When it concerns a match being played on grass, the primary stats that people generally use to determine the possible outcome revolve around serving skills (aces, serving percentages, etc.), closely followed by return-related ones. The Friday’s semifinal at Wimbledon pitting the world number one Rafael Nadal against his long-time rival Novak Djokovic is one encounter in which that particular area should be put aside to foreground other facets of the game. Let’s be frank, neither Nadal nor Djokovic are monster servers.
The bread-and-butter components of their formula for winning matches rather rest on stroke production from the baseline and rally patterns that their groundies can carve out in their favor.
Serves may play an important role insofar as initiating the server’s attacking pattern on the next shot or restricting the opponent from initiating his own with the return. These two men are fabulous returners, with the Serb winning 43% of his return games through the first five rounds (best at Wimbledon this year so far) and Nadal winning 31% of them (tied for third). Nadal, for his part, has proven to be more efficient in converting break-point opportunities at 44% (25 out of 57) than Novak has at 40% (31 out of 77).
I reckon that first-serve percentage may have some significance for Novak since he prefers to dictate rallies against Rafa where he can hang around the baseline or inside, keeping the Spaniard two or three meters behind his own, and running him from corner-to-corner. Ironically, it is how Rafa wins a load of points against many other players. Novak is the only one that he has not been able to frustrate into making into errors in those types of elongated rallies.
Photo: Clive Mason – Getty Images Europe
Aside that particular thought as to how first-serve percentage may play a minor role, I feel safe in assuming that what happens once the baseline rallies take their course will decide, for the most part, who makes it to the final. Serves and returns will merely factor in as that extra push to get over the hump. Let me illustrate what I precisely mean by that last sentence.
A long game at 5-5 may feature a lot of spectacular rallies and shots, yet when either player gets to his umpteenth game/break point, or faces one, a rare big serve or a stunning return may give that player the final nudge to close out the game and move ahead 6-5. There is a good chance that people will retroactively remember that serve or return and say, “that huge serve/return was the key to that set,” when, in reality, it was everything else that got the player to that point where the particular serve or return in question could assist him in taking the last step across the finish line.
As for baseline stats, I am not sure that they mean much in the case of Friday’s semifinal. It is one of the most prolific rivalries in the history tennis. Nobody could know any better than Rafa and Novak what to expect from one another.
It has also been said that the favorable conditions cause the ball to bounce higher than usual (alert: that does not mean “slower”), but again, as to who that favors, your guess is as good as mine. It is true that Rafa’s spins may bounce higher than in previous years, but if you begin to think it will bounce the same way as it does on clay, that is a firm “no.” It is also true that Novak prefers to strike his aggressive shots at a level between the waist and shoulder. In short, conditions will matter little in that they will not give a distinct advantage to one player over the other.
In their past matches, I often found myself in awe of how Djokovic could take the baseline away from Nadal, run him ragged and put the ball away eventually against the very legend who built his legendary status by doing just that, running balls down and getting them back from impossible positions. I was also bewildered by Nadal’s tenacity as he would search for responses to Novak’s patterns and successfully rise to the occasion a number of times. Rafa is one of the best – if not the best – in the business when it comes to problem-solving.
Photo: Clive Brunskill – Getty Images Europe
Friday’s match is a bit different in that one of the players, Djokovic, is coming into this match “seemingly” in the process of recovering his top form. I used quotations marks for “seemingly,” because no one can be sure that he has recaptured the same form that has brought him so much success until the summer of 2016. Tomorrow’s match represents the best opportunity that he could have asked for to prove that he has. I believe that an in-form Novak would have a great chance to win on Friday, only because Nadal has shown some vulnerability when having to chase hard-hit balls in mid-length rallies. He just has not played anyone who can do that consistently except Del Potro in the quarterfinals.
Personally, I find Djokovic’s footwork to be at a level slightly below the 2015-16 one, especially when he must make rapid directional changes. He is still moving phenomenally side to side and chasing down balls that appear to be unreachable. My question would be, what if he is caught on his backfoot? Or what if a hard serve comes straight to his body? Will he be able to step away quickly? If Novak’s footwork is not optimal, Rafa will take command from the baseline unless the Serb can come up with big flat winners early in the rallies. I don’t believe he can do that consistently for three sets against Nadal.
That’s all folks! Rejoice, one of the greatest duels in our sports is about to take place in the cathedral of our sport.
Below is the link to my contribution to Tennis with an Accent —> My recap/analysis of Kevin Anderson’s epic upset of Roger Federer in the quarterfinal round of Wimbledon on Wednesday.
“It means a lot to me. As I said before, it’s not about reaching this number of the most consecutive Grand Slams played. It’s about being 15 years or more playing at the top level.”
This quote, by the 36-year-old Feliciano Lopez, essentially sums up the man’s accomplishments over the last 21 years. Yes, he turned pro 21 years ago, in 1997.
His was referring to the fact that he broke Roger Federer’s record of consecutive Majors played with his 66th appearance in a row in Majors this morning, when he stepped on to Court 7 to face Federico Delbonis at Wimbledon.
The last time Feliciano Lopez did not play a Major, in the 2002 Australian Open, Lleyton Hewitt was the number one player and Pete Sampras, Yevgeny Kafelnikov, Gustavo Kuerten, Patrick Rafter, Juan Carlos Ferrero, and Andre Agassi were some of the names found in the top 10 of the ATP rankings.
Throughout his streak of 66-straight participations in Majors, Lopez has not acted as a tourist either. He has reached fourth round or better seven times (four-time quarterfinalist) and has consistently been a player that other top players would prefer to avoid in the early rounds. As for his record in five-set matches, Feliciano is 21-10 in Majors and 3-1 in Davis Cup, for a career record of 24-11. This is an athlete who knows what it takes to win, even when he is having a bad day at the office.
The Spaniard is the iron man of tennis. If and when you see him up close, you can judge for yourself. He is a specimen.
Granted, playing Delbonis on grass does not represent the highest order of challenge, but that should not diminish what Lopez put on display today. Unfortunately for Delbonis, Feli had a wonderful day at the office. In fact, everything clicked on all cylinders, except for one game from which he immediately recuperated.
Lopez started the match with an ace, finished the first set with another, and the match with his 19th one. His serve was so effective that, on top of his 18 aces (vs one double fault), he won 93% of points started with his first serve and Delbonis could not return 36 out of 65 of his serves back in the court. Two second-serve aces and a winning percentage of 58% on points started with his second serve were the icing on the cake.
The stats will tell you that he served and volleyed seven times in the match. The reality is that he did it a lot more. It’s just that he did not have to volley. He “approached” the net 20 times, winning 14 of those points.
Impressed yet? That is only half of the story.
He won the majority of baseline rallies, including a 20+-shot rally early in the second set that would have been the envy of most clay-court specialists. He kept Delbonis in check with his deep backhand slices and flat forehands, never allowing the Argentine to dictate rallies with his forehand like he usually prefers to do. Lopez made 21 unforced errors in total, only one more than his opponent who is, by nature, a baseliner. Most of those were on his forehand (16), usually his weaker side.
Beyond the numbers, his forehand was an important part of his win today. He accelerated balls with it whenever he got the chance, earning five direct winners and a ton of low drives that either ended with him winning the point at the net, or forcing Delbonis into errors due to the worry that the Spaniard may follow them up to the net.
Delbonis, for a while, tried to work Feli’s backhand side knowing that, at least, Feli cannot produce winners from that side (he did not, zero for the match). However, that meant Delbonis, being a lefty himself, had to strike down-the-line forehands instead of his preferred sharp, cross-court topspin ones. That also allowed Lopez to use his lefty slice to glide balls deep into corners, making Delbonis add mileage to his legs.
Lopez bided his time during those rallies until the Argentine either went for a risky shot and missed or landed a ball short so that Feliciano could take it on the rise and approach the net with a slice. It worked to perfection. Delbonis was all but resigned in the third set. Lopez, liberated, put on a show. The nightmare ended for Delbonis in a matter of one hour and 29 minutes, by a score of 6-3 6-4 6-2.
I mentioned “one bad game” earlier for Feliciano. It happened when he was serving at 1-0 in the second set, the only game in which he did not put a single first serve in (0 for 5). He also committed his only double fault in it and made three forehand unforced errors. It was a glitch in an otherwise five-star performance. The irony is that Lopez was a perfect 14 for 14 on first-serve points won in that second set. Yet the set included the only break against him in the match. It’s just that he did not get to start any points with his first serve in that game. Stats can be tricky folks.
Let me finish by adding to Feli’s post-match conference quotes. He agreed that the quality of his serves played a key role in his high-level of performance in this match and went on to make enlightening comments about longevity and success on the ATP tour. Here are some highlights:
— On his longevity:
“I think the way I play maybe also. I think I don’t play so many rallies. Also my technique. I play quite easy, so I don’t make a huge effort in every single shot that I play. That’s also important. […] I haven’t, you know, suffered any big injuries in my career. This is the most important thing. And also mentally, I have the strength enough to be, you know, playing so many years (smiling).”
— On breaking Federer’s record of 65 consecutive Majors played:
“Well, when I was [thinking] about breaking the record, I thought, wow, I’m going to beat Federer at something, which is a lot already (laughter).”
— On what the streak represents to him: Lopez said the quote I used to begin this article and added this:
“For me, after 30 years always so important to be competitive and to challenge the best players in the world. This is what I thought at this stage of my career was the most important thing, to stay healthy and to be able to compete against these monsters, because for me I played in the past against other monsters, but after the 30s it was so important for me to stay fresh and healthy, just to challenge these animals, because they are very — the level overall is getting higher and higher in the last decade.” – Only Feli can call his peers “monsters” and “animals” and make it sound as a compliment.
— As to why players today suffer so many injuries, Lopez had an interesting take:
“I don’t know that much about specific things and technique, and probably the twohanded backhand guys have more injuries in the last years. This is something that I realize. I don’t know why. Maybe a doctor can tell you (smiling). But it is true that the two-handed backhand guys have been struggling with injuries lately more than one-handed backhand guys.”
— He also emphasized the idea of mental stress that players experience bleeding into the physicality of the game:
“Also, the stress that these guys they have every single day they compete, because they have to win every day. Also, the mental part is so important that it might be affected, you know, on your body when you step in the court and you have to win every single day […] because they have a lot of, you know, stress. They need to win every day. It’s also something that, I think, something to consider, also.”
— On the evolution of tennis over the course of his career:
“There is no players now that they specialize in one particular surface. I think the game has become more, you know, from the baseline in most of the courts. So when I started playing, it was the clay court players and the grass court and the hard court players. Now everybody plays, you know, more or less the same style, I will say. But the most important, for me, the bigger change was the power in the game.”
Lopez will face the fifth seed Juan Martin del Potro, another Argentine. Without a doubt, it will be a much tougher challenge for Lopez, although Juan Martin, for his part, may experience some of that stress that Feli noted above.
This was as close a match-up to your typical David vs. Goliath encounter as you could see in the French Open, without involving the name Rafael Nadal. It pitted Dominic Thiem, an established top-ten player who has proven himself to be one of the top clay-court performers in the ATP ranks, against Marco Cecchinato, a virtual unknown to casual tennis fans whose rise to fame dates back to… three days ago!
That’s right, hardly anyone knew the 72nd-ranked player in the world before Tuesday’s quarterfinals, even though he had defeated Pablo Carreno Busta (no.11) and David Goffin (no.9) to get there.
It took his victory over Novak Djokovic in the quarterfinals – and the dramatic fourth-set tiebreaker that ended it – for most tennis fans and some so-called experts to familiarize themselves with the Italian.
Marco Cecchinato (Photo: Cameron Spencer – Getty Images)
He is your classic clay-court player, relying on his footwork and consistency from the baseline, while possessing a great touch. He neither has any big weapons from the ground nor possesses a powerhouse serve. He can drop-shot like you have never seen before, but that does not count as a weapon in the sense that you cannot base your entire plan on drop shots – more on that later. His tenacious baseline prowess was enough to carry him to his first career ATP title in Budapest earlier this year.
Thiem got out of this tricky semifinal match-up in straight sets, which is great news for him and his fans. I called it “tricky” only insofar as David vs. Goliath match-ups go, because in terms of what Thiem needed to do, it was not that complicated…
Until Thiem took it upon himself to complicate things, at least for a while…
In my match analysis of Thiem’s quarterfinal win over Alexander Zverev, I praised Thiem’s on-court IQ during the first set. I was ready to do again in this piece, because he began the match with a good game plan, setting the tone of the baseline rallies in a way that favored him.
This main theme of this plan consisted working the backhand of his opponent with high topspin shots, making the Italian muscle the ball back above his shoulder level over and over again. That would either him into committing errors or sending back short balls on which Dominic could pounce from inside the court. It also included the use of kick serves to the backhand on the advantage side to gain the advantage early in the rallies.
Assuming that Thiem successfully imposed this game on his opponent, Cecchinato would be limited to winning points via the use of “left-over” patterns such as the ones related to the use of drop shots, big first serves, or attacks to the net.
That would spell doom for Marco because he was not going to win the match using left-over patterns like the three above. Here are the reasons why:
Firstly, you cannot build your whole game plan on the use of drop shots, because they are specialty shots, so to speak. One should use drop shots sporadically at best, and only as a tool to render the larger game plan more efficient. In fact, drop shots lose their effectiveness when used too frequently. It’s an accessory shot. It’s a risky endeavor to hit drop shots against the best athletes in the world anyway, but even beyond that, and I will be blunt here, you will go nowhere if they represent the central component of your so-called winning plan.
Cecchinato was as efficient as he could get with his use of drop shots – he hits them extremely well on both wings – and won several points with it. There are many examples to cite, such as the deuce point at 1-3 in the first set and the third point of the second set. He even won his first three points in the second-set tiebreaker with drop shots. But he was still down 3-6 because Thiem won the other six points that were mostly based on baseline rallies.
It is true that Cecchinato came back to 6-6 and had chances to win the set, but what took place after 6-3 in that tiebreaker was not related to any adjustments by Marco, but rather to some major blunders by Dominic.
Secondly, Cecchinato does not have a big first serve. Some players manage to build successful game plans on them, but Cecchinato is not that guy, his first serve is not that serve. He won a few free points (ex: first point of the 5-5 game in the first set) but they were rare. Let me sum it up in one sentence. His first-serve percentage was at 80% and yet he only recorded two aces. Need I say more?
Thirdly, Cecchinato will win some points at the net, but the day that he builds an actual winning plan around his volleys, you can start expecting Richard Gasquet to beat Rafael Nadal at the French Open and turn around and beat Roger Federer at Wimbledon a month later. Just let me know when, I’ll be around.
In short, as long as Thiem could make Cecchinato hit a ton of backhands and limit him to left-over tactics, it seemed that he should be able to walk out of Philippe Chatrier without much difficulty and with plenty left in the gas tank.
It looked as if that were exactly going to be the case when the match began. He worked Marci’s backhand and broke his serve in the first game. For example, on the 30-15 point, he hit a high-topspin, inside-out forehand to Cecchinato’s backhand and forced the Italian to hit a backhand above his shoulder. It fell short, and Thiem executed the forehand winner to the open court.
In the next point, he sent two more high-bouncing balls to Cecchinato’s backhand and the Italian missed the second one wide. Later in the game, when Cecchinato managed to get a game-point opportunity at ad-in, Thiem returned sharp cross-court with his backhand and pushed Cecchinato outside the court to retrieve a backhand. Marco missed it in the net. When Dominic had the break point at ad-out, he hit another sharp cross-court return and Marco missed it deep this time.
It got even easier on Thiem’s service game, leading 1-0, because now he had the luxury to start the point by serving to Cecchinato’s backhand. For example, he won the second point thanks to a wide, kick serve that forced the Italian to try to muscle a backhand return from way outside the boundaries of the court. He missed it wide. He held serve to confirm the early break.
Thiem kept working Marco’s backhand and kept winning a ton of points (see the 40-30 point of the 4-2 game, for yet another illustration how Thiem successfully implemented this strategy). Let me be clear. Cecchinato’s backhand is not “bad” per se. But it can break down if a powerful striker like Thiem applies relentless pressure to it. Nadal, I imagine, would have a field day with it.
Cecchinato attempted to favor the ad side to avoid that pattern. That backfired when Thiem hit clean winners to the deuce court that he was leaving open (see the 15-0 point at 3-2 for one example). Meanwhile, Thiem’s wide serves worked so well on the ad side that even when Cecchinato returned well, he still had too much ground to cover to get to the next shot.
For example, on the 15-0 point at 2-1 in the second set, Thiem pushed Cecchinato wide with a kick serve again. Marco hit a tremendous deep return. Thiem had to quickly back up a couple of steps but managed to hit the ball back to the middle of the court. It was enough to win the point, because Marco simply did not have enough time to recover back to the middle of the court.
It just seemed to make sense that Thiem would stick with this plan and cruise to a pain-free three-set victory. It turned out to be a straight-set one indeed, but definitely not free of pain.
Thiem, serving at 4-3, sent a slice backhand in the net and double-faulted to all of a sudden find himself down 0-40. He immediately went to his bread-and-butter and served three times in a row to Cecchinato’s backhand. The Italian missed the first two returns. He returned the third one in, but Thiem simply accelerated to the open deuce court to win the point. His plan was working, he simply needed to stick to the script.
What was not included in this script was missing easy put-away volleys in the net. It happens every now and then to every player, but it did not need to happen to Thiem at 4-3, deuce. And he certainly did not need to follow that up with an unforced error on a routine cross-court backhand to lose his break advantage.
At 5-5, we saw the best game of the match, featuring high-quality shot production from both players and extended rallies. Thiem ultimately broke Cecchinato’s serve, because Cecchinato, as noted above, depended on left-over tactics. He needed to either hit a big first serve or produce a winner during the rally. The game ended after Thiem forced him to hit another defensive backhand that landed short and nailed it away with his forehand.
The Austrian held serve and pocketed the first set.
Logic dictates that Thiem would go back to his working – and simple – game plan, but for some reason, he did not. He would at times go for huge, flat winners from far behind the baseline. At others, he would hit the ball to Cecchinato’s forehand when he could have easily accelerated it to the Italian’s backhand. He also did not use his wide serve nearly as much as he did against Zverev, even though it was such an obvious part of a winning plan here.
So, it was a neck-to-neck affair in the second set. It went into a tiebreaker, and it took Thiem five set points to finally win it 12-10 (on a point that started with another kick serve to the outside by him), but it should have never gone that far for Thiem. It could have also taken a very dark turn for him had Cecchinato capitalized on one of the three set-point opportunities he had himself.
First one came at 7-6, and Dominic saved it with a wide serve (Marco missed the return in the net). Second one came at 9-8 and Dominic saved that one too with a wide serve (Marco framed the backhand out). Again, the winning formula for Thiem was so clear from one end of the match to the other that I kept wondering why he tried anything else at all. He took a page out Cecchinato’s book when he saved the third set point with a beautiful drop shot.
Cecchinato’s mental resolve took a hit once he went down by two sets: “I go a little bit down with mental, and physically I play so many matches, so I think is normal,” he said after the match. Thiem echoed those sentiments: “The second-set tiebreak was the big key to the match, 100%, because obviously he felt all the matches from these two weeks after that.”
The match ended 28 minutes after that tiebreaker with the final score of 7-5 7-6 6-1 in Thiem’s favor. It was an up-and-down performance by Thiem, one that probably made some of his fans feel uneasy. His decision-making was questionable at times, not because he had a bad game plan, but because he did not stick to it. When your plan works, why stop doing it? To be clear, Thiem did not completely stop using it, but used it only in short bursts.
There is some good news for Thiem and his fans. He has not had to play any five-set matches so far, winning his last two in straight sets. He also showed high-IQ in terms of devising a working game plan against both of his last two opponents. Against Zverev he remained loyal to it all through the first set (he did not need to in the second and third ones). Against Cecchinato however, he did not, and he paid for it by playing a much closer match than he should have.
For Thiem, on-court decision-making will matter the most. The question is, can he execute his plan properly? We know that he already has one for Nadal because he literally said so in his post-match press conference: “he’s a big favorite against everybody. Still, I know how to play against him. I have a plan.”
“If I want to beat him, I have to play that way like I did in Rome and in Madrid.
But I’m also aware that here it’s tougher. He likes the conditions more here than in Madrid, for sure. Best of five is also different story. I think also a good thing is that I faced him already twice here.”
As to whether Rafa will allow that plan – or any other one – to succeed or not, that is a completely different question. That is the challenge that Thiem must overcome if he aims to go where no other tennis player has gone before, which is, to defeat Rafael Nadal in the final round of the Internationaux de France on Court Philippe Chatrier.
