Category: ATP

Miami Open Match Report: Diego Schwartzman vs Nicolas Jarry (2nd round)

ATP Players Tactical Analysis 2 Comments

Assuming you have some knowledge of these two players’ games and you only see the final score of the match, you probably thought that it was a straight-forward affair. In other words, you probably thought that Diego Schwartzman remained solid from the baseline and Jarry, unable to penetrate his opponent’s armor, committed many errors and faded away as the match progressed.

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You would not be wrong. In fact, you may be understating the facts of this 67-minute-long encounter. Jarry did indeed commit 44 unforced errors vs 7 by Schwartzman – no, I do not include double faults in the unforced-error count, thank you very much. Yet, every match has a story, and this one also contains some nuances that go deeper than what the score and stats show.

One of those nuances is the underrated IQ of Schwartzman. Yes, it was a good match-up for Diego. His strength is comprised of footwork, returns, and baseline consistency. What better player to face for him than one that depends on big shots, big serves, but at the same time, one that is prone to errors if he must produce them continually? Jarry happens to be one of those types of opponents.

Yet, every match begins at 0-0 and you have to incorporate those advantages into the early points of the match to set the tone for later. If you don’t come out sharp mentally and your big-hitting opponent gets ahead and builds confidence, he can overpower you with winners. Jarry also happens to be one of those types of opponents.

The Chilean has been on the rise as of late and came into this tournaments in good form. Having concluded 2017 at number 100, his 2018 has been nothing but stellar, placing him at number 65 as the Miami Open began.

It would have most likely been enough for Schwartzman to keep his errors to a minimum, even if Jarry had started on a high note. As long as his baseline game remained solid, he would eventually wear the Chilean down and win the points that mattered. The score would have been closer, but he would have grabbed the victory. Well, he had the clarity to go beyond that which would have been enough.

He made adjustments in small doses, beginning as early as in the first game, while remaining loyal to his overall plan A. The goal was to get doubt to creep in Jarry’s mind early, thus not having to depend on a clutch point or two later to break the match free. Credit to Schwartzman for having done exactly that.

Jarry started the match serving. He went up 40-30, thanks largely to his big first serves and/or the use of 1-2 punch thanks to those serves. Diego’s returns were not particularly bad, but Jarry’s plan was crystal clear. He needed to put the heat on Schwartzman immediately and force him to do more than just keep the play in play. This plan played into Jarry’s strengths, on paper at least. He can create openings with his powerful forehand and his flat backhand. He can also serve big, as well as vary his spots in the box.

The problem is, as noted before, Schwartzman has one of the best returns in the ATP and two of the fastest legs on the tour. To make matters worse, he can counter-punch from defensive positions better than the majority of the ATP field. And boy, did he ever put those skills to use as soon as the match started.

Schwartzman quickly realized that he needed to stop Jarry from taking charge after the serve. He began to go for his returns. It may have seemed like the obvious thing to do, but Schwartzman specifically looked to land the return close to the baseline, and at a higher pace (at the cost of missing one or two), to catch Jarry off-guard and make him take a few steps back in a hurry. He sent a message to Jarry that the Chilean could not simply serve and prepare for the next shot inside the baseline. He wanted to take away the 1-2 punch from Jarry. It worked. He kept Jarry at bay, on the baseline, and made him have to force the issue from there. Jarry erred on a couple of shots, and before he knew it, Schwartzman had stolen the game from him.

The first task was completed. For a player like Jarry who considers his serve as one of his main weapons, getting broken on the first game of the match surely caused a significant dent in his confidence. Schwartzman, for his part, still needed to confirm the break to complete the second half of that step.

At 1-0, he went up 30-15 but committed two double-faults to go down a break point. On the break point, Schwartzman did not dwell on those two double faults that seemed to come out of nowhere. He focused and went back to basics. He got the serve in and forced Jarry to engage in a long rally. It ended with the latter committing the error. Two points later, Schwartzman held serve and confirmed the break. He was now up 2-0 without even having performed at his best.

Still only down a break, Jarry pressed on. To get an idea of the mountain he already had to climb, watch the first and third points of the ensuing 2-0 game. In the first point, Jarry attempted several risky shots to put Schwartzman under pressure, but the Argentine not only got all of his opponents’ shots back but added some extra sauce on them. The rally ended with Jarry’s error. In the third point, Jarry put in an impressive serve and stepped into the court, expecting a weak return. Schwartzman returned deep, pushed Jarry back behind the baseline, and eventually won the point from the baseline on a Jarry error once again.

These details were bound to mess with Jarry’s mental sharpness. I mean, what did he have to do in order to put together a successful string of games and get back in the match? And that is where this particular match-up problem rises to the surface. Jarry, as his game stands now, even with the confidence built on the improved results of late, simply does not have many options other than to keep pressing a pesky opponent like Schwartzman. He must continue to take risks and push the envelope.

To his credit, Jarry did seek solutions. He added some backhand slices to change the pace during rallies, hoping that Schwartzman may give him a short ball to work with. He opted for the drop shot a few times, like in the first point of the 3-1 game, looking to bring Diego to the net. In fact, that whole 3-1 game is the second (and last) example among many that I am willing to give in this piece if you are interested in seeing just how much Jarry had to work – and risk – just to earn a point from Schwartzman.

A last glimmer of hope appeared for Jarry when he broke Schwartzman’s serve, on his fourth break-point opportunity, after a contested sixth game that included a few uncharacteristic errors by the Argentine. Jarry’s hopes were quickly dashed, however, when Diego rose to the challenge and played his best return game of the match.

Once Schwartzman held to go up 5-3, you could tell that Jarry’s resolve had taken a substantial hit. Not only was Schwartzman performing at a higher level better than in the beginning of the match, but he was also limiting Jarry’s options in the process, thus chipping away at the Chilean’s belief.

Jarry’s footwork in the 5-3 game looked like one that belonged to someone who felt dejected. He made a terrible drop-shot attempt on the first point, followed it with two forehand unforced errors on the second and third points. Then, he missed a volley on the 15-40 point to lose the set 6-3.

The second set followed more or less the same pattern. Schwartzman had apparently done the bulk of his work in the first seven games of the match. He never deviated from his successful plan while Jarry kept pounding and missing.

The match ended 6-3 6-1 in Schwartzman’s favor in one hour and 17 minutes, but this loss should by no means diminish what Jarry had accomplished so far this year. The Chilean’s game has the make-up necessary to climb up the rankings. If Jarry ever needed clarity on what he needs to work to reach the next step in his progress, he could not have asked for a better feedback than this match. Schwartzman presented him with the type of barriers that he will need to overcome before turning a veritable threat to the higher-ranked players.

In the next round, Schwartzman will take on the Canadian Milos Raonic.

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Indian Wells Match Report: Milos Raonic vs Joao Sousa (3rd round)

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Milos Raonic launched his 2018 campaign in Brisbane in January following a three-month injury-related break that he probably wanted to leave behind as fast as possible. What he has done in the first three months of this year, however, has only been the continuation of the nightmare, except that instead of recovering from injury, he found himself trying to recover from disappointing losses. The Canadian began the year with two first-round losses in Brisbane and at the Australian Open. It takes time to recover from injury, especially for a big guy like Milos, but surely, he was hoping for a better record than 1-3 and an ATP ranking of 38 (last week it was 40, his lowest since 2011) coming into the BNP Parisbas Open in Indian Wells.

Well, his record is leveled at 3-3 after two wins vs Félix Auger-Aliassime and Joao Sousa. His match on Tuesday against the 85th-ranked Sousa was, at least on paper, a straight-forward matchup between an attacker with a big serve and a retriever-counterpuncher with a reliable footwork. Most of the encounter lived up to that billing, with the outcome resting on a game or two here and there. Raonic, being the aggressor and donning a clear weapon, his serve, was the player more likely to decide the fate of the match.

Milos did get couple of assists from Sousa, but it was his shot-making (or shall I say “serve-making with the support of some other shots”?) or his errors that oscillated the match one way or the other.

Photo: Jeff Gross – Getty Images

One aspect of his game plan that had an immediate impact, on Sousa particularly, was his decision to nail as many forehands as possible for winners on his opponent’s second-serve returns. He blatantly ran around his backhand and went for forehand winners each time he saw a second serve coming from Sousa. The Canadian also served big both on first and second serves, even by his standards, from the very first game forward. He seemed determined to finish the point with one shot, period. It was an astute strategy**. Sousa is a pesky player who can run down many balls and create angles from the baseline. The last thing Raonic wanted to do was to resort to extended rallies against an opponent who relies on building his rhythm with longer points.

**Side note 1: I reject the notion that what I described here is “always Raonic’s strategy” thus implying that it has nothing to do with astuteness. Milos is a hihgly intelligent player and to say that he solely does one thing and never varies it only shows that the person making the claim has hardly ever watched Raonic and seen that he often adjusts his return position, his serve’s placement, and the amount of slice he adds to his backhand depending on his opponent.

The example of the first game should suffice to illustrate Raonic’s desire to cut the point short. Most servers start pulling their biggest serves when they are well into the match and there comes a moment when they feel physically and mentally geared to make a run. Their focus peaks and they “free-flow” into hitting one service bomb after another. This does not usually happen in the very beginning of the match. Unless, evidently, your name is Milos Raonic.

His very first serve of the match was a 143 mph bazooka that Sousa could not return in the court. Milos missed the next first serve at 144 mph. In the third point, he nailed a 125 mph second serve that forced an error out of Sousa. In the fourth point, his second serve had such an overwhelming kick that Sousa, bewildered by the bounce, swung the air with his racket. It was a clean ace. The first game was over in one minute and 55 seconds, and it lasted that long only because the second point turned out to be an eleven-shot rally.

Therefore, when one looks at Raonic’s first-serve percentage for the first set, it can be misleading. It stood at 43% when the set ended. Low number by any means, but not as dismal as you might think if you observed how much he went for on them from the opening point. In fact, he only lost two points when he did put them in. He also won the majority of points on his second serves because he was taking risks on them too. Although he would like to at least serve over 50% first serves, his priority here was to cut the point short even if it came at the cost of committing few more errors.

He finished the match at 57% first-serve percentage largely thanks to the third set during which he made 15 out 20 first serves. He won 41 out of the 46 points that started with his first serves, losing only one in the second set, ironically the only one he lost.

As noted above, where the strategy really paid off for Raonic was on returns. He sent an early message to Sousa that the Portuguese better get his first serve in, or else**. In his first two service games, Raonic moved around his backhand side to unload his forehand on Sousa’s second serves, and won a large majority of those points. In fact, Sousa would go on to win only around 20% of his second-serve points for the first two sets and finish the match at 29%.

**Side note 2: By the way, Raonic did not limit his risk-taking on returns to Sousa’s second serves. Whenever he could get his feet set, he also unleashed his forehand on Sousa’s first ones. If you wonder the effect his returns had overall on Sousa, look at the expression on Joao’s face immediately after Raonic hits a warp-speed return at deuce in the 2-1 game, on a solid, wide first serve by the Portuguese no less. Sousa barely gets his racket on it, loses the point to face the third break point in that game, and smiles sarcastically toward his box, probably wondering how Milos was pulling those returns.

You could sense, very early in the match, Sousa’s malaise on second serves when that reality set in. Raonic’s aggressive returns led to two double faults by Sousa in his second-serving game of the match at 1-2. Both double faults came after Raonic punished Sousa’s second serves in the preceding points (at 15-15, and 30-30). Sousa then had to battle for 9 minutes 55 seconds and save five break points in order to survive that game.

Strangely, it was Sousa that got to break Raonic first at 4-4. It was the only game in which Raonic did not get a first serve in and double-faulted twice. It also helped that Sousa’s shot clipped the net and dropped over for a winner on break point. In the ensuing game, Sousa would give his first of two assists to Raonic. He started the 5-4 game with a double fault followed by a badly timed backhand slice that allowed Raonic to attack and win the next point to go up 0-30. Raonic broke serve to get to 5-5 and did it again at 6-5 to finish the first set. In that game, Raonic nailed another forehand return for a winner on a second serve by Sousa at 15-30. Sousa followed that up with a double fault, a pattern previously seen more than once in this set, and lost the first set 7-5. When you look at stats and see four double faults for Sousa in the first set, remember that they are in part products of Raonic’s tremendous pressure on his second serves.

A similar pattern took place in the second set, with a different ending. Again, Raonic served two double faults in the 4-4 game, and again, Sousa broke his serve to go up 5-4. Sousa would not let his opportunity get away this time. He played a very solid game** to hold comfortably and force a third set.

**Side note 3: I should note that Sousa played many solid games in this match and won most points that turned into baseline battles. This is no surprise, but it also shows how accurate Raonic was in his successful attempt to turn this match into one whose outcome depended on serves and returns, rather than winners and unforced errors hit during rallies.

Photo: Matthew Stockman – Getty Images

The turning point of the third set came when Sousa was serving at 2-3. Raonic deserves credit for extending the game to deuce, thanks to the fabulous forehand cross-court winner he hit on the run at 40-30. Then, Sousa gave Raonic his second – and definitive – assist. After an ace to earn another game point, Sousa netted a short, albeit low, forehand in the net on an approach shot. He would get a third chance at holding serve, but then would string together his worst sequence of three-points-in-a-row of the match at a most inopportune time.

He first attempted a serve-and-volley on an average first serve that Raonic was easily able to get down to his feet at the net. I have no idea why Joao would try to do the opposite of what has worked for him during the last hour, which is to engage Raonic in a rally, either to squeeze an error out of him or to approach the net when the short-ball opportunity presented itself. In fact, this formula worked more than once in the very game that he was playing. He missed the low backhand volley and the score went to deuce. He would then pass on a chance to come to the net in the next rally when he had a short ball on his forehand, probably because the volley miss from the last point was fresh in his mind. Few shots later in that rally, he netted a forehand to go down a break point, and followed it up with an angled forehand attempt from the middle of the court that went wide to lose his serve. It was poor decision-making for three successive points and his disappointment showed when he turned to his box to express it after losing the break point.

Raonic took control and raised his level considerably. He played his best tennis of the match in the last two games of the match, breaking Sousa’s serve one more time to win the match 7-5 4-6 6-2. He advanced on to the next round to face the streaky Marcos Baghdatis for a spot in the quarterfinals. Raonic’s game still has glitches and his movement is not at 100%, but playing more matches is precisely what the doctor ordered so the central task was accomplished.

At the end of the day, Sousa and Bahdatis are no more than other competitors who line up as his opponents on a given day. Milos is relentlessly harassed by a much more vicious and powerful nemesis than any single tennis player, one that methodically keeps hampering his progress: physical pain. In the bigger picture, it is nothing less than remarkable that he has been able to accumulate as many impressive results as he has in his career, considering that injuries have relentlessly pursued him since his early years on the tour, often with success, much to the dismay of his fans.

Having said that, you cannot build a game plan for your upcoming opponent around the notion of avoiding injury. Raonic must rather concentrate on repairing the existing glitches in his game. He must aim to win more efficiently than he did in Tuesday’s match against Sousa so that he can move on to the next round with the least amount of wear and tear to his body. And drawing up an efficient winning plan for the next match involves forehands, backhands, serves, winners, aces, angles, et cetera, as well as all the other x’s and o’s that matter once the first point begins. Winning, after all, leads to more match play and the more victories Milos can amass, while remaining healthy, the more confidence he can gain and the quicker he can return inside the top ten.

Until the next one, enjoy the BNP Parisbas Open!

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Indian Wells Match Report: Denis Shapovalov – Ricardas Berankis (first round)

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We often hear that “stats can be misleading.” This phrase is indeed a misguided assumption. It can only be true if the person looking at the statistics of the match in question views them as nothing more than sheer numbers without engaging their critical thinking. It is a rare occurrence at best. In reality, the evaluator’s personal observations of the match, influenced by his/her expert knowledge of tennis, mobilize a certain level of critical thinking that should lead to a healthy post-match analysis. Stats can be useful ingredients during such process, but they merely play a complementary role to the two main components, personal observation and critical thinking. To be blunt, it is very possible to do a sound analysis of a match using these two components alone. It is, by contrast, highly improbable that the same can be done if we lacked one of the two components, even if we had every numerical data at our disposal.

Thursday’s first-round match between the left-handed Denis Shapovalov (Canada, ranked no.44) and the qualifier Ricardas Berankis (Lithuania, ranked no.106) provides a good example of how numbers can be misguiding if stats are mainly taken into account.

Photo: Jeff Gross – Getty Images

In the first game of the match, Shapovalov made his first serve only once in six total points, double-faulted once, yet still managed to hold serve. In the third game at 1-1, he committed another double fault, only hit half of his first serves in, but held serve again. In the fifth game at 2-2, he double-faulted twice to start the game and still dug himself out of the hole and held serve.

In fact, when the scoreboard showed 3-2, it almost seemed miraculous that Denis would still be on serve. Thus far in three serving games, stats showed that he committed four double-faults and got only seven out of seventeen first serves in at 41%. I prefer to say the following: Denis Shapovalov was serving so well that even at 41% first serves and four double faults, he had yet to face a break point and lost only one point on his serve outside of the four double faults.

Because, you see, the numbers could not tell you the story of how well Shapovalov was placing the first and second serves that he was getting in, how much variation his serves had in terms of spin and speed, or how many errors Berankis was making on returns as he would try to adjust to the different bounces coming off the Canadian’s wicked combination of flat, slice, and kick serves.

Neither could the numbers tell the story of what precisely happened in the four points that followed when Denis went down 0-30 at 2-2, after the two successive double faults. At 0-30, Shapovalov got in a high-kicking second serve that forced Berankis to hit a defensive return, eventually leading to a forehand winner by Denis. At 15-30, Shapovalov hit a slice first serve to the outside corner of the box, stretching Berankis to the outside of the court and forcing him to float the one-handed backhand out. At 30-30, Shapovalov struck a hard serve to the “T” that Berankis could not get back in the court. Finally, at 40-30, Shapovalov hit a clean ace to the outside, for good measure, and closed out the game.

Stats were showing a “bad serving day” for Shapovalov. To a careful observer however, it was clear that Berankis was having a “nightmare returning day,” precisely because of Shapovalov’s serving skills. Do you believe that, after Shapovalov held and went up 3-2, Berankis was getting edgy thinking what he would do if Shapovalov’s first serve began to truly click, considering how much trouble the Canadian’s “un-clicking” serve was already giving him? You bet he was! And that anxiety showed in the ensuing sixth game.

The same Berankis that cruised through his first two service games without losing a point became restless. He committed his first double-fault at 30-15. He escaped a break point at 30-40 with what was probably his best point of the match, a long rally ending with his forehand winner to the deuce corner. He squandered two chances to hold serve before saving another break point. Then, the pressure finally got to Berankis. He double-faulted a second time in the game on the fourth deuce point and gave Shapovalov his third chance to break. Berankis then missed a fairly routine backhand cross-court wide, and Denis was now out in front 4-2.

To confirm the break, Shapovalov served three successive first serves in, winning the ensuing rallies in each point, to go up 40-0. To finish the game, Shapovalov kicked a second serve so high that Berankis swung and almost completely missed the ball, his racket frame barely clipping the ball behind him. It was very symbolic of the havoc that Shapovalov’s serve was causing on the Lithuanian.

Yet, when the set ended 6-3 in Shapovalov’s favor, his serving numbers were unimpressive. He served at 48% first serves, recorded two aces and four double faults. It was rather the placement and the variation of both his first and second serves that did the damage not the amount of aces or first serves that he got it in the box.

Photo: Cameron Spencer – Getty Images (Jan 2018)

It was déjà vu in the second set, except that Berankis did try to attack more by coming to the net. The problem was that he could never solve the puzzle of Shapovalov’s serves. For example, when he was leading 3-2 and 0-15 on Shapovalov’s serve, he tried to attack on a second serve that kicked so high that he had to jump up to hit it and missed it deep. On the next point, Shapovalov’s terrific first serve earned a return error from Berankis again. At 30-15, another solid second serve eventually led Denis to finish the point at the net. At 40-15, yet another second serve forced Berankis to miss the backhand return wide. Do you notice a pattern?

It is not the kind of pattern in which a player holds serves by simply serving aces or powerful serves. It is a singular type of service domination, one where the server hits double-faults, only a handful of aces, yet manages to completely derail the opponent’s returns. This is not to say that Shapovalov is not capable of doing the first pattern. He did it at 3-4 in the second set, by winning the game in 62 seconds, thanks to three aces and one winning second serve.

Berankis finally cracked on his serve at 4-4. A double fault and two unforced errors from the baseline were enough to give Shapovalov a chance to serve for the match at 5-4. Of course, Denis obliged, winning the game and the match 6-3 6-4. He will face the 30th-seeded Pablo Cuevas in the second round.

Side note 1
Shapovalov finished with 25/53 first serves for 47%, but out of the 25 points that he started with his first serve, he only lost three. Not counting the five double faults, he only lost six points when having to start the point with a second serve. Variety and placement are the essentials here, not power and stats. Looking at first-serve percentage, and the number of aces and double faults, one could easily say that Denis had a “bad serving day.” The truth is, his serves played the leading role in his victory.

Side note 2
Shapovalov rarely uses the slice on backhand returns. Even when reaching for the ball, he seldom blocks or slices the ball back in the court. It’s a questionable choice in my opinion, especially considering that one-handed backhand hitters have stronger wrists and better control of the racket head when forced to hit a stretched one-handed backhand. A slice return could also come in handy when facing a powerful server. Trying to muscle a one-handed return over the top of the ball on a serve coming to you like a bazooka may prove costly. I can only assume Denis and his coaching know something others don’t because he has been doing this for almost two years with little sign of integrating the slice into his backhand returns.

Side note 3
It never ceases to amaze me how well Berankis serves for a player of his size.

Side note 4
Shapovalov rarely tries a regular drop shot during a rally. Maybe it will come with time, but seeing his finesse skills at the net, I would be surprised if he does not develop his drop shots.

On an unrelated note, I would like to thank all those who provided wonderful, positive, and encouraging feedback/comments via social media and private messages on my previous match report from Wednesday.

Until the next one, enjoy BNP Parisbas Open!

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Australian Open: Men’s Final Preview

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Roger Federer (2) vs. Marin Cilic (6)

At this point in the Roger Federer – Marin Cilic rivalry, their 2014 US Open encounter, in which the Croat crushed the Swiss in straight sets, looks more and more like a colossal exception to the norm. It remains to this day Marin’s only victory over his rival. In return, Roger has defeated him eight other times, with the only “close call” having taken place at the Wimbledon 2016 quarterfinals (Federer came back from two sets down and saved three match points in the third). Roger played average tennis for most of that particular match and, by his own admission much later, did not prepare adequately for the tournament due to an arthroscopic surgery that required substantial time-off earlier in the spring. This Sunday, I strongly doubt he will play average tennis on Centre Court.

There are several reasons for which Federer dominates Cilic. I will not list all of them here because most are obvious to every enthusiastic tennis fan. The one that makes the biggest difference, in my opinion, is the fact that Cilic’s first step on returns and change of directions lacks the explosiveness needed to position his upper body for his shot, without which he cannot generate enough power on his groundstrokes.

Cilic’s upper-body rotation on the forehand and his ability to lean into the ball on his two-handed backhand are two essential elements required to produce his best tennis which mainly consists of overpowering the opponent. It is a complete change of equation when Cilic has to stretch for his shots and reach with his upper body to make contact.

Photo: Scott Barnour – Getty

I believe most readers will agree with me when I say that Federer is one of the best in the history of our sport when it comes to exploiting the glaring weaknesses of his adversaries. It should be no different on Sunday. Federer will look to vary his serves – some into the body, many out wide, some flat ones to the “T” – with the goal of exploiting Marin’s lack of speed on his first-step. He will use his serves to force the Croat to either get out of the way quickly on a serve that is curving into his body, or lunge wide to reach a sliding serve to the outside on the deuce side, or retrieve a flat serve bouncing on the “T.”

The only way this advantage in favor of Federer gets negated is if he struggles with his first serve and begins to depend on second ones. I do not, obviously, mean to knock down Federer’s second serve since it is one of the best in the Open Era, probably right behind Pete Sampras’ second serve. I intend simply to emphasize the fact that a bad first-serve day by Roger will not allow him to take advantage of an edge that he would otherwise have against Marin.

That still does not solve Cilic’s potential problems during baseline rallies. Federer is a master of creating angles and not relinquishing the upper-hand in the rally once it turns in his favor. He can keep his opponent on the run until he puts it away with a winner at the net or from the baseline, or until his opponent makes an error on a low-percentage winner attempt from a difficult position under pressure. He can also accelerate the ball to the same corner from which the opponent is recovering, putting him on his backfoot. Did that ring a bell? See two paragraphs above if it did not.

For his part, – and this will sound like a repeat of my semifinal preview – Cilic needs to focus on his strengths and not contemplate too much on aspects that he cannot control. He was able to do it against Kyle Edmund, another player with a big forehand and first serve, and raise the rest of his game as a consequence. Can he not do the same on Sunday? So what if his opponent serves well? So what if the opponent out-rallies him? Can he still not stay toe-to-toe with his oppponent if he serves at a high first-serve percentage and adds in a healthy number of aces? Can he not successfully put to use his solid 1-2 punch skills as a follow-up to those serves? Sure, he can. In that scenario, he would probably need to take the set to a tiebreaker and steal it, but yes, it is possible. But now change the word “opponent,” used thrice earlier in this paragraph, to “Federer.” All of a sudden, Cilic’s task seems a lot more difficult than it did against Edmund.

Defeating an in-form Federer is an imposing mountain to climb for any player. It is a challenge that very few players have been able to overcome, and that, only a handful of times. Cilic is not one of those players. I do not expect that to change on Sunday. His first serve and 1-2 punch – assuming the first serve clicks – may earn him a set, and then he would need help from Roger (or something…).

Otherwise, look for an extremely jovial Federer to break a new record, his own, for the number of Majors won, as well as the record for the “duration-of-post-match-interviews” statistic, also his own, set earlier this week (I gather).

Enjoy the match!

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Photo: Mark Kolbe – Getty

ATP Finals Saturday: Goffin Happened

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David Goffin pulls the shocker, defeats Roger Federer 2-6 6-3 6-4

What constitutes a shocking upset? There are many components to it, but the three major ones in my opinion are when the match pits two players where one has clearly dominated the other in their previous encounters, it takes place on one of the favorite player’s surfaces in one of his favorite events, and it initially takes shape as expected, meaning the favorite player showcases his skills, looks unbeatable, repeats successfully the patterns seen in their previous matches, subsequently grabbing a commanding lead while the underdog seems to look helpless.

And then, the improbable (or the impossible) happens. The match turns around completely, and stays that way for an extended period of time while most people are constantly expecting at any time that it will “soon reset back to normal.” Yet, it never does. It continues to the bitter end.

This is virtually the scenario we saw today in London with Goffin and Federer. There was also the added pre-match nuance about Goffin’s condition in terms of his endurance and his knee.

Photo: AFP – Glyn Kirk

In my preview, I talked about the match-up problems that Goffin would have against Federer, which were directly the causes of his 0-6 record against the Swiss until today. Here they are:

“Firstly, his second serve is weak enough to where Federer can either attack the net and pressure Goffin behind the return, or begin running him ragged from the start of the point. Secondly, handling Federer’s serves is a puzzle that he needs to solve to have any chance to get ahead, in case he stays toe-to-toe with him in the early portions of the match. Thirdly, his up-and-down movement will have to shine, because Roger can bounce the ball high or keep it low with his slice, and David is a player that has a strong preference on where to strike the ball, which is around his hip-to-chest level.”

These took place in the first set, more or less in the way described above.

Then came the beginning of the second set.

Each of the first two games deserves a close look.

0-15 up in the first game on David’s serve, Roger misses a makeable passing shot, frames another backhand, erasing his 0-15 and 15-30 leads. Goffin, to his credit, gets his first serves in when needed and holds. Yes, there was a bit of help from Federer, but Goffin also did his part.

The second game on Federer’s serve is when we see clear signs of shift in Goffin’s approach. He begins tackling Roger’s serves with aggressiveness, at the cost of missing a few returns, in order to solve the puzzle that I mentioned as my second point in the preview above. Not much he could do on a wide serve by Federer on the first point. On the second point however, Federer hits a first serve to his comfort zone, and Goffin nails the reflex return deep to the corner – ok, a bit of a mishit may have helped, I am not sure. Federer, caught a bit by surprise, misses the the next shot, a forehand.

At 15-15 on Federer’s second serve, Goffin takes a big risk again. He steps inside the court and sends the return deep to the middle. It lands a bit out, but it’s the right play. This is what I meant by “at the cost of missing” above. It’s a typical case of doing the right thing, missing the execution.

At 30-15, same thing again! Goffin nails the return from inside the baseline, this time on Roger’s first serve. Federer is caught backing up and misses the next shot, which is also a forehand. Now it’s 30-30.

Roger serves well in the next point and wins it at the net. Now, it’s 40-30, game point for Roger.

Roger serves a second serve, and guess what? David returns aggressively again, pushing Roger back to hit a backhand that lands short, on which David attacks to the open corner. Federer misses the next shot, a forehand, again!

Notice closely what is happening here.

Goffin makes an adjustment, noticeably going fully aggressive on returns, and not only does it begin working for him, but bye then he has already pushed Federer into making three forehand errors. The consequence? Anytime a player misses three times from the same wing in a game, you better believe that a certain level of doubt begins to settle in his mind about that particular shot. Need I remind those who watched the match how Federer’s forehand went from this point forward? Well, its downfall began right here, in the second game.

(Those who do need the reminder should just watch the 1-0 game in the third, in which Roger goes up 0-30 on David’s service game with a legitimate chance to get a head start in the final set.)

At another game point for the Swiss later in the same game, an extended rally ends with, Roger missing his forehand again in the net. That error may go down as unforced error in the stats, but it is a direct result of the doubt beginning to burgeon in Federer’s mind from the three previous misses caused by Goffin’s aggressive returns. Back to deuce, still 1-0 Goffin, in the second set.

Fast forward to the third deuce. Goffin hits a direct winner on the return and now he has a break point against the man who has only lost his serve twice in the tournament. What happens in that break point? A short rally takes place in which Roger gets a short ball on his forehand, and hits a badly placed, mid-pace approach to David’s forehand who passes him cross-court. Is it a mediocre approach shot by Roger? Yes. Was it just a brain freeze? No. Did the previous four forehands missed in the game, the first three caused by David’s shift in tactics, play a role in his apprehensiveness to nail that approach shot? You bet. I believe the fear of missing that forehand contributed to the fact that Roger ended up hitting the approach shot safer than he would have otherwise done.

Goffin gets the break, goes up 2-0. The improbable turnaround has now taken off the ground, about to turn into an extended, high-altitude flight for two sets.

It does just that, with more adjustments from Goffin. He is determined to play inside the court and begins to move forward beautifully to hit the ball at his favorite height – see my third point above in the preview quote – on evry short ball hit by Roger. A great example of that is the very first point of the next game. It ends with Goffin’s swing-volley winner, set up by three aggressive shots in a row from inside the court.

The pattern has now changed. Federer is defending, Goffin attacking. For that to work, Goffin not only needs to return aggressively, but also get a lot of first serves in and “go big” on the second shot. He will do just that for the remainder of the match, and by the time he holds to confirm the break, the improbable turnaround has reached the necessary altitude and cruising.

Speaking of the second shot following the serve: see the 1-2 game in the final set. David has played, up to that point, his worst service game since the beginning of the second set. He should feel the heat, right? Nope. He stays as cool as cucumber. He presses on. He gets the first serve in, attacks on the second shot, hits the a volley winner: deuce. Next point, he gets the first serve in, attacks on the second shot, hits the volley winner: ad-in. Maybe I should have copied and pasted. Finally, a return error by Roger, and it’s 3-1. Break confirmed.

By now, Goffin is feeling it, Federer is not, probably a bit in shock himself. So were most tennis fans, I would think. Goffin rolls on his service games continuing the same pattern, all the way to the end. He continues to hit hard on returns whenever he can, but by now, holding serve has become a priority. For that to continue, getting first serves in and staying aggressive on second shots are the two components he needs. They do indeed work, his winning formula is complete. One break each set suffices.

Could Federer have made adjustments once down a break in the third? Of course, he was in a losing pattern. For example, he attempted to hit his backhand return that he has been slicing for the most part (not for the wrong reasons, it has worked in the past and in the first set) and missed it into the net to lose the game. That is what losing confidence does, and makes you less likely to try it again.

His confidence was also long gone in his two biggest weapons. As noted above, his forehand was spotty by then. Under the heat brought on by David’s returns, his first serves were no longer clicking either. While he served beautifully at 68% first serves in the first set, in the second and third set those numbers dwindled down to 57% and 59% respectively.

Conclusion: let’s give credit where credit is due. Goffin deserved to win the match. He was the better player for two sets, and the fact that Federer’s level dropped after the early break in the second set was secondary, and consequential, to what Goffin did to reverse the tide.

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Looking Ahead to Federer vs Goffin

ATP Tactical Analysis No Comments

The Belgian facing a giant hill to climb

For the preview of the other semifinal between Grigor Dimitrov and Jack Sock, click here

David Goffin played two lop-sided matches in his last two group matches. He lost the first, won the second. One certainty is that after a grueling three-setter against Rafael Nadal in his first match, he could not have asked for a more economical duo of matches even if he ended up on the losing end in one of them.

For him to have any chance against Roger Federer, he needs to have his footwork geared up, and even in today’s seemingly routine win over Thiem, he did not appear to be at 100% in his movement. By tomorrow, hopefully for him, it will improve. It better! Or else, he is packing up his bags.

The question is, would packing up his bagsy necessarily be a bad thing for him? Consider that he is one week away from playing his first match, a five-setter need I remind, at the Davis Cup finals in Lille, France. The Belgian tennis fans might not think it would be. But what does Goffin think? I tend to believe that top professionals in our sport would give 100% in an event like the ATP World Tour Finals, regardless of what awaits the week after.

Photo: Getty – Julian Finney

I do, however, believe that if Federer gets a head start and wins the first set, the subconscious may create a few dents in the professionalism of David, in the sense that the will to fight and to climb back into the match may not be as intense, since something even more intense is approaching fast – and yes, Davis Cup is a more intense experience for a player than any other event.

The bad news for Goffin is that getting a head start is a trademark of Federer. He has won Basel, and remained undefeated so far in London, without playing at his top level. You can, on the other hand, see his desire to win, his will to achieve perfection.

Everyone knows that this tournament means a lot to him. On numerous occasions, he has explicitly stated that winning the ATP World Tour Finals is a priority for him, ranking right behind the Majors. His drive will insure that, even if he does not perform at his best, his mind will stay sharp. He will put forth what is necessary to turn the match in his favor. “Efficiency” will be the key term for him, as it was in his win over Zverev on Tuesday. His top-level form may not even be necessary.

Furthermore, there are match-up problems here for David, above and beyond the psychological weight of having an 0-6 record against the Swiss.

Firstly, his second serve is weak enough to where Federer can either attack the net and pressure Goffin behind the return, or begin running him ragged from the start of the point. Secondly, handling Federer’s serves is a puzzle that he needs to solve to have any chance to get ahead, in case he stays toe-to-toe with him in the early portions of the match. Thirdly, his up-and-down movement will have to shine, because Roger can bounce the ball high or keep it low with his slice, and David is a player that has a strong preference on where to strike the ball, which is around his hip-to-chest level.

Photo: Getty – Julian Finney

The longer the rallies, the better for Goffin. At his sharpest, Goffin moves side-to-side as quickly as any other player on the tour, and extended rallies are likely to favor him, if not, at least increase the chances of Federer committing errors. Again, we come back to Goffin’s endurance. Can he play the scrambling style of game throughout the match, putting in long miles on his legs, and not run empty on fuel? I do not believe so.

If Federer’s first serve is on, considering all the above factors, look for a routine straight-set affair. Otherwise, Goffin must stay on serve early in the match, just to keep it close. Let that happen first, then have Goffin manage to steal the first set, “and then we’ll talk” (as Hank says to Walter in an episode of Breaking Bad).

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