Category: ATP

Roland Garros Match Report: Grigor Dimitrov vs Jared Donaldson (second round)

ATP Majors Tactical Analysis 2 Comments

I have written plenty about Grigor Dimitrov before in my articles and talked about him during my guest appearances in the media and on Tennis with an Accent podcasts. I always felt – and still do – that although he has the potential to join the elites of our sport, he needed to settle on a direction for an A game plan and succeed on a specific surface before moving on to conquer all surfaces. During the 2014-16 period, he was stuck playing an ‘in-between’ game style where he would try to play consistent and outlast his opponents on slow courts, while adopting an attacking style on fast courts. Grigor’s talent level certainly permits him to play at a high level on all surfaces, using different tactics. But was it enough for him to catapult his status into the next level?

Starting with 2017, I felt that he began to indeed have a clearer vision of his target (his coaching-team changes may have had something to do with that). He seemed to have decided to take an aggressive approach in his style, which was the right move in my opinion. Because, when you make such a decision, you can begin to meticulously work on every detail of the specific pursuit without having to spread your attention on different strategies. Thus, his success in the latter portions of the 2017 campaign, culminating in his triumph at the Nitto ATP Finals in London and in a career-high number three ranking.

In 2018, another problem popped up. Having entered the year with extremely high expectations, Dimitrov had disappointing outings in the down-under swing (losing in the quarterfinals to Kyle Edmund in Melbourne and never really playing at a high level in the previous rounds), followed by more dismay in Indian Wells and Miami. I can’t evidently be 100% sure about what goes on in a player’s head but observing Grigor’s match play during February, March, and April, I am fairly certain that doubt has crept – and settled – into his mind, leading to some confidence-related damage.

The good news for Dimitrov fans is that he still believes in his game and feels that he can get back to his end-of-2017 level of play. Another good piece of news, at least from my perspective, is that he is not willing to go back to the game-searching phase of 2014-16. His match against the American Jared Donaldson is a good example of why I believe that, and his words in the post-match press conference confirm that: “I was very clear on how I wanted to play my match.” Before I unpack that statement and the rest of what he said, let me remind readers the sequence of the match to which he was referring at that moment in the press conference.

He was answering a question that touched on the last game of the third set when he was serving at 4-5, and it all fell apart for him in a matter of three points, allowing Donaldson to get the break and go up two sets to one.

Until that moment, both players were handily winning their serves. At 15-15, Grigor had a routine forehand inside the court that he had put away many times up to that point. It was a low but a short ball which allowed him to move inside the court and guide the forehand topspin to the open backhand side of Donaldson. Grigor gagged it wide and tilted his head tilted to one side in deep disappointment.

You could almost tell that doubt crept into his mind in those few seconds. In the next point, his feet seemed to get heavy (typical response by an apprehensive mind). He hit three shots off his backfoot in that rally and framed one, before finally missing in the net a sharp cross-court counter-punch forehand that had worked for him wonderfully in that set, up to that point. It was as if his elbow blew up to the size of a basketball and he could not freely swing anymore. All of a sudden, he was faced with two set points. Donaldson would only need one before Grigor would add in another unforced error, straight on the second shot after the serve.

It was a disastrous ending to an otherwise solid set on his part. He let Donaldson literally steal that third set.

Now back to more of what Grigor said pertaining to the consequences of that sequence. It had to do with him not losing his clarity despite that horrible ending to that set. He was not going to change his game plan just because of one game. For someone who has had a spring season filled with disappointments, it would be tempting to do so after making three straight unexpected errors to lose a crucial game against an underdog, and finding yourself one set away from another early exit from a Major.

Dimitrov did not fall into that trap: “I wanted to play my game the way I wanted to play my game with that margin of, you know, missing or making a winner. And I think for me that is important,” he said. It was the right decision, hats off to Grigor.

He won the fourth set in the same manner that he lost the third one, seizing on a bad sequence by Donaldson in one of the American’s serving games. Dimitrov expressed how important it was that he does not lose his game-plan clarity because of a few misses: “Okay, I missed. I missed. There’s still one set to be played and anything can happen. And it did happen, obviously, in the fourth set. I had a look. I seized that opportunity.”

In the fifth set, he found himself in the same position as he did in the third, not once, not twice, but three times, serving at 4-5, 5-6, and 6-7, to remain alive in the match. He held firm on all three occasions, hitting quality first and second serves. He was not going to let Donaldson sneak in another break, one that would have abruptly ended the match.

Then, Dimitrov had his own chance to wrap-up the Court-18 party when he broke his opponent’s serve at 7-7.

At that point, Donaldson’s physical condition was clearly diminished due to a cramping problem that reared its ugly head as early as the fourth set. It progressively got worse to the point where he could neither push off his left leg to serve nor run at 100% after balls in the extended moments of the final set.

Then, that 8-7 game made everyone ask “what?”

Donaldson went free-wheeling on his ground strokes, going for warp-speed on every shot, hitting one winner and forcing Dimitrov into three errors, to break back, out of nowhere. Grigor fans surely could not believe it. Never mind though. Their man had this, and his opponent was spent. Grigor broke serve again and finished the epic match in his next service game

It was epic and dramatically tight.

The point count ended at 176 to 170 for Dimitrov. At 8-8, it was at 169 for Donaldson, 168 for Dimitrov (Grigor won the last eight points of the match). That is how close the 4-hour-19-minute-long match was.

Donaldson performed at a high level for most of the match, really going after Dimitrov’s second serves on returns right off the gate. You could see a clear difference between how he prepared to return a first serve vs the second (see the photos below). Not only would he move up to the baseline to show Dimitrov his intention to attack, but he would also take two or three steps forward once the Bulgarian tossed the ball, aiming to fire the return.

Donaldson’s return-ready position for Dimitrov’s first serves
Donaldson’s return-ready position on Dimitrov’s second serves
Donaldson’s position when he actually strikes the return on Dimitrov’s second serves

It worked many times, not only to win that point in question, but to also cause havoc in Dimitrov’s mind, the next time he had to serve a second serve. If you are solely mad at Grigor for having served seven double faults in the first set, you are probably taking some credit away from Donaldson’s brilliant return tactics early in the match.

You may have also missed how effectively Dimitrov adjusted to circumvent that problem after the first set. He took pace off on some second serves (but added more spin) and he varied the target spots in the box. Donaldson was especially fond of catching the return at shoulder level on his backhand and pounding away, as in the third photo above. So, Dimitrov placed more serves in the “T” on the ad side or wide on the deuce side to make Donaldson stretch for some forehand returns (see below).

The point is, Dimitrov successfully responded to a challenge that was presented to him by a determined opponent. And that was after the catastrophic first-set tiebreaker (2-7) in which he made five errors – three of them unforced by my count**. His double fault count went from seven in the first set to a total of two for the next four sets. The positive news for Dimitrov are indeed in the details.

** In the name of avoiding repetition, see my previous Roland Garros match recaps – for example, this one – for an explanation on how I approach the unforced error count, and why I do so (I basically do my own count).

None of the above should be understood as an attempt on my part to argue that Dimitrov is in good form. I believe everyone, including Grigor himself, is aware of the fact that he has struggled not only this year, but in this particular match. The endings to the first and third sets were regrettable, and his backhand let him down at some crucial moments in the match. But it is not all full of gloom and doom as some people would have you believe, and the reason why is the central point that I tried to unpack in the above analysis.

I have mainly talked about Dimitrov, but make no mistake, Donaldson’s tactics and his performance deserve praise. I have already talked about his return plan above. He also worked Dimitrov’s backhand relentlessly, often winning the extended rallies. Don’t get me wrong. Deciding to work Grigor’s backhand is not an ingenious idea by itself. Every player is aware of his backhand being the weaker side from the baseline. What was well-planned was the way that Donaldson worked it.

He did not just feed the ball to the ad corner and make Dimitrov hit a bunch of backhands. For example, he would flatten the ball with his own backhand to Grigor’s, change pace and send one back high and deep, and add more topspin on the next shot. He would often accelerate to Grigor’s deuce corner, opening up the ad side, then hit the ball to the open ad-side on the next shot, get Dimitrov stretched to slice his backhand back, and use that opportunity to sneak up to the net and catch some of those floaters in the air for winners.

Granted, he missed some of those volleys (see the first point of the 3-2 game in the opening set), but that type of tactic is not designed for success on one or two points here and there. It is meant to make your opponent think twice every time he is stretched to hit a defensive backhand. Dimitrov did indeed miss some of those backhands, trying to keep the ball low over the net, expecting Donaldson to sneak in (see the 40-0 point at 3-3, opening point set).

For Donaldson, the match first took a downturn when, after stealing that third set on a bad game by Dimitrov, he turned around and served a dismal game of his own at 1-1 in the fourth set. He made five errors, three of them unforced, allowing Dimitrov to get ahead by a break and see the light at the end of the tunnel.

Then, when his physical condition began to deteriorate, his options for tactics got diminished (thus, the reason for which he went for rocket winners in the extended portions of the fifth set). He still fought valiantly and probably hoped for a steal – à-la third set, tenth game – in one of Dimitrov’s serving games in the late stages.

It did not happen because Dimitrov was no longer the Dimitrov of the late first or third sets. In fact, his body language in the last 30 minutes was exceptional. Being in good shape played a major role in his victory as he confirmed it himself, although not in those exact words: “when it really got down to the crucial moments, we played good tennis. But in the same time, I felt more fresh.”

Dimitrov’s next opponent is the always-dangerous Fernando Verdasco. It will be interesting to see how a high-IQ player like Dimitrov will tackle a situation in which the outcome may depend more on what version of his opponent will step on the court than what Grigor can do himself.

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Roland Garros Match Report: Kyle Edmund vs Alex De Minaur (first round)

ATP Majors Tactical Analysis 2 Comments

Alex De Minaur, no.105 in the ATP rankings and the recipient of a Wild Card at Roland Garros (thankfully so, he would have missed direct entry by one spot in the rankings), entered Court no.3 earlier today as the clear underdog, at least on paper. His opponent was the 16th-seeded Kyle Edmund, the man who replaced the injured Andy Murray as the highest-ranked British player in men’s tennis earlier this year. There was also the fact that Edmund got the best of De Minaur just a month earlier on the clay courts of the Estoril ATP 250 event in straight sets, 6-2 7-5.

If you asked Edmund this morning, however, I am sure he would have had a much different expectation of the match than “the tale on paper.”

He was certainly aware that De Minaur had a phenomenal debut to his 2018 season, getting to the semifinals of the Brisbane ATP event, then topping that result with an appearance in the final round in Sydney. The 19-year-old Australian further galvanized his fans when he threw everything but the kitchen sink at Alexander Zverev in their Davis Cup duel at the end of January, only to come up short in the tiebreaker of the fifth set, in one of the most thrilling men’s matches so far this year.

Edmund is enjoying a terrific 2018 campaign himself, having reached the semifinals in the Australian Open and earned a top-20 ranking for the first time in his career. He also built some clay-court confidence by getting to the finals of the Marrakesh ATP 250 event, defeating Malek Jaziri and Richard Gasquet on the way.

Kyle Edmund

Then, there are the contrasting styles. Edmund is a straight-forward shooter with a dangerous first serve and a robust forehand that poses as a threat on any surface. His backhand down-the-line acceleration – one of his underrated skills – adds an additional dimension to his overall aggressive game. Although he does not have a flashy style, he can go on productive streaks in the course of a match that can leave opponents – and spectators – bewildered.

De Minaur, on the other hand, relies heavily on his footwork, consistency, and tenacity. His arsenal is not donned with as many weapons as Edmund’s is – although he can direct rallies well with his forehand when positioned on the baseline or inside – but he can counter-punch the heck out of some shots that may have looked spectacular when the ball left the racket of the adversary. He would naturally look to respond to Edmund’s shot-making with some of his own high-octane send-backs.

Except that he rarely got the chance to do that…

Edmund started the match at a stellar-level and relentlessly pushed De Minaur around. If it were not for a few glitches that his well-oiled machine encountered at about midway in the second set, this one may have turned out to be one of the more lop-sided matches of the first round.

The 6-2 6-4 6-3 victory by Edmund showed not only why he should be a force to be reckoned with, but also what De Minaur lacks in his game in order to become one himself in the future. In every area that De Minaur struggled – more details on that a bit later – Edmund excelled. For every ball from the middle of the court that De Minaur struck hard, but could not put away, Edmund fired a winner from the same position. For every break point that De Minaur earned, Edmund responded by raising his game to save them.

Edmund came out bludgeoning the ball. He hit a backhand down-the-line winner to go up 0-15. He then followed that up with a rally that featured three rocket shots in a row struck by him. De Minaur got them back somehow, but in his scramble to do so, he had no choice but leave too much open-court space to avoid Kyle’s backhand winner on the fourth strike. De Minaur managed to get back to 30-30, but Edmund nailed a return that he could not get back in the court and found himself in danger of losing his serve, five points into the match.

That break point at 30-40 encapsulated what awaited Alex for the rest of the afternoon. The two players engaged in a long rally, one in which De Minaur got to run around and hit forehands, heavily testing Edmund’s backhand. He even got to turn up the heat on a couple of those that he got to hit from the top of the baseline. But Edmund’s backhand passed the test, he sustained the rally. Eventually, De Minaur accelerated one more time with his forehand, this time changing direction, to the deuce side of Edmund. It sailed deep and De Minaur lost his serve from the gates.

It was ironically a good example of the type of point that De Minaur would like to play against Edmund, one in which he controls the rally from the middle of the court, working his opponent’s weaker side. Yet, he lost the point, because he was simply not able to unleash his forehands on Edmund the way Edmund was able to unleash them on him when he got similar opportunities – or, I should add, the way highly ranked players do when they get similar opportunities. De Minaur hit them hard, but not hard enough to produce a winner or force Edmund into an error.

To Alex’s credit, he recognized his shortcomings with remarkable clarity.

When I asked him about this specific contrast after the match, he acknowledged it immediately as something on which he needs work: “Yes, that was the difference. He’s got a little more power than I do. You know, obviously, it’s such a powerful game, short ball or middle of the court ball, he manages to put away. At this stage in my career, on clay, I don’t have the same sort of power, so I probably got to keep getting stronger. I will look at this match, you know, I have already talked about it [with his team].” He added that this type of shortcoming shows more on clay because “you gotta generate a lot more power [on] slower courts.” He affirmed more than once that he needs to keep working to get better at it.

The stark difference between the number of winners hit by each player serves to confirm the contrast. Edmund finished with 26 winners, De Minaur with 12**. More importantly, Edmund finished with 16 forehand winners, ten more than De Minaur hit with his forehand. Those are precisely the type of forehands that De Minaur was not able to put away (like in that break point in the first game), and that Edmund did.

** I do not include aces in the “winner” column. Hitting an ace is a whole different notion – and requires a completely different set of skills – than producing a winner off one’s ground strokes once the ball is in play. It’s a shame that official stats do not adhere to that standard.

In this day of advanced technology, many readers may have access to replays of matches. If you have one for this match, and you want to see what Edmund did in that same situation – when he had a chance to take charge with his forehand – see the break point that Edmund saved at 30-40, 0-1 in the second set**. In his very first opportunity to accelerate his forehand, he landed the hard forehand to the corner of the court, pushing De Minaur three meters behind the baseline. Alex was able to send the ball back and had to quickly recover to guard the open court. Kyle unloaded another forehand to the same corner, catching Alex on his backfoot, for a clean winner.

**For more examples of this, see also the two points in succession at 3-2, 15-15, and the 15-0 point at 5-4, all in the second set. Keep in mind, these are only few of the many.

In short, What De Minaur could not do in several forehands in that first break point of the match (see above), Edmund was able to do in two forehands.

This pattern also led to an odd statistic. It would seem like Edmund, being the risk taker, would end up with more unforced errors than his opponent who, as I noted in the introduction, relied more on his tenacity and footwork. Yet, when this pattern occurs, the less powerful player feels forced to step outside of his comfort zone, in terms of his “A” plan, to have a chance to win. Consequently, his error count climbs quickly. Edmund, who generally plays with lesser margins for error than his opponent does, ended up with 16 unforced errors, whereas De Minaur ended up 22**.

** That is by my count, of course. See my previous post for an explanation of why I keep my own count of unforced errors. The official count today for both players stood at 30 for Edmund and 32 for De Minaur. I wondered at one point if the stat person was not simply chalking it up to a player’s unforced-error count anytime he missed a shot from the baseline. You want to see an example of why I do not trust that count? See the 30-30 point at 1-1 in the second set. De Minaur hits a sharp cross-court forehand that puts Edmund on the full stretch (his legs were literally wide apart and sliding to get to the ball) and the Brit misses it in the net. That counted as an unforced error! Excuse me? And that is one of several – see also the forehand miss at the 5-1, 15-15 point in the first set. That also went into the records as an unforced error. Oh-kay…

The superior skills Edmund possessed in finishing the points was not the only reason for which he was able to win so convincingly though. If I claimed that, I would be undermining how clutch Kyle was on the few occasions that a glimmer of hope appeared to his opponent.

Alex De Minaur looking at his box after a winner by Edmund

But before I get into that second major contrast, let me clarify for the record that serves did not play a major role in this match (two aces for Edmund, three for De Minaur). If anything at all, double faults were the source of the temporary glitch the Edmund machine experienced in the second set. All of his seven double faults for the match came in the that set, two of them playing a part in the only service break De Minaur managed to get.

But right after breaking Edmund’s serve and equalizing at 4-4, the Australian turned around and played his worst serving game of the match, one that featured three backhand errors and a double fault (one of his four for the match). He had a chance to get a late lead in the game count for the first time since the match had begun, and in less than two minutes, it slipped away from his hands.

Let’s compare that to how clutch Edmund was whenever he faced a difficult moment in the match (other than the break point that I noted above at 0-1 in the second set).

Moment 1:
After going up a break in the first set, Edmund faced a break point himself, serving a second serve at 2-1. He landed it so deep in the box that De Minaur (who was way inside the baseline in the hopes of unleashing his return on Edmund) had to hit an off-balance backhand that sailed wide. Edmund would hold serve two points later with an ace.

Moment 2:
In the second set, De Minaur led 2-1 and had a break-point opportunity on Edmund’s serve at 30-40. Kyle came up with three monster forehands in a row, running De Minaur from one corner to the other on the first two, leaving him helplessly as the third one flew by for a winner.

Time after time, Edmund remained clutch on important points. These are the types of differences that produce clear-cut, straight-set victories. You may look at the final score and be tricked into thinking that it was a boring match, but in fact, the quality of tennis on display was quite high. It is just that, as noted above, De Minaur needs more time to develop the type of skills that his opponent already possesses. The good news for Alex is that he had two chances to learn that lesson in a matter of thirty days – he said “the same thing happened” in their Estoril encounter. He should be able to identify what he needs to work on and tackle those challenges with alacrity.

As for Edmund, I am surprised that he does not get more recognition than what he has gotten so far. Players that have accomplished less than him in 2018 – and behind him in the rankings – are receiving more accolades than him. I am just curious to see on what court his second-round match vs Marton Fucsovics will get scheduled. I would not be surprised if it is not scheduled on one of the main courts (today’s match was on Court no.3).

Edmund’s backhand accelerations worked flawlessly today

The reality is, Edmund played a rock-solid match to begin his Roland Garros campaign.
Forehand winners? He profusely produced them.
Successful backhand down-the-line accelerations? More than usual.
1-2 punch winning points? Plenty.
Clutch? You bet.

Fucsovics will have his hands full in the second round.

Until next time…

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Roland Garros Match Report: Kei Nishikori vs Maxime Janvier (first round)

ATP Majors Tactical Analysis 2 Comments

This was billed by most as a one-sided affair for valid reasons. Although Kei Nishikori was to play his first match in a Major – due to injuries – since Wimbledon of last year, he has lately shown signs of elevating his level of play, reaching the final in Monte-Carlo and the quarterfinal in Rome. Squeezed in between those, was a retirement in the first round in Barcelona, after going down a set vs. Guillermo Garcia-Lopez, citing a wrist injury resulting from fatigue from the previous week in Monte-Carlo. He did suffer two losses to Novak Djokovic in Madrid and Rome, so it is hard to claim that he has returned to the high form that marked his top-5 ranking back in 2015.

Facing him, nevertheless, was the wild-card recipient Maxime Janvier – ranked 304 – who had yet to play a main-draw match at the ATP events or in the Majors. He had mostly been playing Challengers, with one title under his belt (Casablanca, 2016).

The final score was an expected straight-set victory for Kei, but an unexpectedly tedious one. The Japanese player quickly admitted after the match that it was a hard-fought battle and that he felt “lucky to finish in three sets.” That was because Janvier had a plan for this match, and it was one that fit his long-term goals perfectly (more on that shortly).

Nishikori began the match serving, and Janvier began unloading. He would look to move well inside the baseline and go for direct winners whenever he could on returns. On Nishikori’s first serves that came into his strike zone, he would nail the ball, and if Kei’s serve was well placed, he would get the return back deep and accelerate on the second shot. On second-serve returns, there would be no hesitation at all. He would attempt winners on most, if not all, of them.

Janvier unloading on returns

This plan was naturally going to also result in more errors, but that was understood. He would control the points and decide his own fate. Janvier confirmed himself after the match that it was precisely his plan because he and his coach had decided that, in general, if he were going to be successful later in his career, he needed to find “regularity in his aggressiveness.” In other words, his goal is to put out this high-octane shot production more consistently: “I’d like my game to pay off one day. I’m very aggressive, and I’m proud because I’m doing my job.”

In his first ever ATP-level main draw match, he came up just short of that goal, and under the parameters of this match, it is understandable. But he made life very hard for Nishikori for 2 hours and 19 minutes. He relentlessly put Kei on the run from the beginning of rallies. He did not stop either when he erred. For example, at 1-2 and serving, he made a forehand unforced error, then a backhand one, to go down 15-30. You would think that a player with zero experience at this level may get apprehensive and play more conservatively. Not Monsieur Janvier. He attacked again with his forehand to get to 30-30, served and volleyed successfully to go up 40-30, and held serve in the next point.

His big chance came in the fifth game. He hit two winners on the way earning three break points at 0-40 on Nishikori’s serve. Yet, as noted above, this type of tactic also carries its hazards. They appear in the form of errors. First break point was eradicated when he missed winner attempt on the return. Then, came a drop-shot attempt in the net. Finally, another forehand return in the net, and just like that, it was back to deuce.

He got a fourth opportunity to break when Nishikori, under pressure again, missed a passing shot at deuce. Maxime had a look at a backhand down-the-line winner and sailed it deep. Kei, feeling some high heat on his second serves, double-faulted to give the Frenchman a fifth chance to break. Nishikori came up with a sharp, wide serve to level at deuce again. There would not be a sixth opportunity.

Five of those for Janvier, four squandered on his errors…

First game-point opportunity for Kei, he held…

That is how it goes when you have two players on the extreme ends of the experience barometer. One with 70 wins and a final to his name in the Majors, the other with the number zero in the “matches played” column in those categories…

In fact, Janvier would end up 0/10 on break -point opportunities for the match.

In fairness to him, he played those break points in the same way that helped him reach them. His awareness of that fact manifested itself in his post-match press conference. He affirmed that he had no regrets and that he needed to press on. He understands that it may not work out for him at the end. Again, he reiterated that in the long term, this is what he needed to improve; the ability to attack consistently. He has a point. Tennis skills are not texts to be studied. You must actually learn by doing, stumble a few times, get better at it, before finally – and hopefully – reaching a higher plateau of success.

To Janvier’s credit, there were also cases where that vision worked to his advantage. At 3-4 down and serving, Janvier faced three break points himself at 0-40. Guess how he saved them? A backhand winner at 0-40, a well-hit wide serve that forced a stretched Nishikori to miss the return at 15-40, and a forehand inside-out winner completing a 1-2 punch at 30-40. He also closed the game at ad-in with a volley winner after serving and volleying.

Three errors at 0-40 up on his opponent’s serve earlier, three winners at 0-40 down on his own serve later. You win some, you lose some, and that is how you learn.

It’s too bad that Janvier was on the losing end of an easy put-away opportunity on his forehand at 5-5, 30-30, on Nishikori’s serve. That cost him a crucial break-point opportunity to go up 6-5 and serve for the set.

It’s also too bad for Maxime that the tiebreak turned into a disaster. He lost it 7-0, losing six out of seven points on his backhand errors, four of them unforced. He finished the set with 19 unforced errors**, 12 of them on the backhand. Meanwhile Nishikori committed only four errors, two on each side.

**Disclaimer on my unforced error numbers: After observing five days of qualifying matches, and few matches earlier today, and seeing the way the stat people judge and record the unforced errors, I have decided to keep my own count of them for my match analyses. An easy passing shot missed from the middle of the court is counted as an unforced error. A shot where the player’s feet are set, yet simply missed, counts as an unforced error in my book even if they are three or four meters behind the baseline. A second-serve return where the player misses it going for a winner, because they were able to balance their body to go for one, also counts as an unforced error, even if the serve had a kick on it. In general terms, if the player misses a shot that they should make the large majority of the time, that is an unforced error in my book.

Another key moment came in the beginning of the second set. You could tell by Nishikori’s body language, when he won the last point of the first set, that a deep relief had invaded him. He came out liberated to return Janvier’s serve in the first game of the second set. You could also tell that he made a decision: he was going to start taking some risks of his own on returns and not let Janvier push him around on the second shot, like he had done in the first set.

Nishikori turns aggressive on returns himself in the 2nd and 3rd sets

When I asked Nishikori after the match if the shift to more aggressive returns at that point in the match was a “conscious decision” on his part, he confirmed it: “Yeah, well, that was the most toughest part. I was struggling. First set I wasn’t returning well, and I tried to be little more aggressive, stepping in, and change my position.”

It worked. He hit two direct forehand return winners to go up 15-40 and finished the game on a backhand one at 30-40. It also helped that Janvier hit only two first serves out of the six total points played in that game (the Frenchman was 0/4 on second-serve points). That was all that Nishikori needed to wrap up the second set. He carried that single break all the way to 6-4.

It was, nevertheless, another high-quality set played by the Frenchman, despite not taking advantage of the only two break-point opportunities he had. Yet, the problem was not his errors this time (he only made a total of nine in this set). Nishikori stepped up on his returns for one game and got sufficient leverage with that break to pocket the two-set lead.

Down two sets, Janvier would still not fade away. In fact, at 3-2 up and Nishikori serving, he put himself in a position once again to get a decisive break. He had three different looks at break-point opportunities. Nishikori got the upper hand in the rally on the first one and saved it with a forehand winner. On the second one, Janvier went for a rocket backhand down-the-line and missed it in the net.

On the third, he actually had a clean look at a winner, inside the court, on a sitter. He had produced numerous winners with that same attempt, up to that point in the match. He lined up (see the photo below) and swung at it.

He framed it! The ball did not even land in the court!

*That* miss by Janvier

When asked about that miss, Janvier said that he started that point with the same type of aggressive return that got him to the break-point opportunity – it’s true, Janvier’s return was phenomenal and Nishikori struggled to get those back throughout the match. But Kei was able to return that one in the court. Janvier praised Nishikori for making him come up with the big shots on important points and even said at one point that he wants to be consistent at a high level like him: “For me, I would like to be like Nishikori, of course.”

With that miss, disappeared Janvier’s last chance to extend the match. Nishikori held serve first, then broke Janvier’s serve to go up a break. Janvier must have framed at least four more shots in the last three games, but it was influenced by deception rather than a loss of concentration. He did not stop fighting until the last point.

Janvier ended up with 39 unforced errors to Nishikori’s 14. Kei did not play his best by any means and will need to raise his level to continue further. He also struggled with Janvier’s serves throughout the match, although that may have had more to do with Maxime’s ability to produce a wide variety of serves to keep him off balance.

In any case, what matters for Nishikori the most is that this match was precisely the type of first-round encounter that a player of his caliber needed. He was challenged by an eager adversary against whom his experience ultimately made the difference. On the road to accomplishing that, he kept his game at a solid level, without any substantial ebbs and flows to his performance.

Kei’s mental state also appears to be in a good place. When asked about how he feels about his form and fitness, he did not hesitate: “I’m feeling almost perfect. I think I had a good preparation, and I had a good couple matches before coming here. So, I’m feeling, yeah, great body-wise, and also tennis-wise, too.” He also added later that he had been “playing pretty good last couple weeks.”

His next opponent will be the winner of the match between Benoit Paire and Roberto Carballes Baena.

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Madrid ATP Final: Recap

ATP Tactical Analysis 2 Comments

Alexander Zverev def. Dominic Thiem 6-4 6-4

In the aftermath of Rafael Nadal’s loss in the quarterfinals of Mutua Madrid Open, an encounter between Alexander “Sascha” Zverev and Dominic Thiem is about the highest-profiled final that tournament organizers in Madrid could have hoped to see on stage. If you had to count the best five clay-court players in the ATP outside of Rafa, both players would probably figure in your top-five list. It promised to be a baseline slug-fest.

Photo: Clive Brunskill – Getty Images

I doubt however that many people expected one of them to have disastrous starting game on his serve after seeing these two at peak form for a large portion of the week.

Zverev took advantage of two unforced errors and a double fault by Thiem, complementing that with return winner of his own, to break the Austrian’s serve. Then, he comfortably held to confirm the break and go up 2-0. Early breaks have played a prominent role in the outcome of almost every set played from the quarterfinals forward. Thiem found himself in a position to break that pattern if he wanted to stay in the set.

Zverev had other ideas of course. He kept his errors to a minimum, mostly playing deep and not targeting spots too close to the sidelines. For example, his sharp backhand cross-court, usually a potent weapon, was relegated to the background during this stretch. The idea – I suppose – was to keep pushing Thiem back and make him force the issue from far behind the baseline. In contrast, Sascha often stepped inside the baseline and struck a few hard and flat shots directly at Thiem in an attempt to rush him, or sneak in a few drop shots to catch him off guard.

Thiem steadied the boat on his service games but he could not shake all the errors out of his system. Sascha’s tactic was apparently working. He maintained his break advantage all the way to 5-4, losing only three points on his service games despite only serving at 56% of his first serves in. If you are wondering why Thiem was not attempting to nail a few returns for winners on those second serves, I am too.

Sometimes a successful tactic can instantly turn into a dangerous habit and bite you in the back if you stick to it too many times. It is true that Zverev was winning plenty of points by playing deep to the middle part of the court and staying away using risky lines, but when you get a short sitter inside the court on your favorite wing – backhand for the German – and you decide to approach behind it, you need to put your opponent on the run. Zverev did not**. He hit a high-paced backhand approach that went straight to Dominic’s backhand. The Austrian got it low to Sascha’s feet first and passed him on the next shot.

** See the game point at 3-2 in the second set for an example of what he should have done in that same position.

Zverev then aimed for the sideline on forehand down-the-line and missed it wide, swaying away from the plan that has been working until that point in the set. Just like that, following two tactical errors in succession, Sascha trailed 0-30 on his service game and found himself in dangerous territory on his serve for the first time in the set. That is when his first serve came to the rescue. He won four out of the next five points on powerful serves that either did not come back in the court or forced a defensive return out of Thiem, allowing Zverev to put the ball away. He won the set 6-4 on a forehand winner.

In case anyone has not yet figured it out, Zverev is a great front-runner. He seems to tune in far better with the lead than most other players do. I should spend a paragraph foregrounding the nuance to avoid misunderstanding, so here it is.

I am not saying Zverev plays better with the lead than when trailing. Although true, that is nothing more than a score-related confidence and it is valid for almost any other player holding a significant lead. I am rather making the distinction that Sascha performs better with the lead in comparison to how other players perform when they have the same type of lead. That is the nuance. This is probably because Zverev has a tendency to lose his poise when falling behind or after committing critical errors in neck-to-neck positions – more than most other players at his level do when faced with the same situation. His body language shows it, he expresses it verbally, and his level drops significantly, more than that of other players in similar positions.

Hence, transitioning back to the match recap, the alarms bells began ringing loudly for Thiem when he lost his serve again to start the second set. Once again, it was enough for Zverev. No need to go into details because everything progressed much in the same way as the first set, with the 3-2 game being the only one in which Thiem was able to reach deuce on his opponent’s serve. Zverev closed the curtains on him with a score of 6-4 6-4, without ever facing a break point on his service games.

Photo: Denis Doyle – Getty Images

For those who doubt Zverev’s potential, this week should have been enough, even in their mind, to place Sascha, along with Thiem, into that small group of players – behind Nadal, naturally – with a legitimate chance to win Roland Garros. It should also tilt the explanation for Zverev’s lack of success in Majors toward one of an “oddity” at this point, rather than one of “insufficiency.”

The next step of evolution for the 21-year-old German is to be a threat to go deep in the Majors (he has yet to reach the second week of a Major). It should not delay much longer. Roland Garros, the Major played on what seems to be Zverev’s favorite surface, emerges as a tremendous opportunity for him to vie for an elite spot in our sport.

Oh wait, there is still Rome! The grind on the professional tour, I tell ya’…

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Madrid ATP Semifinals: Recap

ATP Tactical Analysis No Comments

Dominic Thiem def. Kevin Anderson 6-4 6-2

There was little doubt earlier today that this top-10 encounter presented all kinds of match-up problems for the eighth-ranked Anderson, the 2017 US Open finalist. Thiem, a spot ahead of Kevin in the ATP rankings, is the steadier baseline rallier and he was getting to play on his favorite surface, as opposed to his opponent who has yet to win a title on clay courts. And frankly, Thiem’s 0-6 record vs Anderson, none played on clay, mattered little in today’s outcome.

Anderson would naturally have to rely on his serve but what was he to do on the return games? That was a question that haunted him throughout the match, one to which he could not come up with a response against Dominic who was, for his part, oozing with confidence following his upset win over Rafael Nadal one day earlier.

Anderson began the match on his serve and the expected pattern settled in early, too soon for the South African. He found it difficult to push Thiem around. Instead, the Austrian was the one striking the corners with considerable depth making Kevin scramble, a lot.

Photo: Denis Doyle – Getty Images

The 30-30 point put on display the type of rally on which Thiem built his impressive clay-court career. It lasted around twenty shots. Anderson not only got stuck three meters behind the baseline, running left and right to retrieve balls, but ended up losing it in the most discouraging way possible, with Thiem stepping inside the baseline on a short ball and smacking the inside-out forehand winner.

Anderson did save the ensuing break point thanks to a big first serve – precisely what he needed – but could not turn this nine-minute-long game in his favor. He won a point or two more on big serves but anytime Dominic got the return in and the rally began, Anderson would force the issue and make the error. His last one in the game came when he sailed a forehand deep on the third break point.

Following a comfortable hold by Thiem, Kevin trailed again (0-30) on his serve. It was clear that he needed to avoid extended baseline rallies at all cost. This is probably why he began going for big cuts on the second shot following the serve, and even served and volleyed once – which, in retrospect, he should have attempted to do more in the set than just this one time. He came back and held serve before the first set got out of control from his perspective. Nevertheless, he was still behind a break, and Thiem’s serve was clicking. He played an Anderson-like game, winning three points directly on well-placed serves, to go up 3-1 and keep the break advantage.

Instead of Anderson challenging Thiem for a break and looking to level the score, he ended up being the one to struggle on his service games. After saving two more break points at 1-3, he succeeded to stay within distance with a big service winner at deuce and a well-timed drop shot in the next one.

Unfortunately for Anderson, Thiem responded with another routine hold to go up 4-2.
Unfortunately for Anderson, this pattern would continue for the rest of the match.

Except the one anomaly at 5-4.

Something extraordinary needed to take place to cause a glitch in that pattern and it took place in that tenth game. Thiem committed a double fault at 0-15, and Kevin fired a flat and hard return – despite a bad bounce on the second serve – that forced Thiem to misfire a backhand. All of a sudden, Anderson had three break-point opportunities at 0-40.

But that is where the anomaly ended.

Kevin missed a forehand deep at 0-40, another one at 15-40, and backhand deep on the third one. “Poof” flew away his only chance to sink his teeth into the match, in a game where Thiem made only one out of eight first serves.

It would not be fair to say though that it was all due to Anderson’s missed shots. Thiem did come up with three terrific second serves in succession – from 15-40 to ad-in – that did not allow Anderson to nail the returns for winners, something he was definitely aiming to do at that point. On set point, Thiem made a first serve, his only one in the game, and completed the 1-2 punch with a forehand cross-court winner.

Photo: Clive Brunskill – Getty Images

It only got worse from that point forward for Anderson, beginning with a double fault to lose his serve to start the second set. It did not help either that Anderson’s first-serve percentage hovered around 50% in the second set. The pattern that I described above, score-wise and tennis-wise, for the first set continued even more blatantly. No anomalies, no glitches.

Thiem would solidify his lead with another break and oust the South African with a score of 6-4 6-2, in a comprehensively dominating performance. Now he needs to erase the one anomaly for his career. For as accomplished a clay-court player as he is, he has yet to win his first ATP-1000 title on the surface. Alexander Zverev stands in his way tomorrow.

Alexander Zverev def. Denis Shapovalov 6-4 6-1

Alexander “Sascha” Zverev is the third-ranked player in the world, already holding two ATP 1000 titles at the age of 21. Denis Shapovalov, at the age of 19, is one of the most exciting up-and-comers, the youngest top-100 member of the ATP rankings at no.43 (probably top 30 by Monday). Both are former junior champions at Majors (Sascha at the 2014 Australian Open, Denis at the 2016 Wimbledon), and experienced meteoric rises following their junior careers to eventually reach their current rankings.

Both have already recorded wins against the ATP’s elite. Both still have plenty of room for improvement.

Photo: Denis Doyle – Getty Images

On top of everything else, both play exciting brands of tennis. Zverev relies on a powerful first serve, a fundamentally sound backhand, and the ability to generate power from the baseline. Shapovalov counts on his terrific shot-making skills and overall aggressive play. Both are brave, both are athletic.

For all the above reasons and more, there was no reason why any tennis fan should not have been excited to watch these two names face each other in the semifinals of an ATP 1000 event.

Did it live up to its billing? No, it did not.

Until 4-4, each player comfortably held serve, not because they were hitting extraordinary shots – only a few, combined – but rather because their opponent would either miss the return or make an error in the next shot. The only deuce came at 2-2 on Shapovalov’s serve, but he won the next two points without much difficulty. There were not even many rallies that went beyond five shots during this stretch. The quality barometer remained inoperative because neither returning player pushed the other one to raise his level on service games.

Zverev broke through one of the best shots of the match until then, a well-placed backhand down-the-line return that Denis could not get back in the court. He did nevertheless get to that break point thanks to two unforced errors by Shapovalov, the second one coming on a framer at 30-30. That was all that the German needed as he closed out the set on his serve with a forehand winner on a 1-2 punch.

Prior to the match, we were wondering how Shapovalov would react to his forehand cross-court, one of his favorite weapons, going to Zverev’s strong side, or if Zverev would respond to Shapovalov’s power with counter-strikes or steady retrieval, or if Denis would consider coming to the net to finish some points instead of going for winners with big cuts from the baseline.

Yet, nothing that elaborate took place in the confines of the Manolo Santana Court. Instead, we got a dud first set – dud (adj.): not working or meeting standards; faulty.
It basically consisted of errors, one bland break, and only a handful points worthy of mentioning.

Contrary to the first set, the second started with a break, and marked the moment where one of the players finally elevated his level. Zverev hit two spectacular winners, both followed by pumped-up screams and fist pumps, that helped him get the definitive lead on the Canadian.

Sascha started holding his end of the bargain from that point forward, or at least, showing glimpses of his potential. Denis, for his part, never took off. He fell behind 0-4 in the blink of an eye. It was a constant drip-drip of errors that would not cease, a backhand smacked in the net here, an overhead from the top of the net framed deep there, and so on.

Photo: Clive Brunskill – Getty Images

The encounter was over in 58 minutes, with the final score of 6-4 6-1.

Sascha could not have asked for a better outcome in a match that began past 10 PM in Madrid. The last thing he needed was to get involved in a long battle that finishes past midnight and does not allow him enough rest time to properly get ready for tomorrow’s final. He not only avoided that, but also finished on a strong note, never mind that he was largely left unchallenged by his opponent.

As for Shapovalov, his second career semifinal in an ATP 1000 tournament resulted in a straight-set loss again, suffered at the hands of the same player (first one, Canadian Open 2017). This semifinal run on the red clay of Madrid is still a major step forward for the Denis who, I imagine, would have gladly accepted it, had it been offered prior to the tournament’s start.

All eyes now turn to tomorrow’s final, pitting two of the best baseliners in the men’s game. As a fan, I can only hope that it will be more closely contested than today’s semifinals.

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Istanbul Open Final Recap

ATP Tactical Analysis 2 Comments

Taro Daniel def. Malek Jaziri 7-6 6-4

Every player begins a match with a certain game plan in mind. Whether it is the right one or not is unpredictable at that moment, and players are well aware of that fact. There are nuances to this presumption of course, which shield it from falling into the cliché category. For example, it is possible that the plan turns out to be wrong, which leads to a change. It is also possible that it’s the right plan, but the opponent has an answer for it, and a modification becomes necessary. Those are just two possible nuances out of many that may emerge once the match begins.

There is also the case where a plan depends on the combined use of several different shots, and although it is a sound plan, the player gets caught in the web of implementing it too frequently. This leads to the opponent deciphering the plan and its components. It allows him to understand it early and adjust to it before it gets the best of him. In return, the player responsible of executing the plan finds himself unable to tactically reframe the components of his plan, because he does not feel comfortable recalibrating his shots on the spot. He turns into a repeat offender, too apprehensive to change gears as the set progresses and each point becomes paramount.

I believe that I just summarized what happened, in my opinion, to Jaziri in the first set.

Malek Jaziri – Photo: Tenis Dunyasi, @tenisdunyasi on Twitter

He adopted a plan that aimed at derailing Daniel, one that you would call “junk tennis” if you were old school. It consisted of changing the ball’s pace and spin often, throwing in drop shots and loopers, and occasionally producing a flat forehand with the hope of catching Taro off-guard. Throwing Daniel off his rhythm was more important than taking risks and hitting winners.

There is nothing wrong with this type of plan and Jaziri has the ingredients necessary – finesse and variety – to execute it well. The problem would appear if the plan did not work and he had to turn aggressive, because that would represent a 180-degree turn-around from his initial plan. It’s not that Jaziri is not a skilled attacker, but to switch from a passive plan like the one with which he began the match to an aggressive one is not an easy task. Nevertheless, Malek would still have to go for the adjustment, simply because he would not have any other choice if his plan A were to fail.

But he did not, because his plan kept on “teasing” him, you see.

It would work just enough to where Jaziri kept on using it, believing that if he was close to winning the first set. It would work here and there, yet not enough to give him a commanding lead. It would appear friendly to him as it would help him earn chances to put the set away, only to take it away at the last second. It would offer him just enough to keep him attached to it, but not carrying him to the desired conclusion.

It may be best to illustrate my meaning with concrete examples from the match.

First one took place in the second game, on Daniel’s serve. Up 0-15, Jaziri sliced a few backhands and got a look at a short ball from Daniel at one point in the rally. Instead of moving into the court and attacking with a slice approach shot – Jaziri definitely has that shot in his arsenal – his feet stayed close to the baseline and he reached forward with his upper body to simply send back another mid-pace slice. You could tell from his footwork that he never even considered taking charge. He missed the slice deep and lost the point. He should have undoubtedly attacked on that short ball. Typical case of a player so preoccupied with executing the shots of his initial game plan that he fails to recognize a logical opportunity to do otherwise.

Let’s move forward to the 30-30 point of that same game. The next two points are emblematic examples of what I attempted to explain above how his plan would “tease” him.

At 30-30, the players engaged in a long rally. Jaziri, determined to keep the ball low and not give Daniel any pace to work with, hit one sizzling slice after another, making Daniel bend his knees to strike the ball at below-the-knee level. He hit four of them in a total of six shots, the other two being flat and hard forehands. In other words, it was the perfect illustration of how his plan could work. Daniel could not handle the final slice and missed the backhand wide, his feet off-balance. So yes, the plan worked, and Jaziri now had a break point. It only made sense that Jaziri would look to develop the same pattern again to win the break point.

He did. He got Daniel engaged in another backhand-to-backhand rally. On his third backhand, he was on his front foot and could have easily aligned for an acceleration with his two-hander – why not, after slicing a bunch of them? – but he did not. Instead, he decided to slice it back conservatively, although he was positioned inside the court. He missed it wide. There went an opportunity to take command early in the set, simply because other options were being ignored by Jaziri, even when the circumstances demanded that they be used. The plan teased Malek with the 30-30 point, but stopped him from reaching the desired result in the next one.

I thought for a moment, in the sixth game, that Jaziri began to realize the trap he was falling into and would look to adjust. He hit a drop shot for the umpteenth time on the 15-15 point. Daniel read it of course, having faced it at least half a dozen times in five games, and won the point. Down 15-30, Jaziri got aggressive and held serve, playing three attack-oriented points in the process. It made me think that he was coming to terms with the necessity of not completely abandoning aggressive tactics.

In the meantime, the plan was working in the sense that Daniel would occasionally commit errors, like the one mentioned above at the 30-30 point of the second game, or the game point for Daniel at 3-3, 40-15. Taro struggled to respond to a low, short, off-pace slice backhand by Jaziri and missed an ill-advised backhand drop-shot attempt in the net. Then, on the deuce point, one of the longest rallies of the match took place, ending with an error by Daniel who overhit a forehand. Twice in the same game, Jaziri’s plan to derail Daniel’s rhythm worked and provided him with another break-point opportunity.

Yet, guess what took place on that break point? Having been rewarded by Daniel’s errors in the above two points, Malek once again passed on chances where it made sense to get aggressive and stubbornly stuck to his plan. In that break point, Daniel hit two shots to Jaziri’s backhand that bounced well inside the service line. Jaziri reached forward on both and sent them back passively with his backhand slice, instead of running around and striking a forehand, or simply putting the heat on Daniel with a deep slice approach shot. He missed the second slice in the net, a clear unforced error. Just like that, for the second time in the set, Jaziri got his foot in the door thanks to his plan but could not enter because he got too attached to it. Daniel held serve and went up 4-3.

Jaziri did finally break to go up 5-4, largely thanks to a routine forehand error by Daniel at deuce, on another slice by Jaziri. That error led to the break point won by Jaziri. It was another case of his plan working again in his favor.

Let me reiterate; the plan itself was not the problem. It was Jaziri’s over-attachment to it that played a role in the ultimate result. His refusal to take charge on occasions that presented themselves, where going a little outside the box of his plan would have made sense, allowed Daniel to stay tight in the scoreboard and contend for the first set. Jaziri remained too loyal to his plan at moments where logic dictated him to do otherwise. This is not an unusual occurrence by the way. It happens often that a player goes one time too many to the well that may appear to work for him and become too predictable too soon. The key is to recognize the shifting dynamic and intervene in time, so it does not start working against you.

At 5-4, 40-30, the Tunisian earned a set point on his serve. He found himself in the middle of the court with a chance to rip the forehand. He did it this time, stretching Daniel to the backhand corner. Jaziri thought about following that shot to the net, and even took a step forward with that intention, but changed his mind. Daniel’s shot floated back to the middle of the court again and Jaziri unleashed another forehand that sailed wide. Daniel broke back a few points later and the match was relaunched at 5-5.

I would argue that, not approaching on that first forehand on set point was another consequence of playing too passively for too long. Had Jaziri been attacking the net on similar shots in the previous nine games, he would not have hesitated to do the same on that set point. Instead of finishing the set on a makeable volley on Daniel’s floater, Jaziri had to produce a put-away forehand from the baseline and missed it. He should have still hit a winner on that second forehand no doubt, so that part is on Malek. But not taking his chances at the net on the first one had to do with his mental disposition since the match began.

After Jaziri saved a set point himself at 5-6, thanks to a big first serve that Daniel framed on the return and hit out, the two players got to the tiebreaker. Daniel got in front early, starting with a 31-shot rally that ended on a thunderous forehand winner down-the-line. He never relinquished the lead, winning the tiebreaker 7-4.

Jaziri did get aggressive in the tiebreaker but it came too late. And like I said in the beginning of this piece, you cannot just switch from passive to aggressive in the blink of an eye. Your mental state, your strokes, your stance on the court, all need to be modified and it does not smoothly happen from one point to the next. Although he did try to take the initiative during rallies, Jaziri finished the tiebreaker with three unforced errors in the last four points. The second one was an easy forehand sitter missed in the net, that Jaziri should usually make in his sleep, and the third was an overhead smacked in the net on set point.

Jaziri continued the tactical turnaround and attacked frequently in the second set, dropping his initial game plan. He committed 15 errors in the process partly because, as I have pointed out earlier, it takes time to overhaul one’s game plan within a match. He also had to do that against an opponent whose confidence skyrocketed after winning the first set. In short, Jaziri’s adjustment was appropriate, but its timing was too late.

However, the fact that he approached the net 18 times in the second set and won 16 of those points sends significant messages. Had he taken charge on the few chances he had in the important points of the first set – the ones I discussed in detail above – he may have been the one holding his first ATP title now. If he was that successful (16/18) at the net in the second set, against a confident Daniel, imagine how many more points he would have won in the first, if he took advantage of those short balls. And that was when Daniel was still committing errors, prior to elevating his level in the second set.

When Daniel, who had never reached the semifinal round of an ATP event, won the tiebreaker, he found himself a set away from his first title. The 114th-ranked Japanese player about whom I have barely talked so far – apologies to Taro fans – kept his poise like a veteran and marched on. Throughout the match, his footwork remained phenomenal despite having put in long hours to win his previous rounds. More impressive was his disposition, as he never looked desperate or negative, sending a signal to Jaziri that he is not going away unless Jaziri can produce some top-quality tennis.

Much to Jaziri’s dismay, Daniel made only four unforced errors and two double faults in the second set. Two of those six came on match points, completely understandable considering how close he was to a career-changing moment. In fact, let me bring up the first one, as part of the larger discussion on how this week in Istanbul has transformed Daniel.

Taro Daniel – Photo: Tenis Dunyasi, @tenisdunyasi on Twitter

If you have watched Daniel several times, you probably know that his best weapon is the down-the-line backhand acceleration. He earns most of his winners from that shot. That is precisely the one he missed on the first match point at 5-3, one that he would otherwise make nine out of ten times. You could almost see his arm turn rigid, surely the result of nerves. It was not even close. The ball dropped midway in the doubles alley.

Daniel would get the same chance in his fourth and final match point. He did not let the earlier error prevent him from trying again. He never hesitated as he aligned his body. He trusted his “money” shot and struck it with confidence. This time, it landed smack in the deuce corner by the baseline, leaving Jaziri staring helplessly from the middle of the court. Never mind that Daniel missed that shot on the first match point. Never mind that he double-faulted on the third one less than a minute ago. His mental resolve never eroded, and for that, he got rewarded. The sequence was a microcosm of his mental growth this week.

Wild fact: Daniel was in Estoril – another ATP even that also takes place this week – preparing to play qualifying rounds there one week ago. When he found out he could enter main draw in Istanbul, he made a last-minute decision to hop in a plane and play in Istanbul. Life is a game of choices, they say, don’t they?

This ends the 2018 Istanbul Open coverage. Thanks for reading!

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