Category: Players

A Short Essay on Underrated Overachievers – Two in Action on Friday at Wimbledon

ATP & WTA Majors Players 2 Comments

Wimbledon’s 2018 edition has been marked by stunning upsets and we have only completed four days of competition. Six out of the top 8 seeds on the women’s side, including names like Garbine Muguruza, Caroline Wozniacki, and Petra Kvitova, and three out of the top 8 seeds on the men’s side (possibly four with Alexander Zverev’s match suspended at two sets to one down), have all temporarily changed their status from competitors to tourists in London.

While you will find plenty written on the seeded-player debacle in the tennis media, you will not find any on two names that got lost in the shuffle, probably much to their liking. Most casual tennis fans probably never heard of them, and yet here they are, quietly waiting for their third-round matches. First, let me describe the type of players that I want to tackle in this piece.

These players neither have flashy styles, nor fan followings. They are often overshadowed by spectacular shot-makers with physical presences or flair on the court, or by ones that possess a certain type of character on the court that fans deem “worthy of watching” (yes, such approach exists indeed). They do not possess a big weapon in terms of stroke production. Instead, they rely on either their shrewd on-court-decision-making skills, or on their resolve during critical moments, or on their dependable footwork and fighting spirit, or on their endurance, or on a combination of any of the above.

History of our sport is filled with them although you would have a tough time getting any expert to name 10 of them right off the bat. For example, do you remember Rainer Schuttler (if you are old enough)? The German turned pro in 1995, and steadily rose through the rankings, finishing 332 in 1996, 117 in 1997, entering the top 100 in the beginning of 1999, reaching top 50 later that same year, getting to no.40 in 2001, finishing 2002 at number 33, rising all the way to number 6 by the end of 2003, and reaching the finals of the Australian Open in that same year.

It was a slow but steady rise, with no fanfare. Hardly anyone recognized him if they passed him by in the street or even at tournaments. He remained in the top 10 for one more year and top 50 for a few more, managing to reach the semis of Wimbledon in 2008 as his last big hurray.

Why such little recognition for the man who was, in reality, one of the most admired work horses of his time by his peers? Because, he was the type of player that I mentioned above. He neither had the flashy personality nor the game to garner attention. He had no big weapons – for example, his second serve was considered a weakness and he hit no one out of the court, so to speak. He was also ice-like on the court, showing very little emotion.

Schuttler was simply a good athlete who worked hard and offered no gifts to his opponents. He was the ultimate overachiever against a pool of superiorly talented players during his era, simply because he was a mental rock who would feel to his opponents like that chewing gum feels to you when it gets stuck in your hair and you can’t get it out no matter how hard you try.

Now back to Wimbledon…

There are two of “those” players here, one in each draw and both ranked outside the top 100.

Evgeniya Rodina, a qualifier currently ranked 120 in the WTA, and MacKenzie McDonald, ranked 103 in the ATP, are quietly – and efficiently – having their best show in the Majors. Rodina has matched her third-round appearance at Wimbledon from 10 years ago and McDonald is at his first ever third round in a Major.

If you are a casual tennis fan and you have never heard of them, you are not alone.

On the one hand, they are riding in somewhat different boats in terms of their overall careers. 29-year-old Rodina has been around a long time, but the Russian’s highest ranking was no.74 in 2011, and she has yet to earn a WTA title (she did win a WTA 125K series event in 2016). McDonald, for his part, is a newcomer who turned pro two years ago. The American is 23 years old.

On the other hand, they have plenty in common. They are both astute thinkers on the court and fierce competitors. Although they are limited by their sizes and lack of power, they are skilled at fabricating formulas to get the job done. They don’t hit dozens of winners or blow the opponent off the court. They are not natural shot makers. Yet, both are planning to play their third-round matches on Friday while renowned names have been sent packing, along with their previous-round opponents who had superior talent and skills in comparison to them, at least on paper.

I wrote in detail about Rodina’s first-round win over the more talented Antonia Lottner two days ago and if you read it, you probably understand why I chose the title is “Rodina ‘finds a way,’ again!”

Her comeback win in three sets against Lottner was the product of a never-die attitude, backed by her willingness to do whatever’s necessary to turn the tide around. I will not repeat the details of that win, you can find them in my recap from two days ago. It was her fourth win in one week, having come from the qualifying draw, and a reprint of the script that she has been writing on many occasions for years.

So was the case in her second-round match against Sorana Cirstea, another skilled performer with much more potential in terms of shot production than her. Rodina again “found a way” to turn around what appeared to be a lost cause after the first hour of the match.

After Cirstea dominated the first set 6-1, Rodina began to steady the ship early in the second. She held serve four times in a row to get to 4-3 up in the second set. At 15-15 on Cirstea’s service game, Rodina hit a return winner and followed that up with another sharp cross-court return that forced Cirstea into an error to earn two break-point opportunities at 15-40. On her second opportunity at 30-40, she struck another return deep into Cirstea’s deuce corner. The Romanian barely got it back and Rodina nailed her backhand for a winner to the open court.

Mind you, this was not the way Rodina had planned her comeback, i.e. hitting winners. It is not in her pedigree to win matches solely on direct hits. The two winners in that 4-3 game were only her second and third winners of the set. She finished the set with only three winners!

The bottom line is this: Rodina was willing to step outside the box to get the job done! She was astute enough to realize that her moment had arrived and that she had to force the issue in order to finally take charge in the match. One break right then and there meant that she would serve for the set. She succeeded. She then held serve in the next game and pocketed the second set 6-3. Rodina made the hard decision when it mattered, and the match’s complexion changed in a matter of 5 minutes. She won it 6-3 in the third.

This is how this type of player wins matches. You do not necessarily see it in the stats because stats do not reflect mental fortitude in delicate moments. One telling stat (somewhat) is that Rodina hit 14 winners to Cirstea’s 25, but she only made 7 unforced errors to Cirstea’s 35. Unspectacular, yet efficient, much like her victory against Lottner.

Rodina managed to overcome two athletically superior players, with clearly more firepower potential than her, thanks to her high IQ and competitive spirit. It’s your emblematic, underrated overachiever, having a gritty day at the office, tackling challenges and solving problems with no fanfare.

Much like McDonald on the men’s side.

The American does not have an overpowering serve or forehand. He is a good athlete with quick hands but stands way clear of the over-six-foot range that tennis seems to demand from its top male prospects. His best shot is his return, which comes in handy when he plays doubles, or when he plays a big server like Nicolas Jarry, whom he defeated 11-9 in the fifth set after three hours and 31 minutes in a workman-like performance to reach the third round.

Jarry was without a doubt the more talented player with bigger shots. He was also several inches taller than McDonald. When they stood at the net together, it resembled the second coming of Dudi Sela vs Ivo Karlovic (ok, not that bad, I exaggerated). Jarry did begin the match with a bunch of winners, building a 4-1 lead on McDonald. The Californian remained calm and worked his way back into the match, thanks to some remarkable returns once he got the feel of Jarry’s serves. I will summarize the meat of what happened in one paragraph.

McDonald won a set in which he came within two points of losing twice (4-5, deuce, and 4-5 down in the tiebreaker), produced only six winners to Jarry’s 24, and appeared to be outclassed by the Chilean for the most part. He did so because he stood tall in points like 5-4 30-30, or 5-4 in the tiebreaker. Jarry, required to produce bigger shots and more of them, was the one to err first, including the forehand volley missed in the net that put McDonald up one set to zero (7-6).

It was a crucial set because for another hour and a half after that, his opponent dominated again. Jarry took the second and third sets to go up two sets to one. McDonald recovered in the fourth thanks to an early break and steadied the ship enough to get to extra time in the fifth. With no tiebreaker on the horizon, Jarry cracked first at 9-9 and lost the match in which he recorded 103 winners (including 24 aces) vs. 26 for McDonald, a match that he dominated for a good two and a half hours out of three and a half.

And that was after McDonald defeated the experienced Ricardas Berankis in the first round in four sets, in a similar fashion on Monday. Berankis held a set point to go up two sets to love at 6-5 in the second but he missed the return. On every important point, once again, McDonald stood tall. From the set point saved until the end of the tiebreaker which went his way to equalize the match at one set each, McDonald made only one unforced error, despite some rockets fired at him by Berankis from the baseline.

Again, the numbers will not tell you the story. Berankis produced twice the number of winners that McDonald produced, 14 to 7, in that second set. The unforced-error count was not in McDonald’s favor by much either (16 to 14). The total-points-won category was almost head-to-head (46 to 45). The difference was that McDonald buckled down and gave no gifts on the points that mattered the most. Berankis hit twenty more winners than McDonald, and he lost. McDonald got the job done!

This is repeatedly the pattern with which overachievers such as Rodina and McDonald are able to compete against better talent. Most casual spectators do not notice them, nor watch them much. But coaches adore them. Martin Blackman, the General Manager of USTA Player Development was present on the sideline during McDonald’s five-set victory over Jarry from the first game to the last. I did not ask him, but I assure you he was elated. Compared to coaching talented players who “almost” achieve great things, coaching players like McDonald and Rodina is a heavenly experience.

These overachievers deserve to get their due credit for their achievements, but they usually don’t. Whether it is because they will never get to the elite level – they simply do not have that kind of talent – or because their games are not breathtaking, it is hard to say. I am not even sure if that matters. I would venture to say that these players are not in pursuit of accolades. If they were, they would not last long because the constant disappointment would be exhausting. In my opinion, they bask in the reserved glory of knowing that they are able compete and make a living through their one passion in life.

But I will leave the examining of inner reasons aside and hail openly the likes of Schuttler, Rodina, and McDonald. Whether you care or not, you do not go completely unnoticed, unrecognized. There are those of us who see you!

Until next time…

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Miami Open Match Report: Alexander Zverev – John Isner (men’s final)

ATP Players Tactical Analysis No Comments

Coming into today’s Miami Open final between two in-form players, the fifth-ranked German Alexander “Sascha” Zverev and the 17th-ranked American John Isner, one could not help but wonder what kind of impact each player’s preferred style of play would have on the other.

In the two previous rounds, Zverev won in straight sets against two solid baseliners, Borna Coric and Pablo Carreno-Busta, accelerating efficiently in rallies and overpowering his opponents with accelerations. Isner, for his part, demolished the rising star Hyeon Chung in two routine sets and put a stop to Juan Martin Del Potro’s fifteen-match winning streak. He relied for the most part on his bazooka serves and forehands, and never allowed either of them to settle into their favorite patterns.

This championship match also offered a fascinating background story. On the one hand, Isner had never won an ATP 1000 title but did have a history of performing well on American soil regardless of whether the crowd got behind him or not (see his match from two days ago vs Del Potro). On the other hand, Zverev had never lost in the finals of an ATP 1000, having won both of his previous appearances.

Nevertheless, all that would matter less once the fuzzy ball would get tossed in the air for the first serve of the match. The players’ tennis outputs on the stadium court at Crandon Park would determine the outcome on this day.

Could Isner cook the same recipe that worked so well against Coric and Carreno-Busta, and hinder the German’s well-oiled production of steady, high-paced ground strokes? Could he return big against Sascha, like he did against his previous opponents? In any case, his game plan seemed crystal clear: serve big, return big, nail forehand, and apply pressure.

Photo: Matthew Stockman – Getty Images

The answer to how Zverev would respond was a little blurrier. Could Zverev put forth enough power of his own to stop the American from getting the upper hand in the first two shots of each point? Could he stay in the point long enough to exploit Isner’s weaknesses, such as his backhand and footwork? Tennis fans awaited those answers as the players stepped on the court.

The first two sets were decided on a few key points at different times. The third set was, by contrast, the product of an overarching trend that worked against Zverev throughout the match and ultimately doomed him in the late stages of the match.

Unlike what many expected, break chances came early, all in favor of Isner. The way Zverev saved the first two break points (0-1, 15-40) was, on the other hand, very predictable. He hit a wide (and big) first serve to get to 30-40. Then, he engaged Isner in a deliberately paced backhand cross-court rally, the important term being “deliberately” (more on this later). Isner missed his fifth backhand and Sascha got back to deuce.

Isner would get another break-point opportunity two points later, one that he probably regretted for the rest of the set. He set the point up perfectly, approaching the net behind a forehand, but floated a very makeable forehand volley deep. Zverev held with a couple of big first serves.

In the first set, Zverev executed his game plan well. For starters, he stuck with the right pattern in baseline rallies. As noted above, he pinned Isner to the ad corner, making him hit backhands. He knew that Isner would want to run around the backhand and nail forehands, exactly like the American did against Chung and Del Potro. Thus, Zverev was not holding back on his backhand cross-courts, and therefore, not allowing Isner enough time to move outside the court (again, more on this later).

Secondly, Sascha’s first serves were clutch. Whenever he faced a break point, or a 30-30 point, he came up with an ace or an unreturnable serve, shutting the door quickly on Isner. He saved three of the five break points in the first set with big serves and won numerous other free points on important points.

Zverev was also making Isner hit the first volley low. It was not enough for Isner to simply hit his forehand hard and win the point without having to play the next shot. Isner had to showcase his volleying skills to put the ball away. Muscling serves and forehand were not going to be enough. It worked for Zverev. Isner missed some of those volleys, or at least, had to resort to just placing the volley, giving Zverev a second look at a passing shot.

A glaring example of this occurred when Isner got in trouble for the first time on his serve at 2-2. On game point, he hit a big kick serve wide to the ad side (one of his “money” shots) and followed it to the net. Zverev got the backhand return right down to Isner’s feet. Although Zverev was way outside the court when he returned, he was able to recover and chase the next ball down because Isner had to hit the low volley upward. Zverev ran it down and passed Isner cross-court with his forehand. Although Isner ended up holding serve, he knew he had to stay on his toes, even behind good serves and approaches. That is the type of pressure that, if applied consistently, works on you and makes a difference on an important point later in the match.

It did, in the tiebreaker…

The quality of tennis significantly dropped in the tiebreaker, for one reason or another. Both players committed uncharacteristic errors and lost awkward points on patterns that should have otherwise favored them. Until Zverev led 3-2, nothing looked out of the ordinary. The German won his two serving points on big first serves and he earned the mini break on yet another low volley that he forced Isner to hit. That was the pay-off (see above) for Zverev repeatedly making Isner hit low first volleys.

Zverev lost his mini-break advantage though, and more, when he committed two unforced backhand errors in a row to go down 4-3. Then Isner missed a forehand and double-faulted to return the favor. Remember, I did use the adjectives “awkward” and “uncharacteristic” earlier to describe what happened in this tiebreaker, so you were warned.

The last two points showcased again the winning formula(s) that Zverev adopted throughout the set. Another clutch first serve put him up 6-4. On set point, Zverev once again engaged Isner in a rally, making the American hit several backhands until he missed.

So, what went wrong for Zverev – or right for Isner – after the first set? Not much actually, except in two specific games, one in each set, and the overarching trend on which I touched at the beginning and kept putting off by saying “more on this later.” That is all it took for the American to grab the biggest title of career.

Until 4-4 in the second set, players held serves without difficulty. Then suddenly, on his serve, Zverev played by far the worst game of the match thus far. Out of nowhere, leading 30-15, Zverev squeezed in two unforced errors (one of them, a forehand framed to the sky) and a double fault to give Isner his first break-point opportunity of the set, the only one he needed.

And this is where I finally get to the overarching trend that doomed Sascha.

On that break point, Sascha had a mid-court backhand, similar to the ones he had all along the first set and a half, one that he has been taking early at shoulder level and drilling cross-court. That pattern, until then, regularly pushed Isner to the backhand corner and allowed Zverev to settle into the favorable cross-court-backhand pattern. Instead, and inexplicably, Zverev held back and hit a mid-pace backhand on which Isner was able to run around his backhand and pound a forehand. Zverev responded with another defensive, and shorter, backhand. This time Isner stepped inside the court and unleashed his forehand for a winner, grabbing the first break of the match.

Isner won the second set on his serve in the next game, although he had to save a couple of break points. More importantly for him, the trend from Sascha freely hitting his backhands cross-court and out-rallying him to Sascha hitting his backhands tentatively and giving him a shot at running around to unload his forehands was now in full progress.

Zverev’s success with his first serves still continued. He saved break points early in the third set with big serves. Plus, he was still making Isner hit low volleys when the American ventured to the net. Those two factors remained in his favor. However, extended rallies were no longer a write-in for Zverev like they were in the first 90 minutes of the match.

And you could tell that Isner was smelling blood because, you see, when a player shows apprehensiveness, it is not just the previously working pattern that loses traction for him. His loss of confidence, and Zverev’s body language tends to show this, motivates the opponent to gain mental momentum. Hence, Isner began staying in rallies longer because he now believed that Zverev, due to his tentative baseline play, would eventually hold back on one shot somewhere and give him a chance to take charge in the rally.

Photo: Michael Reaves – Getty Images

At 4-4 in the final set, Zverev’s increasing malaise on his ground strokes had spread to the rest of his game. Even his reliable first serve disappeared. He began with a double fault. Then, Isner, full of confidence, hit a thunder return on a first serve, and followed it with a forehand winner to go up 0-30. One point later, at 15-30, he had to serve a second serve and get in a rally. If there were a rally to show how much Zverev had regressed – the overarching trend – in the deliberate nature of his ground strokes, this would be the one.

He had a sitter on his backhand inside the baseline, in the middle of the court, on a ball by Isner that bounced inside the service line. Instead of accelerating to the backhand corner of Isner, like he has done numerous times throughout the first set and a half (and the tournament), Zverev simply half-looped the backhand back to the middle of the court heck, (he might have even slightly mishit it). Isner moved up and hit a forehand back to Sascha’s backhand. It was deeper but nothing that Sascha could not handle. The German missed the routine backhand deep by over a meter at least.

The miss, and his body language after the miss, pointed to one thing: he had lost his mental edge. The ensuing break point confirmed it. Another rally, another set of baseline shots underplayed by Zverev, ending with an easy forehand sitter slammed in the net. He smashed his racket to the ground, twice, and broke it. It seemed that the match had ended there.

Isner served up the formalities, literally, with three aces to earn his first ATP 1000 title.

The match was more of a mental battle than anything else. The quality of tennis was higher in the first half of the encounter, minus the tiebreaker. The tactical adjustments made by both players, on the other hand, were remarkable. The battle of IQs had no clear winner, both players proved potent there, but the one with the higher resolve stood tall, no pun intended, at the end.

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Miami Open Match Report: Alexander Zverev vs Borna Coric (quarterfinal)

ATP Players Tactical Analysis No Comments

Although Alexander “Sascha” Zverev, ranked no.5 in the ATP and holder of six career titles, should have been on paper the favorite to win when he stepped on the court to face Borna Coric, the 36th-ranked Croat, for his quarterfinal match at the Miami Open, most tennis fans who follow the game closely knew better.

Outside of his first-round loss at the Australian Open, Coric had enjoyed an impressive 2018 season, including a semifinal appearance in Indian Wells and a trio of three-set victories, all against quality opponents, to reach the quarterfinals in Miami. Having played nine matches in three weeks, with five of them extending to three sets, he had appeared to answer the call physically and mentally.

There was also their head-to-head record that favored Coric 2-0 when they started the match. Both previous encounters were extremely close, with Borna winning 7-5 3-6 7-6 in Cincinnati in 2015 and 3-6 7-5 7-6 7-6 at the US Open in 2017.

Coric vs Zverev – Cincinnati, 2015

Simply put, there was every reason to expect an intriguing match that was hard to predict.

It ended up more one-sided than expected, with Zverev outplaying Coric in almost every facet of the game. I have a couple of lingering thoughts on these two players that I want to put on paper, or on the computer screen in this case, but let’s get to the story of the match first, because every match has one.

Zverev’s straight-set victory today did not happen because he did one thing to which Coric could not find a solution or because Coric had a bad day at the office all around, or because Zverev happened to win the few key points that decided the outcome, although the 6-4 6-4 scoreline would suggest the latter. Few differences coming into play intermittently made it possible for Zverev to never be in any trouble throughout the match.

Zverev served well, on both first and second serves. Yes, his percentage on first-serve points won was striking at 83%, but the depth on his second serves was majestic. He was able to apply persistent pressure Coric during rallies. So, what should Coric, or any player facing this problem, do to tackle this problem? One possible solution is to step in on your opponent’s second serve and return aggressively in order to take away his baseline drives from the beginning of the point.

Yet, every time Coric attempted to take charge with his return on the German’s second serves, Sascha came up with high-velocity and/or high-bouncing serves that landed on the back line of the service box, forcing Coric to step back or hit the return at a higher point than his sweet spot, in case he did not step back.

If you need examples, see the 2-1, 40-15 and the 4-3, 40-15 points in the first set. In the latter, for instance, Sascha lands a fabulous second serve that pushes Borna back and forces him into a defensive return. In other words, Coric had no choice but resort to doing the opposite of what he initially intended to do when he stepped up to return. Thus, Sascha controls the second shot, Coric has to scramble on defense, and the point ends with Sascha hitting the winner on the third shot.

There is your explanation as to how Zverev won 75% of the points launched with his second serve. When you can complement your 83% first-serve points won – he literally won two or three free points in each serving game with his first serve – with a 75% rate on your second-serve points won, and commit zero double faults, you get to win your service games comfortably. Zverev lost only 5 points on his service games in the second set. Coric’s only two chances to break came in the very first service game of the match by Zverev.

And that brings me to my pet peeve, which is the importance of the first two games of a set and their underrated existence in match analyses. I bet Coric would like to replay that 30-40 break point at 1-0 up in the beginning of the match, the one in which he missed a routine forehand deep.

Speaking of errors, they were another factor that contributed to Coric’s inability to worry Zverev. As I noted above, Coric did not particularly play badly. He did, however, err uncharacteristically on some important points. The above at 1-0 up, break point, was perhaps the most important one.

Photo: Matthew Stockman – Getty Images

There were also the two unforced errors that made him trail 15-40, at 3-3 in the second set. He got out of that hole, so initially it may seem like a no-biggie in retrospect. But when you do that two service games in a row and fight hard to dig yourself out of each hole, it carries long-term consequences. When you get behind in the score due to those types of errors, although they end up not costing you in those two games (Coric also saved two break points in the 1-1 game), harm your confidence in your ground strokes. The resulting mental dent may come back to haunt you later in the set.

It most likely did for Coric, in the most crucial game of the second set, when he served at 4-4. At 15-15, he missed a backhand down-the-line deep that he would make nine out ten times. He followed it up with another routine cross-court backhand missed wide, and he found himself down two break points once again. He saved the first one but could not save the second (sixth in the set), committing yet another backhand error. It was probably the worst service game played by Coric from the baseline but having to dance on thin ice on your service games throughout the set while your opponent is winning his serves with ease, can crush you when the match is on the line.

Again, it was not like Coric performed badly throughout the match from the baseline. In fact, in those break points that he saved in the second set, he played some of his best tennis. He bravely hit a rocket backhand down-the-line on one, put his touch on display with a fine drop volley on another, and got a big first serve in on a third one. Zverev did not perform far above his standards from the baseline either. He also committed some errors. The German was, however, the more pro-active player, looking for openings, stepping inside the baseline, changing the pace of the ball, while Coric parked three meters behind the baseline, mostly retrieving, relying on his legs, and playing the reactive role.

Put all the above together and you get a convincing win in favor of Sascha, not in the form of a blow-out (which is more likely to occur if one player had a weakness that the other relentlessly exploited or if one player did everything a little better than the other), but in the form of a steady stream of shifting advantages appearing through various facets of the game, resulting in the inevitable.

I will conclude with one last lingering thought specifically with regard to these two players – and a handful of others with the same obsession, Karen Khachanov comes to mind.

Both players possess better backhands than forehands. Yet, they both occasionally, and inexplicably, move around their backhands to hit forehands. It is baffling to say the least and I am not even sure that it benefits them. Coric and Zverev do not have bad forehands per se and they are capable of accelerating using them. It is just that they can cause the same damage, or more, I would argue, with their backhands. I also believe that Borna and Sascha are themselves aware of the fact that they have better overall skills on their backhands than on their forehands.

So, why then, this obsession with hitting a forehand when you can line-up your strongest shot from the exact same spot? I can provide several detailed examples from this match alone for both players, but I will just stick to a few by Zverev. In the 2-1, 15-0 point, he chooses to hit a forehand and misses. In the 40-15 point at 5-3, he hits three great backhands, puts Coric on the defensive, then moves to hit a forehand on the next shot and misses deep. On the deuce point at 1-1 in the second set, he takes a few steps to run around the backhand, and strikes a forehand that lands behind the baseline.

I would argue that in each one of those points, Zverev would have gotten better results if he got his feet positioned and took those same cuts with his backhand.

In fact, a sequence in the fourth game of the second set shows that he can. In the 2-1 game, at 15-15, Zverev runs around the backhand and produces an inside-out forehand winner. Guess what? Two points later, Coric hits the ball slightly more to Zverev’s backhand side, and this time, Zverev does not around. He sets up and strikes a backhand. He produces almost an identical winner to the one from two points ago, except on his backhand this time, and with a sharper angle.

Photo: Micheal Reaves – Getty Images

I discussed this obsession of certain players with one of the leading tacticians in our game at Roland Garros two years ago and he said that there were studies showing that players can accelerate – or create power – with their forehands better than their backhands. He was not necessarily arguing to the contrary, but data apparently showed that hitting forehands is the preferred method of players when taking charge of a point. I have no doubt that the majority of the ATP players can power up the amp with their forehands. However, using that particular point to draw a blanket conclusion that forehands are preferable to backhands is one that I am not willing to accept.

Zverev will next play the Spaniard Pablo Carreno-Busta, another baseline monster, for a spot in the final. I predict that the German will have to decide a number of times in that match whether to run around the backhand or not. If he does, his forehand better be operating at maximum capacity.

Until next time, enjoy the tennis!

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Miami Open Match Report: Denis Shapovalov vs Sam Querrey (3rd round)

ATP Players Tactical Analysis 2 Comments

A friend of mine texted me in the beginning of this match’s deciding set and asked: “Can we please talk about Shapo’s serves?” It was a rhetorical question of course, her way of languishing in the misery of watching Denis Shapovalov, one of her favorite players, hit only 37% of his first serves in for the first set, and 32% for the second, while throwing in seven double faults for good measure.

I answered her question with another one, except mine was on a positive note: “Can we please talk about Shapo’s second serves?”

The main reason why Shapovalov was still in the match was precisely because he gave a clinic for one set on how to win points when your first serve temporarily disappears. The problem was that he was playing against a top 20 player and you can only live on your second serves for so long against that type of competition. The Canadian’s first-serve began working better in the late stages of the match, but before we get there, let us take a closer look at the first set.

Both players seemed to start with similar game plans in mind. Each knew that the other would prioritize offense over all else, but instead of focusing on defending well, they seemed to have decided that attacking furiously, early in the point, was the best defense. Making the occasional error was acceptable within this game plan, as long as the opponent did not get to win points on his terms.

Querrey began by serving big, aiming for direct points or big cuts on follow-up ground strokes if Shapovalov happened to get the return back in the court. He did make an error at 40-15, but again, that was within acceptable parameters, because he won the other points thanks to big serves or by forcing Denis into errors.

Photo: Matthew Stockman – Getty Images

Querrey took a big cut on the return on Shapovalov’s second serve to start the next game. Denis was ready. He set his feet quickly and sent the ball back with the same pace. Sam was caught off guard and made the error. 15-0 Shapovalov.

Sam tried another explosive return on the next point. Denis responded even better this time, nailing a spectacular winner with his backhand as he was backing up from the American’s aggressive return. 30-0 Shapovalov.

The Canadian added an ace to go up 40-0.

He followed that with a double fault, surely caused by his attempt at a risky second serve, aware of Querrey’s intention to whack the return. Querrey did go for another rocket return at 40-15, and again, Shapovalov answered the call with a solid backhand down-the-line to the open corner. Querrey did get to the ball but missed it under pressure.

The initial response to the Querrey charge succeeded.

That serving game was the best reaction Shapovalov could have put together to plant seeds of doubt in Querrey’s mind that just power alone would not be enough to oust the Canadian today.

The shift in tone carried into the next game that decided the set. Shapovalov essentially showed Querrey that he can beat the American in his own game. He turned the tables around and went for bazookas on returns, just like the American tried to do in the previous game. At 40-30, he punished Sam’s second serve two points in a row with big forehand returns. Sam saved that break point. Later in the game, on another deuce, Shapovalov went for another big cut on a backhand return that landed on the baseline. Querrey barely got it back and Shapovalov put the forehand away, earning his third break point. He finally got the break on another huge forehand return, this time for a clean winner.

When Shapovalov held serve easily to confirm the break and go up 3-1, Querrey was facing an unpleasant reality. He came out with what he thought was a good plan. It worked in the first game. Then, Denis essentially said, “not so fast Sam.” He turned the challenge around and threw it back at Sam. And precisely where Denis had the answers, Sam did not.

Whereas Shapovalov quickly adjusted to handling Querrey’s monster-return tactic in the second game of the match, Querrey could not handle Shapovalov’s big returns in the following game. That is because Querrey’s legs are not as agile as Shapovalov’s and do not react as quickly to an offensive shot.

Whereas Shapovalov needed one game in which the American had to largely resort to second serves to go up a break, Querrey could not break Shapovalov’s serve all set long, even though the Canadian played with a 37% first-serve percentage. That is because Shapovalov relentlessly varied the placement and speed of his second serves throughout the set.

It’s not that Querrey played a bad set. In fact, he attacked relentlessly, often with success. He served big or used the 1-2 punch after a big serve, and as a result, held serve easily for the rest of the set. Except that the damage was already done. He happened to under-perform on his first serve for one game during which his second serve did not penetrate (or kick, or slice) enough to stop Denis from finding enough rhythm to launch one big return after another. Denis, in comparison, under-performed on his first serve for the whole set, yet he never faced a break point.

If you regularly read my posts, you probably know that I prefer to give concrete examples to illustrate my observations. As for Shapovalov’s second-serve efficiency, the 3-2 game is an excellent example and here is what you will see. Down 0-15, Shapovalov serves and volleys to get back to 15-15. Then, he throws in a heavy-spin second serve that collects an error from Querrey. Up 30-15, he loses the point but goes for a wide, slice serve, which he had not tried previously. He follows that up with a flat first serve, earning a direct point to go up 40-30. Sam gets back to deuce. Dennis misses his first serve again. He hits a high-pace second serve, catching Sam off balance. The American’s return is short and Denis attacks, forcing Sam into a defensive lob that sails long. Denis then closes out the game with a big first serve.

Just look at how many different types of serves the American had to confront even though the majority were second serves. He had to return low on a serve-and-volley, lunge to the outside on a wide serve, step inside the court only to jerk back quickly to get a high-paced second serve back, only to mention a few.

For an additional example, see the 30-15 point at 4-3; a second serve by Shapovalov lands so deep in the service box that Querrey, who stepped inside the baseline with the intention of producing a big return, does not have enough time to make a full swing and misses the return deep.

At the end of the set, Shapovalov had collected 10 out of 19 second-serve points and never faced a break point. He did win 11/11 first-serve points. Imagine if Shapovalov landed most of his first serves in!

You cannot, however, count on winning two successive sets in the third-round of an ATP 1000 event, against a top-20 player, while making less than 40% of your first serves and recording an increasing number of double faults (2 in the first, 5 in each of the next two sets). Shapovalov’s first-serve percentage did not improve in the second set and it did not take long before it caught up to him.

1-0 down in the second set, the Canadian double-faulted twice, once on game point at 40-30, and again on break point, and fell behind 2-0. Querrey raced to a double-break lead when he broke Shapovalov’s serve again in the sixth game. It was on another mediocre service game by Shapovalov in which he double-faulted twice again and missed an easy forehand volley in the net on break point.

When Querrey closed out the second set 6-3, the only question that mattered to Shapovalov was whether he could improve his first-serve percentage or not. He did, to a whopping (!) 53% in the third set. Yet, it was once again his second serve that kept him in the match when the third set began.

At 30-30 in the first game, he hit a great kick serve to the “T” and jammed Querrey’s backhand into his body. Sam’s return fell short and Shapovalov hit the winner to go up 40-30. Three points later, Shapovalov pocketed the game on another kick second serve that bounced so high that Sam had to jump to hit at the last moment. He missed it deep.

During the 2-2 game, Denis’s first serve finally began to come back. It was a contested game that saw Querrey have four chances at breaking Shapovalov’s serve. On three of those, Denis did not need his second serve, winning two of them directly on his first serves. He finished the game with an ace and grabbed the 3-2 lead.

Shapovalov would have to save two more break points in the 3-3 game, one with a hard serve to the service-box ‘T’ and the other with an ace. He won that game on another wonderful kick serve that bounced high into Sam’s body, causing him to miss the return.

At 5-5, Shapovalov would double-fault twice more to go down yet another break point at 30-40, only to save it, yet again, with a big first serve that allowed him to hit a winner on the next shot.

Photo: Matthew Stockman – Getty Images

Having saved seven break points since 1-1 in this deciding set, Shapovalov would only need one chance himself to break Querrey’s serve. It came in the 6-5 game. Querrey made only one first serve in the game and committed three routine baseline errors, including the backhand in the net on match point. It was an abrupt ending, considering how comfortably Sam had been holding serves since the early break in the set.

While Shapovalov’s first-serve percentage barely climbed above 50% in the final set, he got them in on six out of the seven break points saved in the final set. Out of those six points, five were won directly on his first serve. Querrey, for his part, had his worst first-serve percentage in the final set at 36%.

In other words, the first-serve percentage numbers from the first set were essentially reversed in the third set and that brings me to my last point about the difference in this match. When Querrey had to overwhelmingly resort to second serves in the third set, he depended on winning those points from the baseline. It worked for the most part, but all it took was a single string of bad errors (four in that last game) for things to fall apart for Querrey. Unlike Denis, he could not collect many free points on his second serves.

When Shapovalov missed his first serves in the first set, he was still able keep Querrey off balance on returns through the use of different speeds and spins on his second serves. He would thus earn some effort-free points on return errors by Sam or collect weak enough returns to finish the point himself on the next shot.

I would speculate that Martin Laurendeau, Shapovalov’s coach, is extremely pleased with the match, not because his pupil played particularly well, but because he ‘performed’ at a high level. By that I mean, Denis showed high IQ in terms of problem-solving when Querrey came out swinging very early, dealt with the malfunctioning of one of his main weapons (first serves) by meticulously regulating his second serves, remained cool-headed numerous times under pressure throughout the third set, and rediscovered his missing weapon during the extended stages of the match.

In the fourth round, Shapovalov will take another rising youngster, the Indian Wells semifinalist Borna Coric.

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Miami Open Match Report: Kyle Edmund – Frances Tiafoe (2nd round)

ATP Players Tactical Analysis 2 Comments

This encounter appeared to be one of the most intriguing match-ups of the day when the order of play was initially announced. It pitted two rising stars of this year, Kyle Edmund, the highest-ranked British player at no.26 and a semifinalist at the Australian Open, against the American Frances Tiafoe (no.63) who had won his maiden ATP title just a little less than a month ago in Delray Beach.

The match lived up to its billing, not necessarily in terms of quality, but certainly in terms of the twists and turns that it took until the very end of the three-set duel.

From the start, it became clear that both players were going to have considerable edge on their service games, as long as their first-serve percentages remained high. Edmund began with a blank game, hitting three out of four first serves and never having to hit the second shot. Tiafoe returned the favor with a blank game of his own, not missing any first serves. Edmund replied with two aces in the third game for another easy hold and Tiafoe held firm with his second routine hold to get back to 2-2.

You get the picture, don’t you? The first serves were so dominant that by the time it was 5-5, each game averaged around 2,5 minutes. There had been no break points and only one deuce. The first set lasted a brief 45 minutes despite ending with a tiebreaker.

Photo: Matthew Stockman – Getty Images

The only break point – a set point for Edmund at the same time – was in the 6-5 game and it needed a lot of unusual things to occur for it to take place. At 30-15, Tiafoe made an unforced error on his forehand that had been working well until then. Then, a framed-forehand return by Edmund happened to land on the baseline (more on Edmund’s frame mishits later), completely catching Tiafoe unprepared. Frances barely got the ball back on an off-balance shot that landed short. Edmund attacked with his forehand, forcing Tiafoe into an error. Out of nowhere, the Brit found himself up a set point. It was too much variation in an otherwise metronomic set. Frances needed to reset the system. He served three big serves in a row – the third one, an ace – and carried the set into a tiebreaker.

So far, I have talked about how dominating first serves were in the first set, but I would not want you to think that the players served a ton of aces. At 6-6, Tiafoe had six aces and Edmund had two, so nothing groundbreaking there. On the other hand, they had one double fault combined (Edmund), and each played with an extremely high rate of first-serve percentage, Tiafoe at 95%, Edmund at 75%, but there was even more to it than that.

First serves were dominating in the sense that both players collected a ton of points in the form of 1-2 punches (winning on the second shot after a weak return caused by an effective first serve) or in the form of 1-2-3 punches (in which the third shot is a winning volley after a good approach shot on a short return, thanks to an effective first serve).

The returner never seemed to get out of the hole even when he was able to return and manage to get in a rally, because he would be stuck defending from the first shot forward. For an example of this, see the 5-5, 15-0 point. Edmund gets the first serve in, takes an offensive position in the court and runs Tiafoe ragged for the rest of the point behind the baseline, until the American eventually misses after multiple scramble shots.

It should come as no surprise then, that at 6-6, both players were hovering in the mid-80% range on points won on first serves. That set seemed to have “tiebreaker” written all over it from the beginning. Yet, the tiebreaker itself completely deviated from the norms.

It all started with Tiafoe leading 3-2 and serving. Until then, he was 100% on first-serve points won. He got the first serve in and Edmund hit an average return that gave Tiafoe a high forehand to attack. It was the 1-2-punch pattern that had worked to perfection for the American until then. Tiafoe nailed it deep behind the baseline. At 3-3, he got another solid first serve in and Edmund pulled perhaps his best return of the set, a rocket forehand that landed smack on the baseline, and went up 4-3. Tiafoe just lost the first (and only) two points of the set on a total of 37 points that started with his first serve.

So, you would think that with two serves coming, Edmund had a significant advantage, especially if he gets his first serves in. He did, on both points, and he lost both points on errors, the second one being an unforced one. Four points in a row lost by the server despite all starting with first serves in this match? Bizarre indeed, but as many on social media would say, with a hashtag attached to it, “that’s #Tennis.”

There was one more twist. At 4-5, Edmund had a forehand sitter on the service line that he would usually put away with one eye closed. He literally hit the ball with the frame of his racket, sending it to the sky and far behind the baseline. Tiafoe had two set points at 6-4. He needed only one. With an ace he pocketed the first set 7-6.

Edmund must have been disappointed at losing the set. He had a set point and led 4-3 in the tiebreaker with two serves to follow. Also, he probably knew that the match could easily turn around in his favor at any point if he could manage to break his opponent’s serve. After all, Tiafoe never came close to breaking his serve in the first set.

The American would not fare much better in the second set in that department, earning only one break point. To make matters worse for him, he would play his first below-average serving game on the fourth game of the set and get broken. He would double fault to start the game, then at 30-15, he would hit a wacky slice forehand approach shot on a last-second decision that would float out. Down a break point, he would hit the forehand approach shot in the net for good measure, giving Edmund a much-needed adrenaline shot in the arm.

Kyle rode the only break of the match all the way to the end of the set, winning it 6-4. Other than the break point that Edmund saved by an ace at 4-3, the rest of the set reflected more or less the pattern of the match, meaning routine service holds.

As the third set began, it was very hard to predict which player would come out on top. Edmund had the only break of the match, but there had only been a total of four break points in the 22 games played in the first two sets. First-serve percentages remained high, and it looked like unless one of the two had an unexpectedly dismal serving game (à-la fourth game of the second set by Tiafoe), another tiebreaker loomed large on the horizon.

In fact, the first game only served to reaffirmed that expectation. Tiafoe had to resort to second serves in the first three points and lost all three. Down 0-40, he got his next five first serves in, and other than the forehand smacked in the net by Edmund at 15-40, he had little trouble coming back to hold his serve. There were three more routine service holds and the scoreboard showed 2-2 in the final set.

There was one small variation though. While both players were winning almost 100% of their first serves, they were hardly winning any of their second-serve points. They were a combined 2 out of 10 on those, up to that point in the third set. That was different than in the first two sets. Tiafoe was the one to suffer from this problem in the fifth game. He got only one first serve in – an ace, naturally – and made three unforced errors on rallies started with his second serves. Edmund broke to go up 3-2 and it looked like a repeat of the second set was forthcoming.

Until 5-4…

On the first point, Edmund got the first serve in and Tiafoe returned short, like zillion other times before, except that this time, instead of completing the 1-2 punch, like he has zillion other times before, Edmund framed the backhand wide to go down 0-15. At 15-15, Edmund got his first serve in again, but Tiafoe returned well, and a rally ensued. After several shots, Edmund framed the backhand again and Tiafoe punished the ball that landed short with a clean forehand winner to go up 15-30. You could sense the crowd intensity go up a notch. Was an unlikely break finally on the way for the American?

At 30-30, Edmund’s backhand let him down again, this time missing deep on a routine cross-court shot. At 30-40, Edmund approached the net and missed a low backhand volley into the net. The improbable happened. Edmund played his first less-than-average serving game and lost 3 out of 4 points on those started with his first serve. Tiafoe got his first and only – and truly golden – break of the match to stay alive and level the match at one set each, five games each.

Photo: Clive Brunskill – Getty Images

At 5-5, Edmund had another chance to take charge when he led 15-40 on the American’s serve. He had a look at a second serve and hit his third framed shot in the last two games, a forehand return this time, that landed wide (I promise, no more mentions of “frame” shots). Tiafoe followed it up with three big serves to go up 6-5. Not much seemed to go right for Edmund in the last five minutes. He was looking to hold his serve for the 16th time in a row and shake his opponent’s hand as the victor about five minutes ago. Now, he was looking to hold to stay alive and get to a tiebreaker to decide the final set.

For a moment, it looked like he would not even get there. The best point of the match, a spectacular rally during which Kyle threw the kitchen sink and more at Frances, only to see the American get everything back and win the point with a brilliant counter-punch winner, gave the first point of the game to Tiafoe. He would eventually get to a match point at 30-40. Credit to Edmund who played a solid point of his own, approaching the net and challenging Tiafoe to pass him from a difficult position. Frances could not, and Edmund held serve two points later, forcing the tiebreaker.

So, yes, the match did indeed go to the tiebreaker in the final set, just not in the way you would have expected. The tiebreaker would not stick to the script either. Tiafoe would go up 6-1, only to see Edmund climb back to 6-5. On match point number five, Tiafoe would step up to the baseline, toss the ball up, and end the match with an ace.

It was a glorious victory for Tiafoe, and a heavy defeat for Edmund. It was so, not because both players performed at a very high level – in fact, the quality of tennis went slightly down in the final set.

It was a glorious victory for Tiafoe, rather because he had to play for an extended period of time with the burden of letting the match get away from him after having won a close first set, and yet find the determination within himself to finally overcome the barrier that sapped his mind for almost two hours – the inability to break Edmund’s serve – and do so precisely when it counted.

It was a heavy defeat for Edmund, rather because he felt like he had the victory within his reach for the better part of the match, only to have it snatched out of his hands at the last second. It may also bring up some larger questions for Edmund’s camp. The Brit, following a stellar month of January, has now been upset in his first matches, both in Indian Wells and in Miami. The hip injury that followed the Australian Open may have temporarily halted his progress more than expected. One can only hope that he does not have to go through a more complicated mental-recuperation process than he has had to go through on the physical side.

Next challenge for Tiafoe will be the 10th seed Tomas Berdych.

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Miami Open Match Report: Diego Schwartzman vs Nicolas Jarry (2nd round)

ATP Players Tactical Analysis 2 Comments

Assuming you have some knowledge of these two players’ games and you only see the final score of the match, you probably thought that it was a straight-forward affair. In other words, you probably thought that Diego Schwartzman remained solid from the baseline and Jarry, unable to penetrate his opponent’s armor, committed many errors and faded away as the match progressed.

Photo: Tennis Accent – @accent_tennis on Twitter

You would not be wrong. In fact, you may be understating the facts of this 67-minute-long encounter. Jarry did indeed commit 44 unforced errors vs 7 by Schwartzman – no, I do not include double faults in the unforced-error count, thank you very much. Yet, every match has a story, and this one also contains some nuances that go deeper than what the score and stats show.

One of those nuances is the underrated IQ of Schwartzman. Yes, it was a good match-up for Diego. His strength is comprised of footwork, returns, and baseline consistency. What better player to face for him than one that depends on big shots, big serves, but at the same time, one that is prone to errors if he must produce them continually? Jarry happens to be one of those types of opponents.

Yet, every match begins at 0-0 and you have to incorporate those advantages into the early points of the match to set the tone for later. If you don’t come out sharp mentally and your big-hitting opponent gets ahead and builds confidence, he can overpower you with winners. Jarry also happens to be one of those types of opponents.

The Chilean has been on the rise as of late and came into this tournaments in good form. Having concluded 2017 at number 100, his 2018 has been nothing but stellar, placing him at number 65 as the Miami Open began.

It would have most likely been enough for Schwartzman to keep his errors to a minimum, even if Jarry had started on a high note. As long as his baseline game remained solid, he would eventually wear the Chilean down and win the points that mattered. The score would have been closer, but he would have grabbed the victory. Well, he had the clarity to go beyond that which would have been enough.

He made adjustments in small doses, beginning as early as in the first game, while remaining loyal to his overall plan A. The goal was to get doubt to creep in Jarry’s mind early, thus not having to depend on a clutch point or two later to break the match free. Credit to Schwartzman for having done exactly that.

Jarry started the match serving. He went up 40-30, thanks largely to his big first serves and/or the use of 1-2 punch thanks to those serves. Diego’s returns were not particularly bad, but Jarry’s plan was crystal clear. He needed to put the heat on Schwartzman immediately and force him to do more than just keep the play in play. This plan played into Jarry’s strengths, on paper at least. He can create openings with his powerful forehand and his flat backhand. He can also serve big, as well as vary his spots in the box.

The problem is, as noted before, Schwartzman has one of the best returns in the ATP and two of the fastest legs on the tour. To make matters worse, he can counter-punch from defensive positions better than the majority of the ATP field. And boy, did he ever put those skills to use as soon as the match started.

Schwartzman quickly realized that he needed to stop Jarry from taking charge after the serve. He began to go for his returns. It may have seemed like the obvious thing to do, but Schwartzman specifically looked to land the return close to the baseline, and at a higher pace (at the cost of missing one or two), to catch Jarry off-guard and make him take a few steps back in a hurry. He sent a message to Jarry that the Chilean could not simply serve and prepare for the next shot inside the baseline. He wanted to take away the 1-2 punch from Jarry. It worked. He kept Jarry at bay, on the baseline, and made him have to force the issue from there. Jarry erred on a couple of shots, and before he knew it, Schwartzman had stolen the game from him.

The first task was completed. For a player like Jarry who considers his serve as one of his main weapons, getting broken on the first game of the match surely caused a significant dent in his confidence. Schwartzman, for his part, still needed to confirm the break to complete the second half of that step.

At 1-0, he went up 30-15 but committed two double-faults to go down a break point. On the break point, Schwartzman did not dwell on those two double faults that seemed to come out of nowhere. He focused and went back to basics. He got the serve in and forced Jarry to engage in a long rally. It ended with the latter committing the error. Two points later, Schwartzman held serve and confirmed the break. He was now up 2-0 without even having performed at his best.

Still only down a break, Jarry pressed on. To get an idea of the mountain he already had to climb, watch the first and third points of the ensuing 2-0 game. In the first point, Jarry attempted several risky shots to put Schwartzman under pressure, but the Argentine not only got all of his opponents’ shots back but added some extra sauce on them. The rally ended with Jarry’s error. In the third point, Jarry put in an impressive serve and stepped into the court, expecting a weak return. Schwartzman returned deep, pushed Jarry back behind the baseline, and eventually won the point from the baseline on a Jarry error once again.

These details were bound to mess with Jarry’s mental sharpness. I mean, what did he have to do in order to put together a successful string of games and get back in the match? And that is where this particular match-up problem rises to the surface. Jarry, as his game stands now, even with the confidence built on the improved results of late, simply does not have many options other than to keep pressing a pesky opponent like Schwartzman. He must continue to take risks and push the envelope.

To his credit, Jarry did seek solutions. He added some backhand slices to change the pace during rallies, hoping that Schwartzman may give him a short ball to work with. He opted for the drop shot a few times, like in the first point of the 3-1 game, looking to bring Diego to the net. In fact, that whole 3-1 game is the second (and last) example among many that I am willing to give in this piece if you are interested in seeing just how much Jarry had to work – and risk – just to earn a point from Schwartzman.

A last glimmer of hope appeared for Jarry when he broke Schwartzman’s serve, on his fourth break-point opportunity, after a contested sixth game that included a few uncharacteristic errors by the Argentine. Jarry’s hopes were quickly dashed, however, when Diego rose to the challenge and played his best return game of the match.

Once Schwartzman held to go up 5-3, you could tell that Jarry’s resolve had taken a substantial hit. Not only was Schwartzman performing at a higher level better than in the beginning of the match, but he was also limiting Jarry’s options in the process, thus chipping away at the Chilean’s belief.

Jarry’s footwork in the 5-3 game looked like one that belonged to someone who felt dejected. He made a terrible drop-shot attempt on the first point, followed it with two forehand unforced errors on the second and third points. Then, he missed a volley on the 15-40 point to lose the set 6-3.

The second set followed more or less the same pattern. Schwartzman had apparently done the bulk of his work in the first seven games of the match. He never deviated from his successful plan while Jarry kept pounding and missing.

The match ended 6-3 6-1 in Schwartzman’s favor in one hour and 17 minutes, but this loss should by no means diminish what Jarry had accomplished so far this year. The Chilean’s game has the make-up necessary to climb up the rankings. If Jarry ever needed clarity on what he needs to work to reach the next step in his progress, he could not have asked for a better feedback than this match. Schwartzman presented him with the type of barriers that he will need to overcome before turning a veritable threat to the higher-ranked players.

In the next round, Schwartzman will take on the Canadian Milos Raonic.

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