine. Jarry’s hopes were quickly dashed, however, when Diego rose to the challenge and played his best return game of the match.

Once Schwartzman held to go up 5-3, you could tell that Jarry’s resolve had taken a substantial hit. Not only was Schwartzman performing at a higher level better than in the beginning of the match, but he was also limiting Jarry’s options in the process, thus chipping away at the Chilean’s belief.

Jarry’s footwork in the 5-3 game looked like one that belonged to someone who felt dejected. He made a terrible drop-shot attempt on the first point, followed it with two forehand unforced errors on the second and third points. Then, he missed a volley on the 15-40 point to lose the set 6-3.

The second set followed more or less the same pattern. Schwartzman had apparently done the bulk of his work in the first seven games of the match. He never deviated from his successful plan while Jarry kept pounding and missing.

The match ended 6-3 6-1 in Schwartzman’s favor in one hour and 17 minutes, but this loss should by no means diminish what Jarry had accomplished so far this year. The Chilean’s game has the make-up necessary to climb up the rankings. If Jarry ever needed clarity on what he needs to work to reach the next step in his progress, he could not have asked for a better feedback than this match. Schwartzman presented him with the type of barriers that he will need to overcome before turning a veritable threat to the higher-ranked players.

In the next round, Schwartzman will take on the Canadian Milos Raonic.

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Indian Wells Match Report: Milos Raonic vs Joao Sousa (3rd round)

ATP Players Tactical Analysis No Comments

Milos Raonic launched his 2018 campaign in Brisbane in January following a three-month injury-related break that he probably wanted to leave behind as fast as possible. What he has done in the first three months of this year, however, has only been the continuation of the nightmare, except that instead of recovering from injury, he found himself trying to recover from disappointing losses. The Canadian began the year with two first-round losses in Brisbane and at the Australian Open. It takes time to recover from injury, especially for a big guy like Milos, but surely, he was hoping for a better record than 1-3 and an ATP ranking of 38 (last week it was 40, his lowest since 2011) coming into the BNP Parisbas Open in Indian Wells.

Well, his record is leveled at 3-3 after two wins vs Félix Auger-Aliassime and Joao Sousa. His match on Tuesday against the 85th-ranked Sousa was, at least on paper, a straight-forward matchup between an attacker with a big serve and a retriever-counterpuncher with a reliable footwork. Most of the encounter lived up to that billing, with the outcome resting on a game or two here and there. Raonic, being the aggressor and donning a clear weapon, his serve, was the player more likely to decide the fate of the match.

Milos did get couple of assists from Sousa, but it was his shot-making (or shall I say “serve-making with the support of some other shots”?) or his errors that oscillated the match one way or the other.

Photo: Jeff Gross – Getty Images

One aspect of his game plan that had an immediate impact, on Sousa particularly, was his decision to nail as many forehands as possible for winners on his opponent’s second-serve returns. He blatantly ran around his backhand and went for forehand winners each time he saw a second serve coming from Sousa. The Canadian also served big both on first and second serves, even by his standards, from the very first game forward. He seemed determined to finish the point with one shot, period. It was an astute strategy**. Sousa is a pesky player who can run down many balls and create angles from the baseline. The last thing Raonic wanted to do was to resort to extended rallies against an opponent who relies on building his rhythm with longer points.

**Side note 1: I reject the notion that what I described here is “always Raonic’s strategy” thus implying that it has nothing to do with astuteness. Milos is a hihgly intelligent player and to say that he solely does one thing and never varies it only shows that the person making the claim has hardly ever watched Raonic and seen that he often adjusts his return position, his serve’s placement, and the amount of slice he adds to his backhand depending on his opponent.

The example of the first game should suffice to illustrate Raonic’s desire to cut the point short. Most servers start pulling their biggest serves when they are well into the match and there comes a moment when they feel physically and mentally geared to make a run. Their focus peaks and they “free-flow” into hitting one service bomb after another. This does not usually happen in the very beginning of the match. Unless, evidently, your name is Milos Raonic.

His very first serve of the match was a 143 mph bazooka that Sousa could not return in the court. Milos missed the next first serve at 144 mph. In the third point, he nailed a 125 mph second serve that forced an error out of Sousa. In the fourth point, his second serve had such an overwhelming kick that Sousa, bewildered by the bounce, swung the air with his racket. It was a clean ace. The first game was over in one minute and 55 seconds, and it lasted that long only because the second point turned out to be an eleven-shot rally.

Therefore, when one looks at Raonic’s first-serve percentage for the first set, it can be misleading. It stood at 43% when the set ended. Low number by any means, but not as dismal as you might think if you observed how much he went for on them from the opening point. In fact, he only lost two points when he did put them in. He also won the majority of points on his second serves because he was taking risks on them too. Although he would like to at least serve over 50% first serves, his priority here was to cut the point short even if it came at the cost of committing few more errors.

He finished the match at 57% first-serve percentage largely thanks to the third set during which he made 15 out 20 first serves. He won 41 out of the 46 points that started with his first serves, losing only one in the second set, ironically the only one he lost.

As noted above, where the strategy really paid off for Raonic was on returns. He sent an early message to Sousa that the Portuguese better get his first serve in, or else**. In his first two service games, Raonic moved around his backhand side to unload his forehand on Sousa’s second serves, and won a large majority of those points. In fact, Sousa would go on to win only around 20% of his second-serve points for the first two sets and finish the match at 29%.

**Side note 2: By the way, Raonic did not limit his risk-taking on returns to Sousa’s second serves. Whenever he could get his feet set, he also unleashed his forehand on Sousa’s first ones. If you wonder the effect his returns had overall on Sousa, look at the expression on Joao’s face immediately after Raonic hits a warp-speed return at deuce in the 2-1 game, on a solid, wide first serve by the Portuguese no less. Sousa barely gets his racket on it, loses the point to face the third break point in that game, and smiles sarcastically toward his box, probably wondering how Milos was pulling those returns.

You could sense, very early in the match, Sousa’s malaise on second serves when that reality set in. Raonic’s aggressive returns led to two double faults by Sousa in his second-serving game of the match at 1-2. Both double faults came after Raonic punished Sousa’s second serves in the preceding points (at 15-15, and 30-30). Sousa then had to battle for 9 minutes 55 seconds and save five break points in order to survive that game.

Strangely, it was Sousa that got to break Raonic first at 4-4. It was the only game in which Raonic did not get a first serve in and double-faulted twice. It also helped that Sousa’s shot clipped the net and dropped over for a winner on break point. In the ensuing game, Sousa would give his first of two assists to Raonic. He started the 5-4 game with a double fault followed by a badly timed backhand slice that allowed Raonic to attack and win the next point to go up 0-30. Raonic broke serve to get to 5-5 and did it again at 6-5 to finish the first set. In that game, Raonic nailed another forehand return for a winner on a second serve by Sousa at 15-30. Sousa followed that up with a double fault, a pattern previously seen more than once in this set, and lost the first set 7-5. When you look at stats and see four double faults for Sousa in the first set, remember that they are in part products of Raonic’s tremendous pressure on his second serves.

A similar pattern took place in the second set, with a different ending. Again, Raonic served two double faults in the 4-4 game, and again, Sousa broke his serve to go up 5-4. Sousa would not let his opportunity get away this time. He played a very solid game** to hold comfortably and force a third set.

**Side note 3: I should note that Sousa played many solid games in this match and won most points that turned into baseline battles. This is no surprise, but it also shows how accurate Raonic was in his successful attempt to turn this match into one whose outcome depended on serves and returns, rather than winners and unforced errors hit during rallies.

Photo: Matthew Stockman – Getty Images

The turning point of the third set came when Sousa was serving at 2-3. Raonic deserves credit for extending the game to deuce, thanks to the fabulous forehand cross-court winner he hit on the run at 40-30. Then, Sousa gave Raonic his second – and definitive – assist. After an ace to earn another game point, Sousa netted a short, albeit low, forehand in the net on an approach shot. He would get a third chance at holding serve, but then would string together his worst sequence of three-points-in-a-row of the match at a most inopportune time.

He first attempted a serve-and-volley on an average first serve that Raonic was easily able to get down to his feet at the net. I have no idea why Joao would try to do the opposite of what has worked for him during the last hour, which is to engage Raonic in a rally, either to squeeze an error out of him or to approach the net when the short-ball opportunity presented itself. In fact, this formula worked more than once in the very game that he was playing. He missed the low backhand volley and the score went to deuce. He would then pass on a chance to come to the net in the next rally when he had a short ball on his forehand, probably because the volley miss from the last point was fresh in his mind. Few shots later in that rally, he netted a forehand to go down a break point, and followed it up with an angled forehand attempt from the middle of the court that went wide to lose his serve. It was poor decision-making for three successive points and his disappointment showed when he turned to his box to express it after losing the break point.

Raonic took control and raised his level considerably. He played his best tennis of the match in the last two games of the match, breaking Sousa’s serve one more time to win the match 7-5 4-6 6-2. He advanced on to the next round to face the streaky Marcos Baghdatis for a spot in the quarterfinals. Raonic’s game still has glitches and his movement is not at 100%, but playing more matches is precisely what the doctor ordered so the central task was accomplished.

At the end of the day, Sousa and Bahdatis are no more than other competitors who line up as his opponents on a given day. Milos is relentlessly harassed by a much more vicious and powerful nemesis than any single tennis player, one that methodically keeps hampering his progress: physical pain. In the bigger picture, it is nothing less than remarkable that he has been able to accumulate as many impressive results as he has in his career, considering that injuries have relentlessly pursued him since his early years on the tour, often with success, much to the dismay of his fans.

Having said that, you cannot build a game plan for your upcoming opponent around the notion of avoiding injury. Raonic must rather concentrate on repairing the existing glitches in his game. He must aim to win more efficiently than he did in Tuesday’s match against Sousa so that he can move on to the next round with the least amount of wear and tear to his body. And drawing up an efficient winning plan for the next match involves forehands, backhands, serves, winners, aces, angles, et cetera, as well as all the other x’s and o’s that matter once the first point begins. Winning, after all, leads to more match play and the more victories Milos can amass, while remaining healthy, the more confidence he can gain and the quicker he can return inside the top ten.

Until the next one, enjoy the BNP Parisbas Open!

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Indian Wells Match Report: Caroline Wozniacki – Aliaksandra Sasnovich (3rd round)

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After hovering in the 80-to-150 ranking range for the last few years, Aliaksandra Sasnovich is having a career year in 2018, having cracked the top 50 for the first time (no.49 currently). Prior to today’s match, the 23-year-old from Belarus had accumulated a number of quality wins this year and had a breakthrough tournament in Brisbane where, as a qualifier, she advanced to the finals before losing to Elina Svitolina. She had then reaffirmed her form by advancing to the third round of the Australian Open, her best result in a Major.

Caroline Wozniacki had a breakthrough of her own at the Australian Open, winning her first Major title in her 43rd participation in one. More importantly for her, the title ensured that she would never again have to answer that relentless question “a million times or a hundred thousand times.”

Photo: Adam Pretty – Getty Images

For a baseline player like Sasnovich who does not rely on consistently overpowering her opponent, Wozniacki represents a daunting challenge. It puts the Belarusian in this precarious domain where she faces a player who can do everything she does well but do them a little better than her (ok, maybe not drop shots, but that is a specialty shot, not one to build a game plan around). Such matchups often result in lop-sided scores because the better-skilled player beats the underdog at her own game and the latter feels the need to switch to another game plan with which she does not feel at ease.

Of course, there is always the possibility that the favorite may simply have an off day and commit an unexpectedly high amount of errors as a consequence of which the underdog may gain confidence and perform above her expected level. The underdog would also have to continue her form and not take the foot off the pedal. That would be the formula for an upset. The first part of the above equation did indeed materialize in the early games of this match on Stadium Court 1.

Wozniacki made three unforced errors in the first game of the match to lose her serve. After her fifth one at 15-15 in the next game, she switched rackets, but it was soon to become clear that the racket was not the cause of her erratic play**. By the time she lost her serve again to go down 0-3, she had committed six unforced errors and a double fault.

**Side note 1: She said after the match that she was “not a morning person” so maybe that was it (or something)? She also called her father for some coaching advice at 0-3, but the dialog came across more like a back-and-forth disagreement between the two than anything else.

The first part of the equation required for an upset to take place, as noted above, had come true. Wozniacki had a dismal start and Sasnovich had a commanding lead without even having played very well. For the second part of the equation to materialize, Sasnovich would need to lift her game even higher and sustain her lead before Wozniacki had a chance to steady the ship.

She did not.

In fact, this would become the pattern for the rest of the match. Wozniacki would never manage to rise above her average level of play and resort to depending on her mental toughness to pull through. She admitted that much herself after the match. After acknowledging that she struggled throughout the match to find her timing, she said “I mentally stayed tough out there, that’s why I won.”

She would soon find out that she could also depend on Sasnovich letting her back in the match each time that the Belarusian had an opportunity to pull away. That is what happened when Sasnovich served at 3-0. Out of nowhere, she committed three unforced errors, and not-so-out-of-nowhere, she added two double faults (7 total in the set), to lose her service game. But hey, no big deal. Today’s Wozniacki was in a giving mood. She returned the favor in the next game with a double fault of her own to start the game, and a sitter backhand that sailed out to end it. Up by two breaks again, serving at 4-1, Sasnovich would surely run away with the first set now, right?

No, she would not.

She would double-fault twice more and miss a routine approach shot wide on her way to losing her serve with a blank game. Wozniacki then played her first decent game of the match and held serve for the first time to get back to 3-4. In the ensuing game, Sasnovich would add another double fault to go down 15-40. She then played two terrific points to get back to deuce, only to be hampered by another double fault followed by a forehand routine error.

The set was leveled at 4-4 when in fact, all signs indicated that Sasnovich should have pocketed it ten minutes ago. Wozniacki was certainly not raising the level of her game and the fact that she went down 0-40 on her serve at 4-4, due to two more unforced errors, was proof of that. Nevertheless, she would find a way to win five points in a row and pull ahead for the first time in the match. That is what being a Major title holder with renewed confidence does, it makes you believe that you can still cook a decent meal even when the required ingredients are missing on that particular day.

The last game summarized the set well. Sasnovich lost her service game one more time by committing her seventh double fault and three unforced errors (including one on her favorite shot, the backhand down-the-line). Wozniacki was up a set without having played well at all. It was a devastating way to lose the set for Sasnovich.

Up to this point in the match it was a typical case of the favorite having an off day. What was atypical was the fact that, not only did Wozniacki’s errors not lead to the underdog gaining confidence and lifting her level higher, but Sasnovich’s game actually regressed as her lead grew and the set progressed. You would think that the order would now be restored. The underdog would not recover from the disappointment of squandering her opportunity and the favorite would finally feel relief, and find her rhythm to a straight-set victory.

None of that would take place.

In that game, all points but one would end with errors, including two unforced backhands by Wozniacki. Sasnovich would once again start the set with a break. The next game was very contested and it actually had some quality points. Yet, the key point was a dreadful – sorry, no other adjective would do it justice – forehand miss into the net by Wozniacki on an easy sitter from well inside the court at deuce.

Well, you get the idea. I will not bore you with the detailed account of the next two sets, but will simply offer some last remarks to summarize.

– Wozniacki won 6-4 2-6 6-3 in two hours and sixteen minutes.

– After the first set that featured more breaks than holds, some mild sense of normalcy returned in the second set with six holds and two breaks. In the final set, it would go back to more breaks than holds. In total, there were fourteen breaks in the match, which was also the number of total double faults committed by Sasnovich (no deeper meaning here, just a coincidence).

– Sasnovich went on to win the second set 6-2. She probably played her best tennis, within the parameters of this match I must underline, in the three games that took her from 3-2 up to 6-2. Which makes it that much more stunning that, after the confidence-building stretch to end the set and breaking Wozniacki’s serve to start the third one, she still found a way to let Caroline back in. In fact, that first game of the third set was by far her best game. At that point of the match, she had established her aggressive play (which she started doing to increase her lead in the second set) and she was really pushing Wozniacki around the baseline.

– So how did that turnaround happen? How did Wozniacki, who was still playing poorly, stop the slide precisely when Sasnovich seemed poised to break away? You may have guessed it; unforced errors and double faults by Sasnovich. She gifted two of each category in that 1-0 game. Later, Wozniacki broke Sasnovich’s serve for the second time at 3-2 when the Belarusian made four unforced errors, two of them dreadful – yes, there is that adjective again, but for the other player’s errors this time.

– Even when Wozniacki gained control of the match at 4-2 in the third and saw the light at the end of the tunnel, she still struggled with her timing. Watch the replay of the 4-2 game and you will understand.

– It was not a high-quality match by any stretch of the imagination and its fate lingered, for the most part, on what each player failed to do rather than what they accomplished well. On the other hand, it offered some valuable lessons on how matches change patterns for better or worse. It demonstrated that shifts in a match do not necessarily emerge as a result of tactical adjustments by a player, but sometimes originate in the degree of mental struggles that the players manifest. It showed that persistence, combined with patience, can offer a pay off, as it did to Wozniacki, even when the player’s performance remains at a mediocre level.

– This is not a disheartening loss for Sasnovich in the sense that she was not supposed to lose. A defeat to Wozniacki should not be a source of depression for any player. However losing to today’s Wozniacki, especially after having been in a position to win multiple times, is a letdown for an in-form player like Sasnovich. Wozniacki did not do anything differently to turn the match around. If anything at all, whenever she found herself in a position to establish her dominance as the favorite, she kept on allowing Sasnovich to climb back on top by committing errors of her own.

– For those who are interested in variations within the two-handed backhand technique, Sasnovich’s backhand is a great example of how the left hand can be dominant force in your shot. Take a look at the photo below. You can see that the left hand is there for control, and the right hand (and the arm) is the one used to accelerate the ball. Keep in mind that Sasnovich hits her best backhands rather flat. That comes from the dominant left arm that allows her to follow through forward rather than around the body, thus her ability to hit stellar down-the-line backhands, her best shot by far.

Photo: Harry How – Getty Images

Until the next one, enjoy the BNP Parisbas Open!

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